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Het beeld van de beleidsmaker die zijn wil oplegt aan maatschappelijke actoren wordt meer en meer in 
vraag gesteld. De overheid wordt niet langer automatisch erkend als oppermachtig orgaan dat vanuit 
de ivoren toren de maatschappelijke welvaart maximaliseert. Daarnaast groeit bij publieke instellingen 
het besef dat hun middelen beperkt zijn in termen van financiën, kennis en mankracht. Steeds meer 
maatschappelijke groeperingen (bv. milieubewegingen, mensenrechtenorganisaties, bedrijven, 
sectorverenigingen) eisen een grotere betrokkenheid bij het beleid en vallen de monopoliepositie van 
de overheid aan. Bovendien voelen vooral bedrijven een steeds grotere druk om hun maatschappelijke 
verantwoordelijkheid op te nemen met betrekking tot economische, sociale, en ecologische impact van 
hun activiteiten. Onder het motto van ‘zelfsturing is beter dan gestuurd worden’ ontwikkelen ze op 
zelfstandige basis of in samenwerking met andere maatschappelijke actoren alternatieven voor 
overheidsregulering. We evolueren dus naar een beleid dat tot stand komt op basis van initiatieven en 
interacties tussen sociale actoren. In dit netwerkidee staat de overheid niet meer boven de 
maatschappij, maar opereert de overheid als een speler in het beleidsveld waar vele actoren actief zijn. 
In het milieubeleid hanteert men de term ‘vrijwillige initiatieven’ om de veelheid aan instrumenten die 
in dit kader zijn ontstaan, te bundelen. In tegenstelling tot de meer klassieke beleidsinstrumenten die 
afkomstig zijn van de academische tekentafel en verspreid werden onder impuls van multinationale 
instellingen zoals de VN, de OESO, en de EU, kennen deze vrijwillige initiatieven geen eenduidig 
ontwerp. Dit leidt ertoe dat er een grote diversiteit aan instrumenten is ontwikkeld waarbij de 
specifieke kenmerken in sterke mate bepaald worden door de institutionele context waarin ze worden 
ontwikkeld en ingezet. Die link tussen de institutionele context enerzijds en de verspreiding, de 
kenmerken en de performantie van vrijwillige initiatieven anderzijds, vormt het onderwerp van dit 
doctoraat.   
 
In de eerste bijdrage bekijken we welke factoren een bepalende rol speelden in de keuze van bedrijven 
om EMAS te implementeren. EMAS is een standaard voor milieumanagementsystemen ontwikkeld 
door de Europese Commissie. Het vormt een bewijs van goede praktijk op vlak van milieubeleid en 
bedrijven kunnen vrijblijvend beslissen of ze hiernaar streven of niet. We leveren dus een empirische 
bijdrage aan het onderzoek naar de kenmerken van ‘groene’ bedrijven. Uit ons onderzoek blijkt dat de 
beslissing positief wordt beïnvloed door de solvabiliteitsratio, de loonkosten en zowel de absolute 
bedrijfsgrootte als de relatieve grootte van een bedrijf ten opzichte van bedrijven uit dezelfde sector. 
De winstgevendheidgraad heeft een negatieve invloed. Daarnaast vinden we dat een gunstige 
institutionele omgeving, gemeten aan de hand van de houding van de overheid inzake EMAS, de 
introductie bevorderd.    
De tweede bijdrage gaat dieper in op deze laatste bevinding. Een logisch gevolg van de invloed van de 
institutionele context waarin bedrijven opereren is dat het aantal bedrijven dat een gecertificeerd 
milieumanagementsysteem heeft, sterk verschilt tussen landen. De tweede paper onderzoekt waarom 
landen al dan niet getypeerd kunnen worden als een gunstige institutionele omgeving. We 
onderscheiden landen van elkaar zowel op basis van de wijze waarop de overheid is georganiseerd als 
op basis van de maatschappelijke organisatie. Via deze typologie trachten we dan verschillen in de 
opname van de twee belangrijkste standaarden voor milieumanagement (ISO 14001 en EMAS) tussen 
landen te verklaren.  
 
Daar waar vorige twee bijdragen keken naar gestandaardiseerde instrumenten, handelen de laatste 
twee bijdrages over milieubeleidsovereenkomsten gesloten tussen de overheid en sectororganisaties. 
In de derde bijdrage analyseren we de impact van een wetgeving die in Vlaanderen is ingevoerd om 
dergelijke overeenkomsten juridisch meer bindend te maken. Hierbij focussen we op de verschillen in 
de kenmerken van de overeenkomsten en op de manier waarop ze door beleidsmakers worden gebruikt 
in het milieubeleid. Hieruit wordt besloten dat de wetgeving heeft geleid tot meer formele en 
gestandaardiseerde overeenkomsten, die vanuit een weloverwogen visie worden ingezet in het beleid. 
Dit komt echter tegen de prijs van een verlaagd enthousiasme bij de bedrijven, zeker in de beginjaren. 
Bovendien beknot deze wetgeving de snelheid, de flexibiliteit en de creativiteit, die echter algemeen 
beschouwd worden als de grote voordelen van dit instrument ten opzichte van klassieke regelgeving.      
 
In laatste bijdrage koppelen we de institutionele context aan de resultaten die werden behaald met 
milieubeleidsovereenkomsten. Meer bepaald onderzoeken we de verklaringskracht van de traditionele 
beleidscultuur, de aanwezigheid van een alternatief instrument, de sectorstructuur en de competitieve 
structuur op de performantie van 12 overeenkomsten. Vooral de sectorstructuur en de aanwezigheid 
van een alternatief instrument blijken een bepalende invloed te hebben in onze cases. Het 
evaluatieschema kan tevens een belangrijke rol spelen in de instrumentkeuze van beleidsmakers. 
Daarbij is het van belang op te merken dat twee factoren, namelijk de beleidscultuur als de 
aanwezigheid van een alternatief instrument, in sterke mate kunnen gemanipuleerd worden door de 
beleidsmakers om een gunstige context te scheppen voor het gebruik van 
milieubeleidsovereenkomsten. 
Preface 
 
 
This dissertation aims to provide insight into the use of voluntary approaches in environmental policy. 
In strict sense, the contribution of this dissertation is limited to the four research papers presented in 
appendix to this work.  
 
 What determines the decision to implement EMAS? A European firm level study (Bracke, 
Verbeke and Dejonckheere, 2008) 
Published in Environmental and Resource economics, 2008, forthcoming 
 
 Competing environmental management standards: How ISO 14001 outnumbered EMAS in 
Germany, France, Sweden and the UK (Bracke and Albrecht, 2007)  
Published in Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 25, 611-627. 
 
 Twenty years of negotiated environmental agreements in Belgium: from gentlemen’s 
agreements to binding contracts (Bracke and De Clercq, 2007) 
This paper builds on two research projects carried out for the Belgian and Flemish government, 
which resulted in the following publication: Milieurapport Vlaanderen: Beleidsevaluatie (MIRA-
BE 2003), hoofdstuk 4: Milieubeleidsovereenkosten ter uitvoering van de aanvaardingsplicht, 125-
162. An adapted version of this study was published as chapter in the Handbook of Environmental 
Voluntary Agreements by E. Croci (ed.), Springer, 179-202. 
 
 On the assessment of environmental voluntary agreements in Europe: lessons to be leaned 
from a comparative case study analysis (De Clercq and Bracke, 2005)  
Published as chapter in the Handbook of Environmental Voluntary Agreements by E. Croci 
(ed.), Springer, 239-260. 
 
These research papers are the result of research efforts on the overall theme of this dissertation. 
However, each paper puts forward a distinct research question and can be read on its own. The articles 
differ with respect to the subject covered as well as with respect to the research methodology used.  
 
In order to put the research papers in the perspective of the literature on voluntary approaches, we 
choose to provide a lead-text. This text has multiple objectives. First, it serves as an umbrella under 
which the stand-alone papers are embedded. To do so, the papers are introduced in a textbox when the 
lead-text discusses the “stylised facts” on the overall background of the theme. The textboxes might be 
seen as a sort of hyperlink for a detailed analysis of a specific research question. For instance, when 
the lead-text discusses the geographical diffusion of voluntary approaches, the research paper on the 
geography of ISO 14001 and EMAS (Research paper 2) will be introduced and the interested reader is 
invited to consult this work. Second, the lead-text introduces the necessary background for the reader 
with a limited knowledge on the subject. Finally, this text aims to serve as a synthesis of the literature 
on voluntary approaches. It can be consulted as a general overview by anyone who wishes to be 
introduced in the subject.  
 
The lead-text consists of 5 chapters. The first chapter introduces voluntary approaches as an 
instrument in environmental policy and discusses what distinguishes them from more traditional 
policy tools. The second chapter highlights the main drivers that explain why these new instruments 
have emerged. Chapter three deals with the uptake and geographical diffusion of voluntary 
approaches. The following chapter analyses the literature on the evaluation of this alternative policy 
instrument. Finally, chapter five concludes with an overview of the main findings of the research 
papers. The dissertation however starts with a preliminary chapter that outlines the research topic and 
the general methodological approach. We choose to label this chapter as preliminary as it is not a 
necessary condition to start the reading of the main text.  
 
Preliminary Chapter – Research topic and methodological approach 
Preliminary chapter - Research topic and methodological approach  
 
 
“In a country with many laws, chaos must be great”  
 
Confucius 
 
 
Before kicking-off with the lead-text, this preliminary chapter outlines the research topic of the 
dissertation and introduces the main methodological approach. The emergence of an alternative mode 
of governance in environmental policy-making, based on soft steering instead of harsh coercing, called 
our attention. The introduction of voluntary approaches is to be understood in this broader trend and 
forms the research topic of this dissertation. This topic is restricted in two ways. First, only those 
voluntary approaches that involve the business community are incorporated. Second, we largely leave 
aside the analysis of firm-specific initiatives taken in the context of their environmental management 
strategy. Regarding the methodological approach, this dissertation especially builds on the insights 
delivered by institutional economics. Within this broad school, we especially focus on the influence 
exerted by the institutional context on the uptake, the characteristics and the performance of voluntary 
approaches. This chapter is organized into the following two sections. The first section introduces the 
research topic, indicates the relevance of the subject and sets some boundaries. Section two introduces 
institutional economics, which provides the main theoretical and methodological background of this 
dissertation. This section ends with an overview of the research papers presented in this dissertation.  
 
 
1. Research topic 
 
1.1. Introducing the research topic 
 
More and more, the choice of instruments occupies a central place in the study of government 
regulation, as is shown e.g. in Hill (1997). It is by the selection of instruments that the government 
steers actors’ behaviour. The instrument that is selected determines the incentives polluters are 
confronted with. Moreover, different instruments entail diverging distributions of the costs and 
benefits of policy making among the actors involved in a policy setting. The instrument-choice 
perspective on government regulation has been described as one of the dominant approaches in the 
study of government regulation in Canada and the US (Hill, 1997).  
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Environmental policy has traditionally relied on the command-and-control type of direct regulation. In 
the eighties, market-based instruments (e.g. taxes, emission trading systems, subsidies) were added to 
the regulators’ toolbox. More recently, various types of voluntary approaches have further widened the 
set of instruments at the disposal of policy makers. Traditionally, voluntary approaches are classified 
into three categories: unilateral commitments, public voluntary schemes and negotiated agreements 
(see chapter 1). Figure I presents a diagram of the research topic and gives some examples for each 
category of voluntary approaches. 
 
Figure I: Diagram of the research subject 
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In the diagram, voluntary approaches are consciously placed in between direct regulation and market-
based instruments on the one hand and at a somewhat lower level on the other hand. First, we have put 
voluntary approaches in between the other instrument types. When the regulator resorts to the use of 
direct regulation, he constrains the behaviour of the regulated actors directly. The contrary holds for 
market-based instruments. Hereby actors are free to choose how they react to the policy intervention. 
The government simply defines property rights, introduces eco-taxes or subsidies and leaves the rest 
up to the market. Voluntary approaches hold an intermediate position. They rely both on spontaneous 
market-based reactions as well as on a subtle and non-coercive but nevertheless steering intervention 
of the government. Placing voluntary approaches on a lower level reflects the fact that, in contrast to 
the other two instrument groups, policy-makers do not unilaterally impose voluntary approaches. 
Rather they are developed through interactive processes between regulators, regulated and other 
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stakeholders. The degree of involvement of various parties varies for different sorts of voluntary 
approaches. Negotiated agreements for instance, frequently rely on strong government involvement 
and regulatory pressure. As such, they bear close resemblance to direct regulation. Unilateral 
commitments on the other hand are rather initiated by companies themselves and are situated more on 
the market-based instruments’ side. Such initiatives come very close to spontaneous self-regulation. 
De Clercq (2002) claims that the voluntary character of voluntary approaches should be nuanced in 
two ways (De Clercq, 2002): 
 In many cases the voluntary character is relative as companies voluntary take such initiatives 
to alleviate regulatory or market-related pressures. By acting pro-actively, companies seek to 
prevent government intervention or seek to avoid actions by stakeholders that are deemed 
more damaging to their interests.  
 Often the voluntary character is limited to certain aspects of the voluntary approach. 
Sometimes the government unilaterally determines the program and the voluntary aspect only 
concerns the decision whether to participate or not. In other cases, part of the action has to be 
negotiated with the government or only concerns the way in which formally established 
targets would be met. 
 
The diagram also depicts the context in which the different instruments operate. Direct regulation is 
linked with an interventionist way of thinking. As firms are expected to ignore environmental 
considerations, legislative intervention is deemed necessary. This interventionist-ideology lives on 
within economic instruments. However, the idea that a more efficient and less prescriptive way of 
regulating is possible, gains support. Environmental problems that result from market failure should be 
tackled using market mechanisms. Free-market thinking becomes central. For voluntary approaches, 
however, this interventionist thinking is losing its dominant position. Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) is the context wherein these approaches thrive. CSR captures the notion that multiple actors, 
e.g. companies, social groups, trade unions and government institutions, increasingly consider the 
wider interests of society in all aspects of their operations. Actors believe they should take 
responsibility for the impacts of their activities on their stakeholders. In such a context, interventionist 
action becomes less significant. Policy-makers rather encourage CSR-thinking in society. They “pick-
up and stimulate” activities that are going on within and between private and non-governmental actors. 
The development of environmental management standards forms a nice example in this regard. Some 
pro-active companies have started to draw up environmental management systems. Subsequently, a 
wide range of actors including business associations, environmental pressure groups and government 
bodies have, in cooperation, developed general standards for environmental management. Finally, 
policy-makers have begun to encourage the uptake of these standards by companies. The top-down 
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approach of government intervention is more and more substituted by a bottom-up approach building 
on societal initiatives.  
 
Within the broad spectre of voluntary approaches, we restrict the subject in two ways:  
 First, only approaches that involve the business community (companies or industrial 
organisations) are considered. Communication and incentive-based measures targeted at the 
public at large, like campaigns to stimulate insulation, to promote the adoption of solar-based 
heating systems or programs aiming at waste prevention, are thus outside the scope of our 
research. In addition, we exclude voluntary initiatives between public authorities (e.g. 
agreements between the central government and municipalities). This business community 
focus is motivated by the fact that voluntary pollution abatement is generally regarded as 
contradictory to companies’ profit maximising purpose. This makes the existence of voluntary 
abatement initiatives puzzling. Besides, the growing dominance of the business community in 
modern economies implies firms are essential actors to be involved when setting up a 
transformation process towards a sustainable society.  
 Second, we pay only limited attention to firm-specific initiatives (e.g. environmental and 
social reporting) initiated under their green management strategy. Within the diagram, these 
initiatives fall under the denominator of unilateral commitments. Within this group we limit 
ourselves to industry- or business wide initiatives like the chemical industry’s Responsible 
Care Program or the ISO 14001 environmental management standard. Rather than taking a 
strategic and managerial company perspective, we analyse voluntary approaches within the 
context of public policy and mostly focus on the approaches in which the government still 
plays a pivotal position, i.e. public voluntary schemes and negotiated agreements. In other 
words, this dissertation does not aim to assist the environmental manager in developing a 
concrete CSR strategy for his company. 
 
 
1.2. Relevance of the research topic 
 
Why is the study of voluntary approaches a relevant subject for a doctoral dissertation? At the bottom 
line, the answer lies in the fact that this type of non-mandatory governance is gaining importance in 
contemporary environmental policy making, especially in developed countries. Voluntary approaches 
are said to form the third wave of environmental policy making (Croci, 2005). The first wave consists 
of direct regulation; the second concerns the introduction of market-based instruments. The last 
decennia, a shift has been noticed from hard governance models to types of soft steering. It should 
nevertheless be emphasized that neither the direct regulation approach nor the market-based one has 
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decreased in significance (Jordan et al, 2003). As such, it may be more appropriate to speak of a 
downstream that supplements the other two waves. A downstream of which the roots are situated in 
society rather than within autonomous government bodies.  
 
Especially in the beginning of the nineties, a significant increase has been noted in the use of voluntary 
approaches (OECD, 1999). However, for negotiated agreements, the earliest example already goes 
back as early as the year 1964 when the Japanese city of Yokohama and the electric power company 
(Electric Source Development Corporation) signed an agreement in which the corporation committed 
itself to comply with more stringent pollution control measures than the existing national emission 
standards (OECD, 1999). In Europe, the first agreement is found in France, signed in 1971 between 
the cement industry and the Ministry of the Environment (OECD, 1999). The first Belgian agreement 
dates from 1988. The agreement was concluded with the battery industry and aimed to reduce the 
amount of mercury in primary batteries sold in Belgium.   
 
Since these early examples of voluntary approaches, multiple governments and international 
organisations have began to promote this type of governance. In the Netherlands, negotiated 
agreements between government and industry representatives are considered the key instrument for 
implementing the ambitious goals set out in the National Environmental Policy Plan of 1989 
(Glasbergen, 1998). In 1994, the German government declared she had a general preference for 
voluntary agreements above traditional regulatory instruments (Wurzel et al., 2003). Supplementing 
regulatory measures by other policy instruments, such as agreements with industry, was one of the key 
objectives of the European Commission’s fifth Environmental Action Programme of 1992. 
Agreements were thought to promote a pro-active attitude on the part of industry, to provide cost-
effective, tailor-made solutions and to allow for a quicker and smoother achievement of environmental 
objectives. In 1996 the Commission produced a Communication on the use of such agreements, which 
included a number of general guidelines that were intended to ensure their effectiveness, credibility 
and transparency (EC, 1996). This focus on cooperative approaches with industry is repeated in the 
sixth Environmental Action Programme of 2002, especially for managing complex risks where 
knowledge on the scale of the problem and on the availability of solutions is limited (Knill and 
Lenschow, 2003).  
 
Next to the mere observation of the growing use of this instrument (see chapter 3 for illustrations of 
this trend), the relevance of studying voluntary approaches especially lies in the fact that there is still 
lively debate on their merits for environmental protection. The pros and cons of this instrument are 
still incompletely mapped out. One of the main reasons for this lies in the fact that voluntary 
approaches are developed by practitioners in order to cope with the increasing costs and obstacles met 
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when introducing traditional policy instruments. Voluntary approaches, so to say, ‘developed 
spontaneously’ as a pragmatic response to overcome political, social or economic constraints in 
environmental policy-making. Consequently, voluntary approaches have appeared in a high diversity 
of formats and subtypes. However, to a large extent the same holds for other policy instruments. Many 
instrument are implemented as a quick response to rising issues or as the result of a coincidence of 
contingencies that occurred in a specific context rather than as the result of a well-considered element 
in a long-term policy strategy. In Belgium, for instance, the introduction of green taxes is explained as 
an unintended side effect of the State Reform of 1993 (De Clercq, 1996). What however differs is that 
compared to direct regulation and market-based instruments, for which theory to some extent preceded 
practice, theory and practice have developed simultaneously for voluntary approaches (OECD, 1999). 
Maybe this explains why in contrast to direct regulation and market-based instruments, the theoretical 
analysis of voluntary approaches is not that developed.   
 
The on-going debate on the merits of this new type of governance partly results from the notion of 
voluntarism, which contrasts with the simplicity of the coercive regulatory model. This latter model 
builds on a unilateral relation between the policy maker who commands and the private sector who 
obeys (although in practice this model often involves rather intense consultations with the private 
sector making the label ‘negotiated regulation’ maybe more appropriate). Moreover, this latter model 
entails an attractive appeal by implying a moral rejection of polluting behaviour. Whereas direct 
regulation is considered as a strong signal from a powerful regulator, voluntary approaches are 
situated somewhere between public policy and corporate strategy. On the one hand, government 
involvement in many voluntary approaches is intense by limiting the voluntary aspect only to the 
decision whether to participate or not or to the way in which a given target is met. On the other hand, 
the involvement and approval by the business community imply that these instruments cannot be 
placed on the same line with traditional policy instruments. Voluntary approaches may be used as an 
element in the wider corporate social responsibility strategy of a company. Are regulators influencing 
companies by soft signals or are companies influencing regulators and the public at large by adopting 
pro-active strategies to create an image of trust and belief in corporations? Are voluntary approaches 
serving public or rather private interests? 
 
 
1.3. Voluntary approaches compared to traditional policy instruments 
 
The observation of the growing interest in and use of voluntary approaches raises the question: why is 
this happening? In many textbooks on environmental economics (e.g. Tietenberg, 2003) voluntary 
approaches are hardly mentioned. In fact, in a perfect world, there are no convincing arguments for 
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using voluntary approaches instead of command and control policy or economic instruments. The 
standard approach is to consider the government as a single, rational actor with perfect information 
and without costs in decision-making or enforcement. First, the optimal abatement level is determined 
as the point where the marginal abatement cost equals the marginal damage cost. Consequently, the 
government issues a regulation mandating this emission level. Alternatively, the government can 
impose a tax on pollution. The level of the tax should reflect the intersection of the marginal 
abatement cost and the marginal damage curve. Independent of the instrument put in place, if they are 
adequately implemented and controlled; the optimal level of pollution will be achieved (Barde, 2000). 
Economists generally express their preference for taxes as these have an additional advantage over the 
command and control approach. This is the fact that taxes are cost-efficient, i.e. they reach a certain 
abatement level at minimal cost.  
 
So how to explain the current interest in voluntary approaches? In other words, why do command and 
control regulations or MBIs sometimes fail? In short, the answer is because theory does not equal 
practice. In an imperfect world, all instruments are imperfect. In this setting, the choice of instrument 
should be based on a comparison of an imperfect solution within a specific context with another 
imperfect solution and sort out which is to be preferred (OECD, 1999). There are two important 
constraints. First, governments are often confronted with limited information. Command and control 
regulation often comes in the way of prescribing certain emission standards, process standards or 
product standards. This places a high information burden on governments to gather all the necessary 
information and to keep up with scientific and technological progress. What is the optimal level of 
sulphur dioxide in the atmosphere? How many sources emit sulphur dioxide? Which abatement 
technology exists? At what cost? These are just a few questions the policy maker must answer. 
Market-based instruments require somewhat less information as the question of how emissions are to 
be reduced, is left to be solved by the companies. The question of the level of the environmental tax 
however remains. For environmental taxes to be optimal, their level should equal the marginal social 
cost of pollution. This is a difficult question to answer. The future ecological damage of greenhouse 
gases or SO2 and NOx, for instance is very difficult to estimate (Albrecht, 2006). In addition, optimal 
taxes need to be differentiated according to the different pollutants, the mix of pollutants, the sources 
of pollution and their location, the amount of pollution and the timing of the pollution (Albrecht, 
2006). As this information burden on governments (for command and control as well as economic 
instruments) increases with the number of environmental problems and emission sources, it might 
become a prohibitive obstacle. Often this is referred to as the diminishing returns of regulation. Once 
the major sources are tackled, the additional gain from new regulations declines. In addition, more and 
more it is acknowledged that there is neither the need nor the possibility to impose indefinitely more 
 7
Preliminary Chapter – Research topic and methodological approach 
and more stringent standards to address different forms of pollution. The same is true for economic 
instruments (Drente, 1995).  
 
The second important constraint for a proper introduction of direct regulations or market-based 
instruments concerns the existence of various implementation problems. These problems thus arise 
even if the government is perfectly informed e.g. about the optimal abatement technology, emission 
standard or environmental tax level. For command and control policy, a major issue is the need for 
control and enforcement of the regulation. This especially holds when the number of pollution sources 
is high, sources are mobile and diffuse. Barde (2000) claims that it is generally acknowledged that the 
level of enforcement is weak, mainly owing to the low number of controls, and the great number of 
administrative requirements, staff and legal procedures in case of non-compliance. Looking at 
economic instruments, a recurrent implementation barrier is the fact that the proper tax base must be 
measurable at reasonable cost. Albrecht (2006) attributes the lack of pollution taxes in Europe simply 
because emissions of toxic pollutants are not widely measured. As such, implementing pollution taxes 
requires strong initial investments in monitoring infrastructures. Pigou himself even assumed that in 
real life the administrative costs of taxes could outweigh the benefits from externality reduction. In 
addition, Pigou was also critical of the bureaucracy and openly sceptical of the abilities of local 
authorities to undertake effective market intervention (Andersen, 1994). 
 
Next to the information and implementation problems that often occur with traditional instruments, 
there are a number of disadvantages that are related to the instruments themselves. Command and 
control regulation lacks incentives for technological progress (Tietenberg, 2003). In addition, when 
technological progress occurs, it takes a long time before it is embodied in new regulations and 
standards (Barde, 2000). Besides, there is a delicate trade off between adapting standards to 
technological innovation on the one hand and providing sufficient stability for companies on the other 
Tietenberg, 2003). Concerning economic instruments, the main additional barrier is of political nature. 
Industry largely remains opposing environmental taxes based on competitiveness grounds and prefers 
regulations (Barde, 2000; Albrecht, 2006).  Another disadvantage is that it might lead to the creation 
of hot spots as the abatement reductions are allocated based on economic instead of ecological criteria. 
 
Voluntary approaches have some potential to reduce both the information and the implementation 
problem. Regarding the lack of information, voluntary approaches contribute because of the business 
involvement in their development. Besides, many voluntary approaches are relatively vague. 
Negotiated agreements, for instance, often only define an industry-wide target for the reduction of 
some emission within a number of years. Another example are environmental management systems, 
which require companies to monitor and improve the environmental impact of their activities. As such, 
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these systems shift the responsibility for gathering information to companies. In the same manner, 
many implementation issues are shifted to the companies. The companies themselves are free to 
determine how they will comply with the target of the voluntary approach and periodically report to 
the government concerning the progress made. In many cases, business associations and external 
private companies (auditing companies, certification bureaus, consultants etc.) take over tasks related 
to coordination and monitoring which otherwise fall under the responsibility of public agencies and 
policy-makers. Basically, the government only needs to check the outcomes of the voluntary 
approaches. 
 
Finally, voluntary approaches better fit in a policy that is oriented towards sustainability. Traditional 
regulation rather departs from what Tietenberg (2003) calls a toxicological policy approach. It departs 
from the idea that emissions above a certain threshold level result in welfare losses and should 
therefore be avoided. This way, policy-making is reduced to a fragmented and technical exercise. 
Voluntary approaches on the other hand actively involve businesses and encourage corporate 
responsibility. This is more in line with the notion of sustainable development compared to installing 
some kind of end-of-pipe technology. Many unilateral commitments and public schemes (e.g. 
management systems; energy labels) emphasize such a holistic approach instead of the fragmented 
approach of traditional instruments.    
 
 
2. Methodological approach 
 
2.1. Institutional economics in a nutshell  
 
In their recent bestseller ‘Freakonomics’, Levitt and Dubner (2005) claim that economics should be 
‘brought back to its roots’, which is, the study of how people react on incentives. Despite growing 
complexity and downright deceit, it is argued, the modern world is not impenetrable or unknowable. 
All it takes is a new way of looking. Economics should study how the world actually works, not how it 
ought to work. Levitt and Dubner (2005) acknowledge that prices provide strong incentives to steer 
behaviour. However, they are not the sole drivers of behaviour. Social acceptance, rules, shared values 
or common beliefs also provide pillars on which people rely to make choices. In a way, this is the core 
belief of institutional economists.  
 
Institutional economics has been developed around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. The first 
institutional economists challenged mainstream (neo-)classical economics and dominated American 
economics in the beginning of the twentieth century (Hodgson, 2000). The basic assumptions of 
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classical economics were considered too abstract and rationalistic, and as such, inadequate to grasp the 
complexities of reality. Keynes’ inspiring work took over the leading role in post-war economic 
thinking. However, by the works of, amongst others, Coase, Williamson and North, the institutional 
perspective has revitalised under the denominator of ‘new institutional economics’, labelled as such by 
Williamson in 1975.  
 
Institutional economics departs from the idea that behaviour is to be explained by the influence 
exerted by institutions rather than by the assumption of the homo-economicus. In 1919, Hamilton 
argued the most important defect of neo-classical economics is that: “it neglected the influence 
exercised over conduct by the scheme of institutions under which one lives and must seek his good” 
(cited in Hodgson, 2000, p. 324). Institutionalism does not take the individual as a given, holistic 
entity that is completely rational and only seeks to maximise his personal welfare. Rather, individuals 
are affected by their institutional and cultural situation. People’s actions are driven by habits and rules 
rather than by purely rationalist thinking (Hodgson, 1998). These habits show persistence over time as 
they are to a large extent guided by institutions. After all, people are born into and socialized within a 
world of pre-existing institutions. Institutions provide stability by buffering and constraining the 
diverse and variable actions of many agents (Hodgson, 1998). 
 
Typical for institutionalistic thinking is that it defines institutions broadly. A commonly adopted 
definition is the one from North who defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (North 1990 p.3). Institutions involve both formal (e.g. constitutions, laws, 
agreements, contracts) and informal (e.g. habits, social conventions, beliefs, norms, codes of conduct) 
constraints. They encompass organizations (banks, corporations, universities…) but also integrated 
and systematic social entities such as money, language, and law (Hodgson, 1998). These institutions 
lay down the ‘rules of the game’ that govern individual behaviour and structure social interaction. 
Thereby institutions are interpreted much broader than government bodies or their outputs in the form 
of laws and regulations. Even if the state is absent, people rely on customs, cultural and social norms, 
routines and conventions to guide their actions.  
 
It is important to notice that at its core, institutional economics does not simply postulates that 
‘institutions matter’. More fundamental is the premise that there is a strong interaction between 
individuals and institutions, as shown in figure II. The imitation and emulation of behaviour leads to 
the spread of habits, and to the emergence or reinforcement of formal or informal institutions. 
Institutions are formed and changed by individuals. In turn, institutions foster and underline particular 
behaviours and habits, and help transmit them to new members of the group. Individuals are 
influenced and constrained by institutions. Through this mutual dependence of institutions upon 
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individuals and the moulding of individuals by institutions, institutions are endowed with a stable and 
inert quality (Hodgson, 1998). Individual habits both reinforce and are reinforced by institutions. 
 
Figure II: The institutionalist action-information loop 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information 
INSTITUTIONS 
INDIVIDUALS 
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 Source: Hodgson, 1998 
 
Institutional economics does however not adopt a static perspective. Institutional economics focuses 
on learning and evolution rather than assuming stable preferences and general equilibrium. In essence, 
institutional economics questions why certain institutions have been developed and not others, how 
they evolve and eventually might disappear (Menard and Shirley, 2005). The important notions of 
inertia and path-dependency do not rule out change. Habits and routines may adapt slowly as agents 
seek new ways to improve living conditions in a continuously changing world. Institutional 
arrangements on their side have to compete with alternative coordination mechanisms and have to 
adapt to changing circumstances or will become obsolete. As institutions are evoked to fulfil a role in 
society, they ought to change with changes in society (Hazeu, 2000). As such, institutionalism is 
sometimes described as “evolutionary economics” (Hodgson, 1998). Change is however expected to 
be incremental: it will occur by small steps and is path dependent. Path dependency refers to the fact 
that choices made in the past constrain the options for the future. This is explained by adaptation costs 
that go along with institutional change. Given the internally generated stability, breaking lock-in 
situations often requires exogenous pressures in the form of external shocks or crises (e.g. 
technological breakthroughs, social movements or environmental disasters) (Unruh, 2002).  
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2.2. Methodological approach in institutional economics 
 
The mainstream neoclassical economic approach, which relies on developing mathematical models 
aiming to maximise profits, utility or welfare, is only partly suited as methodological approach for 
institutional economics. The usual critique to modelling holds: simplifications and limiting 
assumptions create discrepancies between the model and reality. In addition, the emphasis on 
institutions as driver of behaviour rather than assuming perfectly informed rational agents limits the 
usefulness of the classical modelling technique. However, institutionalists have no powerful 
alternative to offer. Institutional economics has no general theory (Hodgson, 2000), nor a single, 
agreed set of definitive methodological guidelines (Manson and Shirley, 2005). Nevertheless, 
Hodgson (1998) gives some elements that distinguish institutional economics from the mainstream 
economic approach: 
 An emphasis on institutional and cultural factors; 
 The interdisciplinary character of analysis, recognizing insights from politics, sociology, 
psychology, and other sciences; 
 Belief in habit as driver of behaviour next to the rational, utility-maximizing agent; 
 The analysis starts from stylized facts and theoretical conjectures concerning causal 
mechanisms instead of mathematical models; 
 Extensive use of historical and comparative empirical material concerning socio-economic 
institutions. 
 
An important characteristic of institutional research is the multidisciplinary approach. Institutional 
analysts adapt useful concepts and methodologies from political science, sociology, law, 
anthropology, cognitive science, evolutionary biology and any other discipline that sheds light on the 
norms, rules and beliefs that govern human interactions in the process of production and exchange 
(Hodgson, 2000). Hazeu (2000) claims that institutional economics foremost brings along new 
concepts: ways of thinking about issues, explaining their existence, providing insight on the world etc. 
Consequently, the institutional approach is not the sole territory of economists but is adopted by a 
wide range of scholars including sociologists, legal, public and political scientists and historians. Their 
research has produced a wide spectrum of studies bound to a specific historical and institutional 
context. These studies especially provide ex-post explanations for existing phenomena (Hazeu, 2000). 
They are mostly descriptive in nature and aim to provide insight on underlying causal correlations. 
Hodgson (1998) states that this approach is arguably of more operational value than seeking to 
develop an all-embracing general theory.  
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2.3. Voluntary approaches from an institutional economic perspective 
 
Mainstream economic considerations were largely unable to explain the instrument choice that has 
occurred in environmental policy making. From an economic perspective, the limited use of market-
based instruments, for instance, is puzzling. We believe that an institutional economic perspective 
might contribute to our understanding of the instrument selection process. After all, instruments are 
not chosen and developed by economists but rather by legal scholars, technicians and bureaucrats, 
which may have idiosyncratic objectives that divert from social welfare. Hahn (1989) states that 
decisions of policy makers should be regarded from their primal tendency of acquiring political 
support from the various actors in a policy setting. This is not saying that the “wrong” people are 
shaping politics but rather that a purely welfare-based approach might be incomplete. As Bressers and 
Huitema (1999 p. 175) state “it’s not a question of “good science” versus “bad politics”, but a 
recognition that politics has a rationality of its own.” Further they claim that a combination of insights 
from political economy and political science can produce more adequate explanations concerning the 
choice of instrument compared to classical rational choice models. In other words, policy-making is an 
independent arena that requires its own mode of scientific analysis rather than a classical economic 
approach. One of the main arguments put forward is that next to cost-effectiveness, a number of 
additional criteria are taken in account by policy makers, e.g. the impacts on competitiveness, 
distribution effects, the “implementability”, the correspondence with existing regulations and 
regulating traditions and the flexibility of the instrument (Bressers and Huitema, 1999). Besides, 
whereas institutional economics originally focused especially on industrial organisation, interest in 
public or governance questions is growing (Hazeu, 2000). In the following two subsections, we will 
first explain voluntary approaches from a transaction cost perspective and then discuss the importance 
of trust on transaction costs.  
 
2.3.1.   Transaction costs and coordination mechanisms 
 
Institutional economists point to the existence of alternative ways for solving coordination problems in 
society, i.e. ways to organise social interactions and cooperation in order to increase social welfare. 
The following three systems are distinguished (Matthijs, et al., 2005): 
 Hierarchy: consists of coordination mechanisms based on a bureaucracy or administration 
from which central decisions, embodied in enforceable rules are taken. The application of the 
rules is guaranteed by control and enforcement. In this system, information costs are carried 
by the hierarchical system. 
 Markets: depend on decentralised decision-making whereby buyers and sellers take decisions 
based on prices and contracts. In this system, the individual actors in the market carry the 
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information costs. The actors require information about potential products, suppliers, prices, 
quality etc. 
 Networks: consist of a horizontal coordination mechanism whereby actors rely on loyalty, 
trust and reciprocity to achieve cooperative and consensus-minded patterns of interaction and 
decisions. Networks refer to a multitude of coordination systems that cannot be classified as 
hierarchic or market-based (e.g. families, social groups, sector associations etc.). Interactions 
between members of the network are based on persuasion, information-sharing and personal 
contacts leading to mutual trust and loyalty.  
 
These three coordination mechanisms correspond to a great extent with the tripartite classification of 
policy instruments introduced in section 1.1. (direct regulation, MBIs and voluntary approaches). This 
match is however not perfect. Voluntary approaches, for instance, can be found in market systems 
(e.g. eco-labels) and networks (e.g. negotiated agreements).    
 
As such, there are three alternative ways to solve coordination problems in society. In deciding which 
system is to be preferred, the transaction costs that are associated with each system are crucial. 
Transaction costs are costs needed to bring about transactions, e.g. searching sellers/buyers, 
negotiating contracts, considering alternative products based on price and quality, controlling the 
compliance of the transactions etc. The argument that the level of transaction costs determines which 
coordination mechanisms is to be preferred, is familiar to economists since Coase (1937) used it to 
explain the existence of firms. According to Coase, firms, which are a hierarchic system, exist because 
they involve lower transaction costs than when all their activities would have to be carried out by 
market transactions. This reasoning can also be used to explain related issues as the scale of a 
company (make-or-buy decision) or the degree of product differentiation within a company. This 
perspective explains e.g. why large companies moved from conglomerates back to their core business 
in the last decennia. The transaction costs associated with using the market have decreased as markets 
have become more efficient and transparent due to for instance, the formation of the single European 
market, the Internet and the market orientation of former communist countries. The key point is that 
the question which coordination system one should use is a contingent decision: it depends on the 
circumstances as these determine the related transaction costs. Consequently, the way of organizing is 
inherently dynamic. Transactions will shift between markets, hierarchic systems or even networks as a 
function of the transaction costs under these alternatives (Douma and Schreuder, 1991).  
 
A similar reasoning can be applied to policy-making questions. As circumstances change, alternatives 
to direct regulation (hierarchic mode) might become more appropriate. Hazeu (1999) claims that in 
general terms, markets and market-like mechanisms are becoming increasingly more efficient whereas 
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hierarchical regulation is becoming a less efficient solution. In explaining the causes of this shift, 
Hazeu points to the development of ICT technology and the increasing pluralism of society (e.g. 
increasing number of pressure groups). For environmental issues, we can certainly add the high 
complexity of contemporary environmental problems leading to increasing information costs. As 
argued, there is an important information difference between hierarchic systems on the one hand and 
markets and networks on the other. In the former, information costs are to be carried solely by the 
hierarchic authority whereas the costs are shared in the latter systems. When resorting to a direct 
regulatory policy, it is the policy-makers’ task to gather the necessary information. In addition, the 
government needs to set up agencies that will administer the regulatory system. In other words, 
intervention comes at the expense of transaction costs. When transaction costs are high (e.g. 
information is hard to get for policy-makers), implementing an optimal policy response will be costly. 
In fact, the recognition of transaction costs implies that government measures cannot be designed 
perfectly ex ante: it would be prohibitively costly to do so (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, policy 
responses are likely to be sub-optimal. They are developed with limited information in a context of 
bounded rationality and increasing the policy capacities comes at the expense of transaction costs. 
Besides, it is impossible to incorporate all possible contingencies. As such, government measures are 
likely to miss some prevailing interdependencies and fail to anticipate emerging ones.  
 
Confronted with the rising transaction costs of traditional policy-making due to increasing complexity 
of environmental problems and the number of involved actors (polluters as well as pressure groups), 
alternative coordination systems become more attractive. They might succeed in limiting transaction 
costs by sharing the responsibility with other actors in society that are in a better position to obtain the 
necessary information. The development of environmental management standards or eco-labels for 
instance, is in many occasions shared with the business community and environmental organizations 
in order to overcome the high information costs for government. The government simply had 
insufficient knowledge on how these schemes should look like.  
 
2.3.2.  Trust and transaction costs 
 
Next to information costs, costs associated with uncertainty are an important element of transaction 
costs and might be relevant for understanding the policy shift towards network-based policy-making. 
In fact, uncertainty results from incomplete information. A major topic in institutional economics is 
the study of incomplete contracts due to limited and asymmetric information (Williamson, 1985). The 
latter imply uncertainty for the contracting parties. Reducing this uncertainty requires resources from 
the contracting parties (Hazeu, 2000). Sellers have to invest in signalling the attributes of their 
product, buyers need to screen products and producers to ensure themselves of the price-quality ratio. 
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Besides, both need to invest to get the contract “waterproof”, e.g. by including enforcement 
mechanisms and sanctioning stipulations in case one of the parties brakes the contract. In this regard, 
trust between the parties is very important as trust reduces the need for such investments that aim to 
reduce the uncertainty involved in transactions. The more trust between the parties, the less they need 
to check the quality of the products, the less they need to make sure the other will comply etc. As 
such, trust smoothens transactions and thus stimulates economic growth. “Money makes the world go 
round” so the saying goes. Institutional economists grant a similar function to trust and some go as far 
as to claim that trust is highly important in explaining long-term economic growth differences between 
countries (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997; North, 1990). To conclude, the higher the level of trust, the 
less the parties have to resort to a contractual, legalistic approach for concluding transactions. In other 
words, by being based on mutual trust, network-based coordination mechanisms reduce transaction 
costs associated with contractual arrangements.  
 
This leads to the question how trust is developed. At the bottom line, it is by repeated and positive 
interactions between parties that trust is build over time (North, 1990). This might explain why trust is 
higher in modern market-based economies compared to former communist or low developed 
economies. Modern market-based economies rely heavily on numerous transactions conducted 
between rather unfamiliar parties i.e. parties that are not linked to each other by friendly or familial 
bonds. These numerous interactions can only occur in a climate of trust and this will, over time, 
increase the level of trust. This also fits with the observation that voluntary approaches in 
environmental policy are especially popular in modern market-based economies.  
 
The notion of trust and social capital refers to the accumulation of trust that exists between the 
members of a society. Social capital refers to trust between members of society and trust in institutions 
(Hazeu, 2000). We believe this social capital perspective can also be applied to explain the existence 
of voluntary approaches in environmental policy. As explained above, trust between actors involved in 
the policy-making process lessens the need to rely on a legalistic approach. The importance of 
environmental policy has grown steadily since the sixties-seventies in modern economies. 
Consequently, repeated interaction between the different players in this arena through consultation and 
negotiation enabled trust to be built. The resulting social capital, in turn, has paved the way for a more 
voluntary and less legalistic policy-making approach. The fact that social capital facilitates the 
conclusion of contracts might be an important condition for a successful use of voluntary approaches. 
As voluntary approaches often have neither the force of law nor do they provide the juridical 
enforcement options of private contracts, trust among partners is essential. The fact that solving 
environmental conflicts is usually a long-lasting process involving multiple interactions between 
concerned actors increases this importance. After all, trust is hard to develop but easily broken down.  
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The importance of social capital can also be approached from the principle-agent problem. How can 
the principal (the government) ensure that the agent (the companies) to which he delegated a task will 
devote sufficient effort to it? Institutional economics learns that the harder it is to control the outcome 
(e.g. difficult to monitor, hard to specify quantitative targets, no available indicators) the more it pays 
to invest in the creation of a common culture and shared values (Hazeu, 2000). The principal should 
convince the agent that they share a common objective. In many occasions, voluntary approaches are 
implemented in such circumstances: complex environmental problems for which limited knowledge 
on the way to proceed is available.  
 
 
2.4. The theoretical perspective adopted in this dissertation 
 
After the elementary introduction into institutional economics and the institutional explanation of the 
emergence of voluntary approaches, this section discusses the main institutional elements we adopt in 
our research papers. The primal focus of the research papers concerns the influence of the institutional 
context upon the uptake, the characteristics and the performance of voluntary approaches. The papers 
thus depart from the basic assumption that institutions matter for explaining the outcomes of decision-
making processes of agents. This is not to say that we abolish the idea of rational behaviour. We 
acknowledge important institutional concepts like habit formation, limited cognitive decision-making 
abilities and bounded rationality. However, we believe in the dominant influence of a rational cost-
benefit analysis in decision-making processes. In our view, the institutional setting yields an important 
influence by altering the costs and benefits of a certain action. Institutions result in incentive structures 
that alter agents’ preferences on alternatives trough their influence of the related costs and benefits. 
For instance, the cost of failing to comply with a negotiated agreement will be much higher for a 
company that has a tradition of close and cooperative relations with the state.  
 
As a consequence of the focus on the role of the institutional setting on the outcomes of decision-
making processes, the research papers pay attention to factors of the institutional environment that 
may be important for understanding the uptake, characteristics and performance of voluntary 
approaches. Thereby we considered a wide range of elements from the formal juridical setting in 
which a certain voluntary instrument is implemented to informal elements like the traditional policy 
style of a country or the general organization of society. To do so, we will mostly rely on a 
descriptive-comparative case study analysis in which we pay attention to legal, economic and political 
aspects. Both the focus on the role of institutions as well as the methodological approach are two basic 
characteristics of institutional economic research.  
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Before we proceed with a more detailed presentation of the research papers, we first briefly discuss an 
alternative theoretical perspective for analysing voluntary approaches: public choice. Public choice 
theory seeks tot explain political actions based on the self-interests of the actors in the policy field: 
voters, policy-makers, pressure groups and public servants. Public choice offers an explanation why 
voluntary approaches, which are often considered as second-best solutions, might be selected as a 
policy instrument. Kirchgässner and Schneider (2003) argue that voluntary agreements can be seen as 
a sort of symbolic policy in the sense that they only establish business-as-usual trends. For both parties 
however, the advance lies in the fact that the agreement can be sold to the public as a success. For 
policy-makers it might offer a possibility to ‘score’. Without jeopardizing good relations with 
powerful industrial players, they can present a solution to the public by pointing to the voluntary 
approach. In this regard, it is important to note that voluntary approaches are usually much faster to 
realise and easier to implement compared to regulatory instruments. In addition, voluntary approaches 
often to some extent surpass parliament and as such can be claimed totally by the regulator. Besides, 
voluntary approaches may be attractive for policy-makers who pursue their own interests instead of 
public interests (OECD, 1999). From the perspective of business pressure groups, voluntary 
approaches might be preferred above traditional regulation and especially above market-based 
instruments as the business involvement and the voluntary character offers more opportunities to bring 
the policy-making more in line with their interests (Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003). Notions like 
regulatory capture and rent seeking are frequently mentioned in this regard.  
 
Whereas the public choice perspective offers an interesting approach to the subject, we have opted not 
to take it as a basic assumption based on a number of arguments. First, we believe the public choice 
theory does not really correspond with the idea of corporate social responsibility, which is largely 
acknowledged as the context in which voluntary approaches occur. As Hazeu (2000) we believe the 
institutional perspective offers a richer scope for the study of governance questions compared to the 
public choice theory as this latter departs from a narrow assumption on agents’ behaviour (e.g.     
politicians maximising votes, bureaucrats seeking budget maximisation). Second, we believe the 
public choice perspective might offer valuable explanatory insights on the instrument choice question 
(Kirchgässner and Schneider, 2003), but less on the basic research question we adopted, i.e. the 
influence of the institutional setting in the uptake, characteristics and performance of voluntary 
approaches.  
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2.5. Introduction to the research papers  
 
To conclude this chapter, we provide a schematic overview of the institutional approach adopted in the 
research papers as well as a description of the link between the research papers. The main lesson we 
adopt from the institutional perspective is the idea that ‘institutions matter’. Decisions are not taken in 
a frictionless vacuum but are rather contingent upon institutions, ranging from constitutional 
prescriptions to informal norms. Our primal focus concerns the influence of institutions upon the 
uptake, the characteristics and the performance of voluntary approaches. More specifically, we 
formulate the following general research questions: 
 Does the institutional setting influence a company’s decision whether to participate actively in 
voluntary approaches? 
 How do differences in countries’ institutional setting influence the diffusion of voluntary 
approaches? 
 Can policy makers change the institutional context to alter the characteristics and use of 
voluntary approaches? 
 Which characteristics of the institutional setting influence the performance of voluntary 
approaches? 
 
These general research questions are further specified in the research papers. As such, each research 
paper provides a partial answer to one of the general research questions listed above. Figure III 
provides a basic overview of the link between the papers. In short, the first paper empirically proves 
that institutions matter. Subsequently, the following papers investigate how and why institutions 
matter. The second paper looks how institutional differences between countries matter for explaining 
the uptake of environmental management systems. Paper three discusses how a juridical institutional 
shift influenced the characteristics and use of negotiated agreements in Belgium. Finally, the last paper 
analyses the link between the institutional context and the performance of negotiated agreements.  
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 Figure III: Basic overview of the research papers 
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Performance of 
negotiated 
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A more detailed overview of the research papers is provided based on figure IV. For each research 
paper, the figure depicts the general as well as the specified research question. Next, it shows which 
institutions are taken in account for analysing the topic we seek to explain. 
 
The first research paper, which analyses the determinants that distinguish EMAS registered companies 
from non-registered companies, employs an econometric approach (logit estimation). This paper has 
two links with institutional economics. First, the paper is developed around the observation that related 
research on the characteristics of green firms has focussed on the US and Japanese companies. As the 
European institutional context differs from the legalistic and individualistic US context and the highly 
corporatist Japanese one, other determinants might prove to be important in Europe. Second, some 
factors related to the institutional environment (stakeholder pressures and public policy) are included 
in the regression. In short, this paper seeks to determine which company characteristics distinguish 
EMAS participants from non-participants and to check whether the institutional context in which a 
company operates influences this participation decision. Anticipating on the results, it is found, 
amongst others, that the country location of the company is a significant explanatory variable through 
the influence of the national government. If the company is located in a country of which the 
government actively encourages EMAS participation, the company has a higher likelihood of 
participation. As such, we conclude that ‘institutions matter’.  
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Figure IV: The institutional approach of and the link between the research papers 
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The first paper showed that the institutional context, specified as the government’s policy stance 
towards EMAS, matters. The second paper builds on this finding and seeks to explain why some 
governments choose to encourage environmental management systems whereas others take a rather 
passive approach. More specifically, the paper analyses the diffusion of EMAS as well as ISO 14001 
in four European countries. The paper departs from the observation that the uptake rate of both 
environmental management standards differs between countries. Next, it is assumed that this 
difference might be (partly) attributable to differences in the socio-institutional context. Based on a 
country typology from Jepperson (2002), which distinguishes countries based on the organization of 
society (corporatist versus associational) and the organization of authority (statist versus societal), four 
different polity types are distinguished. For each polity type, a country that is identified as a prototype 
example was selected. Subsequently, a case study was conducted for each country. Finally, 
conclusions were drawn based on a comparative analysis of the four case studies. As such, this paper 
uses the national institutional setting to explain differences in participation rates of voluntary 
approaches between countries. 
 
The third research paper links the institutional context with the characteristics and the use of 
negotiated agreements. However, instead of focusing on differences in the institutional context 
between countries, the paper takes a dynamic perspective. This paper looks at the impact of the 
institutional shift that was induced by the introduction of a legal framework for concluding negotiated 
environmental agreements in Flanders. The paper thus compares two points in time rather than 
different countries at the same point in time. The paper discusses how this legal framework changed 
the ‘rules of the game’ (the incentive structure) and clearly points to the differences between 
agreements concluded before and after this legal framework was introduced. Besides, this paper pays 
attention to behavioural changes of companies and other involved actors that were induced by the 
legal framework. 
 
The previous two papers have pointed to the influence of the institutional context for explaining 
uptake rates of voluntary approaches as well as for explaining the characteristics of the approaches 
that are adopted. Finally, the last paper links the institutional context with the performance of 
negotiated agreements. The main goal of this study was to identify which specific characteristics of 
negotiated agreements and which factors within the institutional-economic context wherein a 
negotiated agreement is used, influence the performance of negotiated agreements. This was done 
based on a comparative case study analysis of twelve negotiated environmental agreements. With 
respect to the institutional economic context, the study looks at (i) the general environmental policy 
style in a country, (ii) the existence of an alternative policy instrument that is used as a background 
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threat, (iii) the industrial organisation of the sector involved and (iv) the extent to which firms can gain 
competitive advantages by participating in the agreement due to green consumer pressure. 
 
 
3.  Summary 
 
This dissertation studies the newest innovation in environmental policy making: voluntary approaches. 
Voluntary approaches fit in the more general trend from hierarchical, coercive governance models to 
more horizontal and soft governance models that is observed in developed countries. The voluntary 
character sets them apart from tradition policy instruments that are unilaterally developed by policy-
makers and imposed on polluters. Voluntary approaches are rather developed through interaction 
between multiple societal actors, sometimes even without government involvement. These approaches 
are concrete manifestations developed in the context labelled as social corporate responsibility in 
which societal actors consider the wider interests of society in all aspects of their operations. We 
restrict this subject in two ways. First, we only consider initiatives that involve the business 
community. Second, we largely leave aside the analysis of firm-specific initiatives taken in the context 
their environmental management strategy. In other words, we focus on voluntary approaches in which 
the government is actively involved and we take a public welfare perspective rather than a strategic 
company management one. 
 
Each research paper presented in this dissertation departs from a specific research question and 
employs the preferred methodology to answer this question. Nevertheless, regarding the general 
theoretical and methodological approach, this dissertation mostly builds on the insights from the 
institutional economic school. Institutional economics is concerned with how institutions emerge and 
evolve and with the interactive processes between institutions and the actors that shaped them. 
Institutional economics diverts from mainstream neo-classical economic analysis by questioning some 
basic assumptions like complete information and perfect rationality. Institutional economics rather 
starts from a critical and in-depth observation of reality to uncover underlying causal relations. 
Hereby, it acknowledges hard to grasp notions like confidence, social capital, transaction costs and 
builds on insight gained from other disciplines like psychology, sociology or political sciences. In a 
way, the institutional school de-abstracts economics and brings it closer to reality. The primal focus of 
this dissertation is on the influence of the institutional setting on the uptake, the characteristics and the 
performance of voluntary approaches.  
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Chapter 1 - Voluntary approaches in environmental policy 
 
 
“Calling education, information, and voluntary measures new tools is something of a misnomer. 
Certainly, command-and-control and economic instruments are very old, dating to the earliest 
states. But the “new tools” based on education, the provision of incentives, reputation, and peer 
pressure are even older. Before the state emerged, humans lived in groups with relatively little 
hierarchy, and the market was not a feature of daily social life. Societies of food foragers and 
early horticulturalists usually had no permanent political leadership and traded mostly for things 
not produced locally. Governance involved discussion, ritual, tradition, and peer pressure. 
Although debate continues about how well pre-agricultural societies managed the parts of the 
environment that supported their lives, the management tools they used were surely closer to what 
we are calling “new tools” than to the “old tools” of command-and-control and market 
incentives. Thus, although these approaches may be considered innovations in the contemporary 
policy system, they have an ancient lineage.” 
 
Dietz and Stern (2002) New Tools for Environmental Protection: Education, Information and 
Voluntary Measures, p. 6-7. 
 
 
This first chapter introduces voluntary approaches as an instrument in environmental policy. 
Voluntary approaches will be presented as a denominator that groups a wide range of environmental 
policy initiatives. These initiatives can be seen as concrete manifestations that are taken in the broader 
context labelled as social corporate responsibility. CSR captures the notion that multiple actors, e.g. 
companies, social groups, trade unions and government institutions, increasingly consider the wider 
interests of society in all aspects of their operations. First, voluntary approaches are distinguished from 
other policy instruments in a classical threefold typology. The second section subdivides voluntary 
approaches in three groups depending on the level of government involvement.  
 
 
1.  A typology of environmental policy instruments 
 
1.1.   The classical threefold typology 
 
Rational decisions from the perspective of economic agents might be sub-optimal from a societal point 
of view due to a welfare loss caused by environmental degradation. In a market economy, government 
intervention may be helpful to curb these welfare losses resulting from externalities or imperfect 
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information (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996). Externalities arise when an agent does not bear the full 
consequences of his or her decision, resulting in a welfare loss for some other agent(s). Imperfect 
information on the other hand, hinders agents’ ability to make rational choices. However, due to rent-
seeking behaviour of interest groups resulting in sub-optimal regulations, the political system might 
also be a source of environmental pollution (Tietenberg, 2003).  
 
Commonly, environmental policy instruments are categorised based on the degree of authoritative 
force involved in the governance. Here we present the distinction as suggested by the OECD (1994) 
into the following three groups:  
 Direct regulation: is often described as “command-and-control policy”. This approach 
typically specifies standards with which the regulated must comply (‘the command’). If not, 
he is penalized (‘the control’) (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002). These standards determine 
e.g. technologies to be used or avoided; amounts of pollutant that can be emitted from a 
particular waste pipe, smokestack, or factory; and/or the amounts or kinds of resources that 
may be extracted from a common pool such as a fishery or forest (Dietz and Stern, 2002).  
 Market-based instruments: provide financial incentives to discourage (taxes) or promote 
(subsidies) certain behaviour, instead of penalising or prescribing certain actions directly. 
Next to taxes and subsidies, MBIs also include more sophisticated tools like emission trading 
schemes. Market-based instruments seek to incorporate the external environmental cost in the 
market price of a good or service. Confronted with the appropriate price signal, the polluter is 
pushed to reduce emissions in the most efficient way, up to the point where it is more rational 
to pay for the pollution, i.e. where the marginal abatement cost equals the pollution tax.   
 Suasive instruments: are used as an umbrella-term encompassing a wide range of instruments 
that try to alter behaviour by moral persuasion. These instruments are often referred to as 
“new or soft instruments”. Voluntary approaches (e.g. ISO 14001, EMAS, eco-labels) and 
information-based instruments (e.g. EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory, obligatory 
environmental reporting) fit in this category (OECD, 1994). Here we distinguish voluntary 
approaches from other suasive instruments like information and communication because the 
former requires some kind of business involvement. In contrast to voluntary approaches, the 
regulator can implement informative instruments unilaterally.    
 
Whereas there is a rather widespread consensus on the distinction between direct regulation and MBIs, 
the grouping of policy tools that do not fit into these categories differs to some extent in other 
classification-typologies. Dietz and Stern (2002) propose a fivefold classification between: (i) 
command-and-control; (ii) market-based policies; (iii) education; (iv) provision of information and (v) 
voluntary measures. However, they claim a strict taxonomy of environmental policy tools is not 
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possible and use the notion of “new tools” to encompass the last three approaches. Kaufmann-Hayoz 
et al. (2001) suggest a parallel fivefold classification between: (i) command and control, (ii) economic, 
(iii) service and infrastructure, (iv) collaborative agreements, and (v) communication and diffusion 
policies. The last two categories can be labelled suasive. An overview of other public policy 
instrument classifications can be found in Vedung (1998). Vedung (1998) suggests distinguishing 
between regulation, economic instruments and information. Interesting is the fact that Vedung does 
not consider voluntary approaches as policy instruments in their own right but as an instrument mix 
tending to embody one or more of the three fundamental categories. Given the lack of consensus on 
the classification of policy instruments, section 1.2 will discus the key element used for distinguishing 
the threefold classification we choose.  
 
Another popular way of classifying policy tools is to distinguish between positive and negative 
instruments. Each instrument might be formulated either in the affirmative way to prescribe or 
encourage or in the negative to prohibit or deter an action. This distinction goes back to the general 
distinction between reward or punishment, carrot or stick. Figure 1-1 gives some examples of 
instruments along both dimensions: the degree of authoritative force on the horizontal axis and the 
way of formulation on the vertical.  
 
Figure 1-1: A typology of environmental policy instruments 
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Before we proceed with the next paragraph, we first refer to the work of Bressers et al. who consider 
these kinds of instrument typologies deceptive and confusing. Rather than focussing the analysis on 
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certain types of instruments like subsidies or licenses, it is claimed that the focus should be placed on a 
basic set of characteristics of a particular instrument (see e.g. Bressers and O’Toole, 2005; Bressers 
and O’Toole, 1998). Bressers and O’Toole refer to the following characteristics: the degree to which 
the instrument involves the provision/withdrawal of resources, the freedom to opt for/against 
application, bi/multilaterality, normative appeal, proportionality, and the role of government in policy 
implementation. It is not the instrument type as such that is “coercive” or “suasive”, but rather the way 
it is specified and implemented in a particular policy context. The same instrument might have 
different characteristics depending on the policy context in which it is to wield an impact (for a 
detailed description of the relation between instrument characteristics and networked context see 
Bressers and O’Toole, 1998). A product norm that excludes the use of a hazardous substance (e.g. 
CFCs) for which a viable alternative exists might be considered as less coercive than an informative 
product label on the energy effectiveness of certain household goods or a negotiated agreement that 
has been negotiated under severe regulatory pressure.  
 
Another downside of the instrument typology as presented in figure 1-1 is that it gives the deceive 
impression that instruments are simply options waiting to be selected by policy makers (Bressers and 
O’Toole, 2005). Modern theories on public administration however point to the complexity of the 
administrative context due to e.g. multiple involved actors, diverging interests and many related issues 
(Kleijn et al., 1998). As the complexity increases, the role of the government shifts to a more process-
oriented director (Bogason and Toonen, 1998). Especially voluntary approaches are not instruments 
developed and implemented at the discretion of the policy-maker. Rather, they are developed by or in 
cooperation with social actors. The image of policy making as a top-down exercise with an isolated 
government on top is to be replaced by an image of bottom-up policy-making in which the 
government is just one among the many actors in the policy process. Bogason and Toonen (1998) 
claim that policy-making will become an external rather than an internal activity. Hierarchical control 
is increasingly replaced by continuing processes of bargaining among interested parties. The changing 
role of the government is further elaborated in the second section of the following chapter.    
 
 
1.2.  Influencing behaviour: hard law or soft steering 
 
1.2.1.  Incentives for behavioural change: the degree of constraint 
 
In order to have an impact, a policy instruments must alter an agent’s behaviour. We consider 
behaviour as the outcome of a decision-making process in which agents compare costs and benefits of 
alternative actions. As such, behaviour is the outcome of a decision based on a function of prices, the 
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lure of economic opportunities, the treat of sanctions, the availability of useful information, concern 
with reputation, and various intrinsic motivations. The way in which a policy instrument influences 
this decision-making process is the central element of the instrument taxonomy proposed above. 
Basically, three options exist: 
a. alter the set of actions open to agents (direct regulation); 
b. alter the costs-benefit ratio of different actions directly by external intervention (MBIs); 
c. alter the costs-benefit ratio of different actions by changing the internal value structure of the 
agent (suasive instruments). 
 
Direct regulation simply limits the set of feasible actions by prescribing or prohibiting certain actions. 
Direct regulation restricts an agent’s freedom of choice. MBIs on the other hand do not limit the set of 
actions but alter the costs and benefits of feasible actions with the aim to change the preference 
ranking in such a way that environmentally beneficial actions become more attractive. The motivation 
relied upon here is that if more appropriate behaviour is made rewarding in the eyes of the agents 
involved, attitudes and behaviour will ‘automatically’ shift in favour of these socially more desirable 
alternatives. In contrast to direct regulations, MBIs allow agents the freedom to respond to certain 
stimuli in a way they themselves think is most beneficial. The final approach seeks to change the 
perceptions and priorities within the agent’s decision framework. A full internalisation of 
environmental considerations within the preference structure of the agent is aimed at. For this, more 
subtle and soft persuasion or deterrence strategies such as education, information, labelling, training, 
negotiation or public blaming are used. As with MBIs the set of possible actions is not altered. It is the 
ordering of the alternatives that might change. In contrast to MBIs however, the altering of options is 
achieved by altering the agent’s (internal) value structure. Alberini and Segerson (2002) argue the 
main difference between suasive instruments and the other categories is the (in)ability to impose 
unwanted costs on polluters of the latter.  
 
Each taxonomy, however, is to some extent artificial. Bressers and O’Toole (1998) even attribute the 
limited theoretical advance in the study of policy instruments partly to an exaggerated interest in the 
proliferation of overlapping and somewhat incompatible instrument typologies. Labelling an 
instrument as command and control, market-based or suasive, although useful analytically, overlooks 
the fact that every tool is actually a hybrid of all these forms (Dietz and Stern, 2002). Legal 
instruments are often accompanied by financial sanctions, while economic instruments are anchored in 
legal regulations (Bressers and Klok, 1988). Regulations can be non-complied with depending on the 
cost between compliance and non-compliance. The strictness of the enforcement policy (e.g. the 
amount of controls, the level of sanctions) determines the cost-benefit ratio of compliance versus non-
compliance. Implementing MBIs also involves regulation-like actions like designing institutions that 
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will implement tradable permits or pollution taxes, determining the level of pollution allowed, the tax 
rate or penalties for breaking the rules. On the other hand, drawing up command-and-control 
regulations or MBIs has some persuasive impact as well. Moreover, regulations and MBI are normally 
accompanied by public information campaigns to inform the target group of their existence and 
content. Using subsidies as an example, Bressers and O’Toole (2005) claim that next to economic 
incentives, communication, support for existing rules and the activation of the networking among and 
with the target groups are all potential impacts of the instrument on the target group. Systematic 
investigation of the Dutch effluent charges shows that about half of the impact of this economic 
instrument can be attributed to the communicative modes of operation such as: communication about 
the policy problem and possible solutions, a disruption of habitual behaviour, the encouragement of 
more legitimacy for environmental-rule enforcers and the activation of others in the network (Bresers 
and Lulofs, 2004). Many voluntary approaches in turn are developed against the backdrop of future 
regulation. Some types specify emission targets or recycling targets to be met. As such these hardly 
differ from command-and-control-like regulations. Sinclair (1997) claims that the theoretical 
distinction between command and control and self-regulation is highly blurred in practice. Rather than 
focussing on the content of a specific policy tool, the pivotal question is how the behavioural change is 
aimed at. Table 1-1 presents an alternative typology of policy instruments based on who determines 
the ends and means of policy (Jordan et al., 2005). It clearly reveals the extensive overlap between 
main sub-types of policy instruments. For instance, forms of regulation are found in three of the four 
cells.  
 
Table 1-1: A simple typology of instrument types 
 The state specifies the goal to be 
achieved 
The state does not specify 
the goals to be achieved 
The state specifies how the 
goal is to be achieved 
Regulation (e.g. linking an 
emission target to the use of a 
certain type of technology); fiscal 
incentives (e.g. tax reductions for 
a less polluting technology) 
Technology-based regulatory 
standards (e.g. BAT) 
Non-state actors specify 
how the goal is to be 
achieved 
Most negotiated agreements; 
some MBIs; some regulations 
(e.g. environmental quality 
objectives) 
Environmental management 
systems; most MBIs; some 
negotiated agreements; eco-
labels 
 Source: Jordan et al. (2005)  
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1.2.2.  Internal or external motivation 
 
The suasive technique that aims to modify agents’ internal value structure is frequently considered as 
little effective. There is no obligation involved; the regulated is left free whether to respond to the 
reasoned argument and moral persuasion of the government or not. Suasion is the softest and most 
lenient instrument in the government’s tool-kit. Especially when it comes to abating environmental 
pollution where free lunches are seldom, advocates are blamed to have a naïve belief in corporations. 
Profit maximisation, it is stated, is the inherent raison d’être of companies and voluntary pollution 
abatement does not fit in here. As such coercion, in the shape of regulations or economic instruments, 
is needed to change behaviour. Moral appeals will not induce behavioural changes within profit 
maximising entities.  
 
The suasive approach however entails the advantage that it changes the internal preference structure of 
the agent. The agent is internally motivated instead of externally. This implies that the change in 
behaviour is likely to be consistent and holistic. With consistent we mean that the chance in behaviour 
that results from a new perspective on the norms and values of an agent is likely to stay, even when 
the instrument is removed. This in contrast with a behavioural change induced by a regulation or a 
MBI that will only remain as long as the external stimuli is in place. Holistic implies that the 
behavioural change might not be limited to the change induced by the instrument. A subsidy on the 
insulation of houses will bring down the emissions of greenhouse gasses due to heating and cooling. 
An information campaign on inefficient heating and cooling might however invoke a number of 
reactions: people might invest in new heating/cooling systems, insulate their house, install double 
glass windows, turn down the indoor temperature… Besides it might trigger awareness on issues as 
energy consumption, lightening, water use and other environmental impacts. This in contrast with the 
aforementioned subsidy on insulation of which the result might even be countered by a rebound effect. 
The rebound effect points to the fact that people might cool or heat more as the cost of additional 
heating or cooling is diminished. The gain in efficiency is countered by an increase in the activity 
level.  
 
The pessimistic view on suasive instruments is inherently built on a narrow view on the motivations of 
a corporation. Without doubt, achieving a sufficiently high profit rate is primordial to survive in the 
long run. However, companies have a diversity of motivations and it should not be assumed that 
deterrence is the principal weapon available to regulators. Other motivational drivers might be equally 
important (see e.g. Gunningham and Rees, 1997). These include the effects of negative publicity, 
informal sanctions and shaming, incentives provided by various third parties, the significance for 
private enterprise of maintaining legitimacy, and the necessity to maintain co-operation and trust. Each 
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organisation has its own order and logic. It also has its own values, core beliefs, and institutional 
memory.  
 
However, the assumption that companies need to have at least some sense of social consciousness is 
no condition sine qua non for suasive instruments to have any impact. Instruments like labels, 
information, or awareness campaigns might be attractive for companies from a purely economic 
viewpoint. They might attract green consumers and investors or reveal the existence of profitable 
environmental investments. Concluding, suasion might even work in an a-ethical environment.  
 
 
1.3.  Are voluntary approaches policy instruments? 
 
Given the central element of voluntarism, one might question whether voluntary approaches are in fact 
policy instruments. Vedung (1998) defines policy instruments as “the set of techniques by which 
governmental authorities wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect social change”. 
If a company voluntary chooses to design its product according to the requirements of an 
environmental product label or to publish an environmental report for its stakeholders, there is no 
government involvement in these actions. Should we label these actions as policy measures? 
 
For a number of approaches (public schemes and negotiated agreements; see section 2) the answer is 
clearly affirmative as public regulators play an active role in their development. Agreements that are 
negotiated between regulators and industry representatives are a straightforward example, just as 
environmental management standards that have been written and are verified by environmental 
agencies. In a number of cases, an obvious link with politics is however absent, as in the example of 
the environmental report. In this case, there is only an indirect link and perhaps the label “policy 
instrument” is not appropriate here. We call upon the Coase theorem for a discussion on this issue. 
  
An important feature of the Coase theorem is that it stresses the reciprocity of environmental problems 
between polluters and victims. Environmental resources have alternative uses. When a polluter uses a 
river to dispose of some residuals of his production process, this limits the use of the river by other 
actors. The fact that the latter might claim to be entitled to benefit from a non-polluted river, however, 
also affects the polluter. As such, a field of tension between polluters and victims is created. Basically, 
there are two ways to smooth out this conflict situation: with or without government intervention. 
 
Coase (1960) states that the optimal level of pollution (abatement) can be the outcome of a bargaining 
process between polluters and victims. Two conditions are necessary: the absence of transaction costs 
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and the existence of properly defined property rights. Depending on the party that holds the rights, the 
polluter could compensate the victim for the damage caused or the victim could pay the polluter to 
reduce the environmental damage. In each case, this will be done up to the point where the marginal 
abatement cost for the polluter equals the marginal benefit of avoided pollution for the victim. 
According to Coase, as long as property rights are defined, there is an automatic tendency to move 
towards the social optimum, independent of the initial allocation of the property rights. As such, the 
Coase theorem serves as an argument against policy intervention.  
 
Unfortunately, the real world is pervaded with transaction costs and free-bargaining situations are 
highly unlikely. Examples of transaction costs include information costs on the nature and extent of 
environmental damage, costs of identifying, finding and addressing the relevant parties, the cost of 
litigation, negotiation costs, etc. Many of these costs are bound to the collective character of most 
pollution problems. As such, policy intervention becomes inevitable when the level of transactions 
costs obstructs a bargaining solution to arise. The trade off between polluters’ and victims’ interests 
now takes place in the heads of democratically chosen representatives. Policy makers are assumed to 
approximate social optimum based on estimates of marginal damage costs and marginal abatement 
costs. The government acts as a democratically legitimized responsive mediator between interests.  
 
Concluding, environmental policy instruments can be regarded as remedies for situations with high 
transaction costs, hindering voluntary negotiation between polluters and victims. Examples of binding 
contracts concluded between polluters and victims are seldom. However, voluntary approaches can be 
considered as variants to binding contracts. If a company implements a certified environmental 
management system it takes an action to smoothen the slumbering conflict with a number of 
stakeholders (local community, environmental organisations, employees…). This reduces the 
probability that the conflict will escalate. At the same time, the probability that victims will push the 
government to take action declines. In this perspective voluntary approaches can be considered as 
alternatives to policy instruments; self-regulation to obviate policy regulation.   
 
 
2.  The many shapes of voluntary approaches 
 
Within the threefold typology presented in the previous section, voluntary approaches were grouped 
within the suasive category. These approaches only depart from moral persuasion to induce 
behavioural change but have some attractive appeal due to their consistent and holistic impact. Finally, 
we argued that notwithstanding the central element of voluntarism, they can be considered as policy 
instruments for achieving public objectives or at least as close substitutes.  
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This section will provide some more background on voluntary approaches. We closely follow the 
classical taxonomy of voluntary approaches suggested by Lévêque (1998). Based on the degree of the 
public sector’s involvement, voluntary approaches are grouped into unilateral commitments, public 
voluntary schemes and negotiated agreements. In addition, some examples are offered to better grasp 
the differences between the subtypes of voluntary agreements. 
 
 
2.1. Unilateral commitments 
 
Unilateral commitments consist of environmental improvement programmes established by firms or 
business associations and communicated to their stakeholders. In these “self-regulatory” initiatives, 
firms have total discretion in the design of the programme. While the authorities can applaud and 
assess these efforts, the targets as well as the way they will be met and controlled are determined 
without the involvement of the authorities. In many cases, the objectives are qualitative instead of 
quantitative, including codes of conduct and communication initiatives. The freedom companies have 
in developing these programs, gives rise to a wide variety of commitments implemented as is shown in 
textbox 1 below.  
 
Textbox 1: Examples of unilateral commitments 
 
A well-known example is without doubt the Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program. The 
initiative was started in 1985 and focuses on improving performance, communication and accountability. 
Responsible care companies commit to work together to continuously improve the health, safety and 
environmental performance of their products and processes. The program helps companies by identifying 
and spreading good management practices and promotes mutual support between companies and 
associations through experience sharing and peer pressure.   
(www.responsiblecare.org) 
 
Volvo Europe Truck situated in Ghent has announced that it will become the first CO2-free company in 
Belgium. A new heating system on biomass will be installed and the existing system will be adapted for 
burning bio-fuel. Next, three windmills will be installed to produce energy for the company. The project 
is carried out together with Electrabel, a major electricity producer in Belgium. The project will be 
implemented in 2007 and the investment costs is estimated at about 10 million euro. 
(www.volvo.com) 
 
Global Ethics is a company that produces One water. The company commits that all profits from the 
sales of One water bottles are used to build PlayPumps. A PlayPump is a water pumping system that 
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works by children playing on a roundabout that pumps fresh clean water from underground into storage 
tanks for the local community. Currently each 14 days a pump is installed in Africa.   
(www.we-are-one.org.uk) 
 
In fact unilateral commitments are pledges from companies without any legal enforceability. Firms 
can withdraw from their commitments at any time only risking some cost in the form of reputation 
loss. Not surprisingly, various stakeholders look upon these initiatives with suspicion. Unilateral 
commitments are considered by them as mere public relation exercises involving only 
communications of no-regret initiatives or business as usual prognoses without any added value. They 
argue that targets are set at the lowest common denominator, are hardly measurable and their 
enforcement is weak or non-existent.  
 
Self-regulation lacks many of the virtues of conventional state regulations in terms of visibility, 
credibility, accountability and compulsory application. These claims might however be countered. As 
a major motivation is to protect a company’s reputation, credibility is crucial. Involving stakeholders 
in the self-regulatory process or seeking external verification or validation of compliance with the 
program will enhance its credibility. Firms may delegate monitoring and dispute resolution to a third 
party in order to strengthen the trustworthiness and the environmental effectiveness of their 
commitments. Communication about the project is another important point to increase transparency 
and reliability. As the Chemical industry puts it in their Responsible Care Program: “don’t trust us, 
tack us”. Especially when the targets are easy to check, as in the example of Volvo and One water, this 
might help to convince criticasters.   
 
 
2.2.  Public voluntary schemes 
 
Within this type of voluntary approach participating firms agree to standards that have been developed 
by public bodies such as environmental agencies. Whereas companies are free to participate or not, the 
criteria for membership are unilaterally defined by the public body. These schemes consist of “take-it-
or-leave-it”-options. In order to stimulate companies to choose ‘take-it’, benefits in the form of R&D 
subsidies, technical assistance or reputation incentives (ecological logo or certification symbol) are 
often provided. Especially this latter function of signalling a company’s environmental behaviour is 
appealing as the credibility of such programs is high due to the pubic character of the initiator. This 
clearly contrasts with unilateral commitments. The eligible program criteria might take the form of 
technology, performance or management prescriptions. Some examples are provided in textbox 2. 
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Textbox 2: Examples of public voluntary schemes  
 
The EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) was launched by the Council Regulation No 
1836/93 of 29 June 1993 and is open for company registration since 1995. EMAS draws up standards for 
a company’s environmental management system. It also requires companies to establish an 
environmental policy and to publish externally validated environmental statements on its environmental 
performance.  By 2007 over 5000 sites were EMAS registered.  
(http://ec.europe.eu/environment/emas) 
 
The US 33/50 Program targeted 17 priority chemicals of the chemicals to be reported by companies to 
the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). The Program’s goal is a 33% reduction in the releases and transfers 
of these chemicals by 1992 and a 50% reduction by 1995, measured against a 1988 baseline. The 
Environmental Protection Agency asked companies to participate on a voluntary basis in this national 
effort to reduce the releases and transfers of these chemicals. Companies were asked to draw up their 
own goals. Nearly 1300 companies (13% of all eligible companies) participated and their facilities 
accounted for more than 60% of the releases and transfers of the 33/50 chemicals reported to the TRI in 
1988. The program achieved its goal in 1994, one year ahead of schedule. 
(EPA (1999) 33/50 Program: The Final Record; www.epa.gov/oppt/3350) 
 
As Prakash and Potoski (2006) point out, these schemes act in a similar way as club goods, offering 
members the rewards of affiliating with the club’s brand reputation from which non-members are 
excluded. There is some ambiguity with respect to the nature of the external body developing these 
kinds of schemes. Does the nominator public imply the initiator is part the government carrying 
authoritative force or is this not necessary? What to do with similar schemes developed for instance by 
non-governmental organisations or not-for-profit organisations like the Fair Trade label from the 
Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO), certifications programs from the Forest 
Stewardship Council, the Rainforest Alliance or even the ISO 14001 standard developed by the 
International Organization for Standardization? Many Member States of the EU give the similar 
incentives in the form of regulatory flexibility, public procurement, support funding or technical 
assistance to EMAS as well as ISO 14001 certified companies (EC, 2004). These initiatives cannot be 
considered as typical unilateral commitments as they are not developed by the discretion of 
participating companies. Besides, in this era of growing mistrust in government bodies, public’s 
credibility towards various non-governmental organisations is expanding.  
 
Including these non-governmental schemes in this category however has two drawbacks. First, as they 
are by nature non-governmental, they are harder to classify as policy instrument. Second, it blurs the 
distinction between public schemes and unilateral commitments, especially since there is a trend to 
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base unilateral commitments on external guidelines (like the Global Reporting Initiative for 
environmental reporting) and to include third party verification (e.g. more and more common in 
Responsible Care). Based on these considerations we will consider these types of similar schemes as 
unilateral commitments and reserve the denominator of public voluntary schemes for programs 
developed by government bodies. However, it should be stressed that the distinction between the 
different types of voluntary approaches is sometimes blurred. In fact it implies that similar initiatives 
like e.g. environmental management standards (EMAS or ISO 14001) are grouped in different 
categories.    
 
 
2.3.  Negotiated agreements 
 
The European Commission (1996a) adopted the following definition for describing negotiated 
agreements: ‘agreements between industry and public authorities on the achievement of environmental 
objectives’. Such agreements can be considered as private contracts between two parties, of which one 
carries authoritative force, with an eye on achieving public goals. Usually, the industry commits itself 
to meet the environmental target that has been set by negotiation with public authorities. The public 
authority on the other hand usually commits itself to do nothing, which should be understood as not to 
introduce new legislation unless the voluntary action fails to meet the target. In fact, most agreements 
are entered into against such a backdrop of threatened legislation. The regulator’s obligation might 
also include providing specified financial or technical assistance, granting a particular permit, creating 
supportive legislation, granting flexibility etc. Such agreements are frequently signed with an industry 
sector, although agreements with individual firms are also possible. Nevertheless, there is great variety 
on other aspects such as the legal character, the liability rules, the environmental objective etc. One 
example is presented in textbox 3.  
 
Textbox 3: Example of a negotiated agreement: Agreement concerning the use of CFCs as 
propellant in aerosols  
 
This agreement was signed in 1988 between the Belgian federal State Secretary for the Environment and 
the Belgian Aerosol Association. The agreement was concluded against the background of rising concern 
on the negative influence of CFCs on the ozone layer and the Protocol of Montreal concluded in this 
regard.  The industry admitted that it was technically and economically feasible to substitute CFCs by 
less polluting alternatives. The policy-makers on the other hand favoured a voluntary solution partly 
because direct regulation like product norms were hard to establish at federal level due to poorly defined 
responsibilities between the federal level and the regions as a consequence of subsequent State reforms. 
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By the agreement, the Belgian Aerosol Association committed itself to decrease the amount of CFCs in 
aerosols in order to achieve a reduction of 90% by 1990 compared to the level of 1976.  
 
From the three subtypes, this voluntary instrument bears the closest resemblance to traditional 
regulation. The time when direct regulation was unilaterally imposed upon business without a certain 
extent of discretion in the implementation has faded. Industry participates in the policy process of 
design and implementation, as well in the form of formal consultation as in the form of lobbying. 
Rather than being two distinct ways of policy making, they are specific manifestations along a 
continuum. In this picture, negotiated agreements are discussed in an open-minded atmosphere 
between co-operative players that acknowledge their responsibility allowing a smoother achievement 
of environmental objectives. This contrasts with the conflict-ridden route of legislation developed in a 
mistrustful atmosphere between partners with conflicting interests. In fact, each concrete policy act, be 
it a negotiated agreement or a regulation, holds an idiosyncratic place on this continuum. Some 
regulations are easily acceptable whereas some agreements have only been concluded after a long-
lasting and hard bargaining process. 
 
Next to the process in which the instrument is developed, the juridical character of the output of the 
policy process could be called the distinctive difference between a regulation (legislation under public 
law) and an agreement (contract between parties). However, this should also be nuanced. Some 
countries or regions like Denmark and Flanders for instance have developed a juridical framework for 
negotiated agreements giving them a legally binding status (Barth and Dette, 2001). In the 
Netherlands, agreements are characterised by individual liability and legal binding status (De Clercq et 
al. 2001). Agreements have the status of contracts of civil law (Delmas and Terlaak, 2002). This is 
achieved by linking the agreements to the local permit system. This “theoretical” enforceability should 
however be nuanced when looking at the actual practice. According the an evaluation study on the 
Dutch covenants carried out by Bressers et al. (forthcoming) there are serious doubts about the 
motivation of local authorities to really implement this formal safeguard via the licensing system. In 
some agreements free-riding occurred, which seems to indicate that local authorities applaud 
companies that adhere to the stricter standards put forward in the covenants rather than strictly 
obliging them. The close relationship between local authorities and the companies on their territory 
might explain this rather lenient enforcement approach. At the same time it is needless to point to the 
fact that the willingness as well as the capabilities to enforce all existing environmental regulations is 
absent in many countries.  
 
Concluding, neither the nature of the policy process nor the actual output of the process clearly 
distinguishes negotiated agreements from direct regulation. The creation of negotiated agreements as a 
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distinct policy instrument is rather a manifestation in a global trend from vertical to horizontal policy 
making. Horizontal policy making refers to the fact that the regulator less and less acts as an insulated 
and dominant initiator of regulations. Instead, a wide range of actors are actively encouraged to 
participate formally and informally in the policy-making process (cfr. Chapter 2, section 2.3). This 
remark especially holds for countries where negotiated agreements fulfil a crucial role in 
environmental policy like Germany and The Netherlands (EC, 1996b).  
 
 
3.  Summary  
 
Within the large amount of instruments that are in the regulator’s toolkit, voluntary approaches are 
considered as a new and distinct subcategory. Voluntary approaches differ from other policy 
instruments by the fact that they rely on a certain degree of voluntary business participation. Voluntary 
approaches are grouped into the category of suasive instruments. Suasive instruments depart from a 
lenient technique to influence behaviour by altering agents’ internal norms and values. By aiming at 
internally motivated behavioural change, the attractiveness of voluntary instruments is their ability to 
induce a consistent and holistic impact. This means the behavioural change is expected to become 
firmly embedded in the actors’ behaviour and might serve as a catalyst for additional self-regulatory 
initiatives. This expectation results from the fact that companies voluntary agreed to and actively 
participated in such initiatives. This contrasts with the more coercive modes of intervention by market-
based-instruments and especially command-and-control regulation, which are often met with 
frustration by the business community. 
 
The notion “voluntary approaches” should be considered an umbrella term encompassing a wide range 
of different initiatives with the common characteristic being that some level of voluntary business 
involvement is required. However, the voluntary aspect might be limited to the decision to participate 
or might to a large extent be induced by the regulatory or other stakeholders pressures. Commonly, a 
distinction is made depending on the degree of involvement by public regulator. In unilateral 
commitments the goals and contents are totally determined at the discretion of a company or a 
business association. On the contrary, public voluntary schemes are developed unilaterally by a public 
body and a company can only choose to participate or not. Negotiated agreements on the other hand, 
are the result of a negotiation process between public and private actors.  
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Chapter 2: Explaining the introduction of voluntary approaches  
 
 
“We will not solve environmental problems by simply adding a few new directives every year to 
our existing 270 or so pieces of European environmental law, especially if we discover later on 
that these directives are not implemented by the Member States… We need a broader range of 
instruments to tackle ever more diffuse sources of environmental pressures.” 
 
European Commissioner for the Environment M. Wallström at the presentation of the 6th EU 
Action Plan (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/about/enviro_en.htm) 
 
 
Voluntary approaches are said to be invented by practitioners rather than by theorists. Many have 
developed spontaneously as a pragmatic response to complex situations for which no straightforward 
solution was at hand. This chapter offers three different perspectives on the introduction of voluntary 
approaches in environmental policy. The first section takes an instrumental perspective. It explains the 
creation of voluntary approaches from a pragmatic viewpoint. It departs from the observation that the 
results achieved with direct regulation and market-based instruments are in some cases limited which 
creates incentives for the development of new instruments. The second section focuses on the role of 
the government. It claims that policy making is evolving towards a multi-actor process. Instruments 
like voluntary approaches are supposed to fit into this trend away from unilateral governance. Next a 
corporate perspective is provided in section three. We present a stakeholder view on company 
behaviour to explain why some might voluntary choose to over comply with existing environmental 
regulations. Finally, section four shows, based on the regulation dilemma, how a cooperative stance 
from government and companies along the lines discussed in the previous sections, might be 
beneficial to both parties.  
 
 
1. An instrumental perspective: looking for optimal policy mixes 
 
Voluntary approaches are said to form the third wave of environmental policy (Croci, 2005). The first 
wave consists of direct regulations, the second of MBIs. As shown in figure 2-1, these waves fit in 
more general (economic) policy trends that occurred in the post-war period in western countries (e.g. 
Lemaire, 1998). Keynesian-inspired governments dominated the first period and deemed regulatory 
intervention necessary to correct market failures. Calls from the neo-classical monetarist and liberalist 
movement on regulatory failure and market efficiency lead to a deregulation movement in the eighties. 
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By the nineties improved (re)regulation became the general mind-set. Concerns on national 
competitiveness in a global economy and prominent public pressure movements pushed policy makers 
to new ways of intervention.  
 
Figure 2-1: Overall trends in environmental policy making 
 
SEVENTIES 
Regulation 
EIGHTIES 
Deregulation 
NINETIES 
Package (re)regulation 
Command and control policies 
MBI 
Suasive instruments
 
 
 
1.1.  From command and control policies… 
 
The first rise in environmental regulations is situated in the seventies (Prakash and Potoski, 2006). The 
regulatory framework was gradually expanded in the subsequent years. Regulations were media-
specific (air, water and soil) and especially targeted the most prominent polluters. That policy makers 
resorted to direct regulation is straightforward. First, regulation was the prominent mode of 
intervention at that time and a legislative framework was needed as a starting point. Next, regulation is 
a very effective mode of policy intervention, especially as the environmental emissions were easy to 
spot and attributed to large, stationary polluters. In addition, regulations have the advantage of giving a 
clear signal of no tolerance and strong action. In an era of growing environmental concern (“Silent 
spring” published in 1962, “Limits to growth” in 1972) and social mobilisation (the World Wild Fund 
for nature was set up in 1961, Greenpeace in 1971), an authoritative government answer was needed. 
The regulatory move was based on the assumption that without detailed orders from the government, 
firms are likely to sacrifice a cleaner environment for their own profits (Prakash and Potoski, 2006). 
Command and control regulations achieved considerable success, especially in terms of reducing air 
and water pollution and improving the quality of the natural environment (Cole and Grossman, 1999).  
 
However, while regulations were successful in securing the first trance of emission reductions from 
previously unregulated industries, more than two decades after their introduction they are now viewed 
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as increasingly burdensome. The regulatory approach has been criticised, particularly by economists, 
for inhibiting innovation, high compliance costs and inflexibility (Jaffe et al., 1995; Stavins and 
Whitehead, 1997). Industry bemoans the financial costs such regulations impose as well as the 
intrusiveness of the process, which often dictates their technology choice. Regulators on their side bear 
the burden of keeping abreast of technological developments in many different industries. The 
fragmentation to media (water, air… ) and class (climate, pesticides, hazardous substances…) created 
an overly complex and vast system that moved beyond the management capacities of the authorities 
(Powers and Chertow, 1997; Fiorino, 1999). One of the final weaknesses of existing regulations is that 
they have focused on the big fishes, i.e. large and easy to identify sources, both because these were 
obvious targets, but also to minimise the information, monitoring and measurement burdens on 
regulators (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002). Moreover, regulations especially relied on end-of-pipe 
solutions.  
 
As the focus turned from large polluters to dispersed, non-stationary pollution sources and complex 
environmental problems, the diminishing returns of command and control became more obvious. Such 
policy settings exacerbate the weaknesses of command and control policy: writing regulations finely 
nuanced for pollution problems that are highly variable, technical and diffuse is quite burdensome and 
monitoring and inspecting these dispersed sources is yet more expensive and onerous (Prakash and 
Potoski, 2006).  
 
 
1.2.  … complemented with some market-based instruments… 
 
Economists advocate the use of MBIs as an alternative for direct regulation (e.g. Buchanan and 
Tullock, 1975; Baumol and Oates, 1988). In 1972, the OECD adopted the “Polluter-Pays-Principle” as 
background economic principle for environmental policy.  Most importantly, economic theory argues 
that MBIs enable a pollution abatement target to be met at lower overall costs compared to traditional 
regulations. Economic instruments also allow for a more hands-off regulation and decentralized 
decision-making, giving greater freedom to the regulated agents. Austin (1999) denotes three key 
advantages of market-based instruments over direct regulation: 
 
 Static efficiency: implies the overall cost of achieving pollution reduction is minimized by 
creating a framework that allows for differential responses by companies depending on their 
ability to make reductions. Marginal abatement costs between firms are equalised.  
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 Dynamic efficiency: stresses that by placing a price on pollution, companies have an ongoing 
incentive to make further emission reductions over time. As such market-based instruments 
accelerate the innovation of new abatement technologies.  
 Revenue raising: implies the regulator raises funds which can be used to support 
environmental, social or economic goals. This advantage brings along a distribution issue. A 
popular theme in this regard is the double dividend argument, which proposes a (revenue 
neutral) tax shift from labour (‘the good’) to environmental pollution (‘the bad’). This way 
two objectives may be reached simultaneously: reducing pollution and increasing 
employment.   
 
In addition, economic instruments may provide greater flexibility in dealing with smaller and diffuse 
emissions sources which collectively contribute large amounts of pollution, but which until now have 
been largely ignored in favour of controlling the pollution from more obvious sources (Austin, 1999). 
 
The total number of MBIs used in OECD countries has grown steadily since the early 1970s (OECD, 
1997). The diversity now extends from ordinary subsidies and emission charges to more complex 
tradable permit systems. About 100 market-based instruments were in place in 14 OECD countries by 
1987, rising to 150 by 1993 (OECD, 1997). In 2007, the OECD/EEA database counts bout 375 
environmentally related taxes and some 250 environmentally related fees and charges (OECD, 2007). 
However, two comments should be made. First, their use shows signs of stabilisation from the mid-
nineties (Eurostat, 2007). Figure 2-2 shows the revenue from environmental taxes as a percentage of 
GDP. One notices that the level has slightly increased until the mid-nineties. Next, the level stabilized 
for some years but shows a declining trend in the last years. It should be noted that the level of the 
energy taxes largely determines the trend of environmental taxes. Second, many of the MBIs 
implemented were of little significance and most of them were not really intended to have an 
allocative impact but were imposed rather with an eye on boosting the government’s overall revenue 
(Austin, 1999). In 2005 the shares of different environmental taxes were as follows: energy taxes 
(74%), transport taxes (23%) and pollution and resource taxes (3%) (Eurostat 2007). This points to the 
financial instead of the incentive function of environmental taxes. The OECD/EEA database shows 
that environmentally related taxes are levied almost exclusively on households and the transport sector 
(OECD, 2007). The OECD report on MBI of 1989 concludes that: “environmental policies in the 
OECD Member countries were basically command-and-control policies with some financial and 
economic add-ons but one should not be deluded into thinking that OECD countries employed market 
based instruments on any significant scale”. Figure 2-2 reveals that this conclusion might still hold for 
the current situation and as such motivates the search for new policy instruments.  
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Figure 2-2: Environmental taxes in the EU (1980-2005) as percentage of GDP 
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Figure 2-2 supports the picture that MBIs somewhat failed to deliver. To some extent the EU wide 
CO2-tax proposal of 1992 marks the turning point. The tax would serve as a materialisation of 
Europe’s leadership in environmental policy, but the Member States failed to agree on the proposal 
(Padilla and Roca, 2004). Moreover, Bressers and Huitema (1999) claim that even when economic 
instruments are implemented, they are usually not shaped according the prescriptions made by 
economic theory.  
 
Several arguments are put forward to explain the implementation failure of MBIs. Largely, all are 
related to one of the following evaluation-criteria for environmental instruments: effectiveness, 
efficiency and legitimacy. Regulations are considered more effective in reaching established targets. 
The results of MBIs depend on the actions they trigger by the ones addressed. Especially in cases 
where marginal damage costs raise fast after a certain threshold level, command-and-control measures 
are favoured. Second, whereas efficiency considerations give the advantage to MBIs, one should not 
solely focus on abatement costs, but also consider administrative costs. MBIs are in many cases 
difficult to implement and enforce due to e.g. measurement and monitoring complexities or difficulties 
in choosing the proper tax base or setting the tax rate at the right level. Finally, there is the issue of 
legitimacy, which encompasses amongst others, the acceptability of the instrument. As indicated by 
the public-choice theory, the interests of those who are subjected to the instruments must be taken into 
account. The OECD report of 2007 points to the fear of losing international competitiveness in 
explaining the limited use of MBIs. This explains the use of numerous exemptions to environmental 
taxes granted to the most polluting sectors. In addition, left-wing parties and environmentalists have 
opposed taxes and charges for a long time, as they may be perceived as legitimating or condoning 
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environmentally harmful behaviour. It would be ethically wrong to allow polluters to buy themselves 
free to pollute our common amenities.  
 
 
1.3.  … to policy packages including voluntary approaches 
 
The discussion on the optimal instrument choice has long been an “or-or” discussion (e.g. Baumol, 
1972, Weitzman, 1974; Buchanan and Tullock, 1975). Reasons for preferring one instrument over the 
other might involve ideological, political, legal, social, administrative, information, monitoring, 
enforcement or other considerations. Efficiency considerations make some point to MBIs as first best 
while others believe the effectiveness of regulations is decisive. However, instruments are usually 
analysed in ideal form and in a generic fashion. In practice, the complexities of the interactions 
between environmental, political and economic processes, as well as the dynamics of innovation 
prelude straightforward and simple broad-brush recommendations on instruments (Rist, 1998). Put 
differently, the effects of a policy are context-specific and depend on the way an instrument is put in 
operation (Bressers and O’Toole, 2005). As such, the discussion has turned from “or-or” to finding the 
appropriate combination of instruments to tackle a specific issue. The OECD (1994) concludes that  
 
‘Partly based on empirical studies, there is much less dogmatism or rhetoric in the dialogue on 
environmental policy instruments. A pragmatic approach is beginning to prevail, in which one no 
longer is categorically in favour of or against certain types of instruments, and in which the interest 
is in realistic assessments of the pros and cons of different mixes of instruments in the specific 
policy contexts and applications contexts within which they are to operate.’ (OECD, 1994) 
 
According to Bemelmans-Videc (1998) good governance implies the following evaluation criteria 
should play a role when selecting an instrument: effectiveness, efficiency, legality, democracy and 
legitimacy. Effectiveness refers to the degree of goal-realization. Efficiency refers to cost at which a 
certain objective is reaches. Legality refers to the accordance with formal rules. Democracy refers to 
the correspondence with accepted norms in society and legitimacy refers to the degree to which 
government choices are perceived as “just and lawful”. These criteria however often compete or 
conflict, i.e. instruments that score high on one criterion often score low on other criteria. In this light, 
the idea of combining instruments is the consequence of the search for optimum solutions. Each policy 
tool has its vulnerabilities. Policy packages are needed which balance one instrument’s weaknesses 
against another’s strengths.  
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Moreover, Rist (1998) notices that policymakers usually face a situation where the problem is not well 
understood, where the choice of instruments is constrained and the consequences not all that 
predictable, and where the policy objectives are multiple, perhaps vague, and even at cross purposes. 
In practice, the complexity and interdependence makes that putting al hope on just one instrument is 
blunt. What is needed is a tailor-made policy package that consists of a number of instruments to 
overcome the disadvantages of another instrument or to reinforce another instrument’s effectiveness. 
Effective regulatory design involves tailoring a particular combination of policy instruments to 
particular circumstances. Moreover, as much of our knowledge about policy instruments and in 
particular about what works and when, is tentative, contingent and uncertain, the optimal package will 
not be developed overnight. This suggest the need for adaptive learning, and for treating policies as 
experiments from which we can learn and which in turn can help shape the next generation of 
instruments (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002).  
 
Examples of instrument packages are multiple. In transport policy, governments combine taxation of 
vehicles and automotive fuels with vehicle and fuel efficiency standards, weight limits on heavy 
vehicles and speed limits. In waste policy, many governments combine landfill taxation with 
regulations on separate collection of waste fractions and recycling targets. In Flanders, negotiated 
agreements are concluded to organise the collection and treatment of waste fractions that introduce a 
levy to be paid when purchasing a new product (see research paper 3). In Denmark, concessions on a 
CO2-tax have been granted to industries on the condition that they enter a negotiated agreement with 
the government to increase energy efficiency. The UK offers an 80% discount for energy intensive 
sectors that sign energy efficiency agreements with the government. In such packages the government 
uses the iron fist together with the silk glove. The negotiated agreements contribute to the acceptability 
confronted with industries’ opposition on the tax. Another interesting observation is that the 
Netherlands and Denmark have highest percentage of pollution and resource tax revenues of total 
environmental tax revenue in the EU (Eurostat, 2003) and that these countries are also very active in 
the voluntary approaches area. Especially voluntary approaches are most viewed as complements to 
traditional policy instruments instead of as pure substitutes (Prakash and Potoski, 2006).  
 
 
1.4.  Pragmatism or rationalism 
 
We presented this instrumental perspective from the underlying idea of pragmatism. We departed from 
the observation that the results achieved with direct regulation and MBI are in some cases limited 
which creates incentives for the development of new instruments. It turned out that voluntary 
approaches (combined with other policy instruments) might deliver a preferable outcome balancing 
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between effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy concerns. As such, our pragmatic viewpoint not 
necessarily corresponds with a sub-optimal connotation.  
 
The transaction cost perspective for explaining voluntary approaches, presented in the preliminary 
chapter, already revealed that in certain occasions it might be rational to seek alternatives to 
hierarchical policy-making.  For instance, when information is hard to get for the policy-maker, it 
might be rational to shift the responsibility to the actors who are in a better position to assemble the 
necessary information. A common example is the development of environmental management 
standards, a task that the government has ‘outsourced’ to the business community. We have also 
claimed that higher levels of trust between social actors and the government reduce the need to resort 
to highly detailed and extensive contractual arrangements which go along with the hierarchical mode 
of solving coordination problems. As such, in policy networks with high levels of interconnectedness 
and trust between the actors, voluntary approaches might be a far more efficient and fast way of 
policy-making.  
 
 
2. A governmental perspective: towards multi-actor governance 
 
2.1.   Advantages of voluntary approaches 
 
By resorting to voluntary approaches, the government to some extent forgoes from its public 
responsibility. The government neglects the task of safeguarding a clean and healthy environment. 
Which advantages could motivate the government to hand some of its power to the business 
community? We present some arguments often found in the literature that could have an impact on the 
following evaluation criteria for environmental instruments, but also point to some dangers: 
 Effectiveness: Voluntary approaches could contribute to the effectiveness of environmental 
policy in at least two ways. First, non-compliance problems might be reduced as one can 
expect an increased internal motivation from business. Moreover, limited resources can be 
invested more rationally by focussing on companies that do not participate in voluntary 
initiatives like self-audits or EMS. Second, time lags in traditional environmental policy 
making might be overcome by surpassing the often time-consuming legislative route. Besides 
a more flexible approach enables to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Transferring 
some responsibility to the business sector on the other hand brings along the danger of 
regulatory capture: industry might exploit this opportunity to bring down environmental 
targets. Moreover, industry might use voluntary approaches to create an image of ‘green 
enlightenment’ that diminishes citizens’ request for stricter environmental regulations. 
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 Efficiency: Especially compared to the command-and-control type of regulation, voluntary 
approaches present an opportunity to increase efficiency. When companies are left to choose 
their own route to improved environmental performance, one can expect they will opt for a 
cost-minimizing route to pollution abatement and target achievement. Besides, voluntary 
approaches might promote cooperation amongst companies whereas traditional instruments 
only evoke responses on an individual company basis. This is important when economies of 
scale, learning effects or synergies can be exploited. Governments on their side may save on 
administrative and control costs. It should however be emphasized that these efficiency gains 
are not automatically materialised. A burden sharing mechanism at sector level, for instance, 
is not frequently developed within negotiated agreements.  
 Legitimacy/acceptability: As business is involved in the policy-making process, the 
acceptance of voluntary approaches is likely to be high. For other interested parties like trade 
unions or environmental pressure groups, the acceptance might however shrink, as it may be 
perceived as a withdrawal of the government as a protector of public interests and a freeway 
for firms to pollute.  
 
 
2.2.  Government failure 
 
Welfare economics argues state intervention is needed (and should be limited) to correct rather well 
defined categories of market failure, such as those arriving from monopolies, externalities, insufficient 
provision of public goods and imperfect information (Trebilcock, 2005). As public choice theory 
however pointed out, one should not consider the authority as some enlightened officialdom with only 
social welfare in mind. On the contrary, politicians as well as bureaucrats are self-interested people: 
politicians’ first interest is to attain or retain office; bureaucrats will be motivated to promote policies 
that maximise their power, pay and prestige. Related to this, Bressers and Huitema (1999) claim that 
government action should be understood from its idiosyncratic characteristics rather than from an 
economic-social welfare point of view. The overall driver of policy-makers is to obtain political 
support from various target and interest groups. As such, policy makers often have to take a multitude 
of decision criteria in account (e.g. cost effectiveness, competitiveness concerns, equity concerns, 
distribution effects etc.). 
 
In addition to the somewhat provocative considerations above, many question whether government 
regulation is a panacea for solving all problems (Coase, 1960; Ostrom, 1990). After all, governments 
themselves sometimes have a tendency to fail (Wolf, 1979; Le Grand, 1991, Dollery and Worthington, 
1996). There is no assurance that politicians and bureaucrats will draft and enforce the optimal law 
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given the complexity of many environmental problems and the available resources at hand. In fact, 
solving environmental problems would be easy if government officials had perfect information and 
there were no transaction costs associated with developing, monitoring and enforcing policy decisions. 
Unfortunately, real-world complexities and uncertainties exceed the government’s ability to perfectly 
predict future events, specify policies for all circumstances, and devise low-cost mechanisms to ensure 
that the policy outcomes match specified objectives. Scarce resources with respect to information, 
time, finances, expertise etc. imply that bounded rationality is the highest one can aim for.  
 
Webb (2005) points to the following “new realities” that governments face in the twenty-first century: 
 Factors that highlight some of the limits of the state, such as the increasing significance of 
international influences beyond the control of national and sub-national governments, the 
continuous calls on governments for “no new taxes”, industry pressures to minimize 
regulatory burden and thereby enhance their capacity to compete, and the rise in importance of 
technological issues. 
 Recognition that actors other than the state have both an interest in and a capacity to carry out 
governing functions, be they industry associations, nongovernmental organizations, 
communities or individual citizens.  
 
Bressers and O’Toole (1998, p. 215) claim that the surge of interest in policy networks “has been 
fuelled partly by recognition of the complex array of actors involved in policy choices as well as the 
inability of contemporary government to move unilaterally without incorporating the constraints, 
preferences and resources of other social actors”.  
 
 
2.3. Horizontal policy-making in a multi-actor network 
 
Janicke and Weidner (1997) argue that nations in similar stages of development face similar issues and 
move through comparable phases in environmental problem solving. Glasbergen (1996) developed a 
learning model to explain policy change as an effort to develop three kinds of capacities for policy 
learning:  
 Technical learning: consist of a search for new policy instruments in the context of fixed 
policy objectives. Change occurs without fundamental discussion of objectives or basic 
strategies. Policy makers respond to demand for change with “more of the same” kinds of 
solutions: more regulation, oversight and enforcement. Technical learning is characterised by 
a high degree of technical and legal proficiency, but also narrow problem definitions, 
institutional fragmentation, and adversarial relations among actors.  
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 Conceptual learning: is a process of redefining policy goals and adjusting problem definitions 
and strategies. Growing recognition of deficiencies in technical learning led to a search for 
new goals, strategies and policy instruments. New concepts (pollution prevention, ecological 
modernization, sustainability) enter the lexicon.  
 Social learning: stresses communication and interaction among actors. Continued 
dissatisfaction with aspects of environmental regulation, especially adversarial relationships 
and a lack of capacity for cooperative problem-solving, led to efforts to innovate through 
social learning  
 
The need for social learning recognises that governments achieve public purposes by steering a 
complex network of public and private actors, institutions, ideas and policy instruments. As Salamons 
(2002) has expressed it: ‘governance has moved - or is moving - from reliance on vertical, or 
hierarchically based instruments to network based regulations and the adoption of new indirect tools 
of government.’ Webb (2005) adopts a view of governance as ‘the sum of the many ways individuals 
and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs’.  
 
Figure 2-3 tentatively illustrates the vertical and horizontal perspective on policy making. The left 
hand side of the figure pictures the old-fashioned policy model. In this setting, the government is not 
considered as a part of society but rather as an enlightened intelligence that unilaterally imposes its 
will upon society based on coercive power. It can only be hoped that representatives are inspired by 
the belief in social instead of personal welfare. Social interactions are the result of a hierarchical top-
down approach. Industry’s role is that of a passive actor that obediently submits.  
 
In a horizontal, multi-actor network, the government is recognised as forming a part of society at 
large. Society comprises all actors involved, individuals as well as social groups and institutions that 
developed and the interactions between these actors. These interactions may take on several shapes, 
from mutual dependency to vague interest in others. The diverging boldness of the lines indicates the 
difference in intensity of the relationship between the different actors (without stating that the boldness 
of the lines in our picture reveals the true intensity). The government is seen as a mediator between the 
interests of social actors instead of as a coercive actor imposing its will on a unilateral basis. The 
vertical-horizontal representation corresponds with the distinction between the notions of 
‘government’ versus ‘governance’. As Jordan et al. (2003) note, these should not be treated as fixed 
entities but rather as two poles on a continuum of different governing types. If the extreme form of 
government was ‘the strong state’ in the are of ‘big government’ then the equally extreme form of 
governance is an essentially self governing network of social actors. 
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Figure 2-3: Vertical versus horizontal policy model 
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The government is consciously placed in the middle of the interactions as the government still takes on 
a unique position due to its coercive power. Notwithstanding the government is no longer on top of the 
system, it still has an unequivocal power to steer interactions between and conducts of actors. 
Government must enjoy some independence from industry influence if it is to maintain pressure for 
improved environmental performance. At the same time, there must be a reasonable degree of trust, 
potential for collaboration, sharing of information, and respect for mutual competence among 
government and industry to sustain the level of dialogue needed to support innovation (Wallace 1995). 
Regarding voluntary approaches, this especially holds for negotiated agreements and public schemes 
but less for unilateral commitments. In the latter, the government is no longer pivotal in the middle, 
but should rather be positioned at the periphery of societal actors. In these occasions, the government 
only plays a secondary role at best and societal self-regulation comes in. The environmental 
management standard ISO 14001 for instance is developed by the International Organization for 
Standardization, with only limited government involvement. Companies implementing this standard 
are audited by private companies. It involves agreements concluded between environmental pressure 
groups and large corporations (e.g. the better banana project between Chiquita and the Rainforest 
Alliance; agreement between KLM and WWF to compensate 4 million tons of CO2). We believe there 
is still huge potential in involving third parties in the governance, especially non-for-profit 
organisations that have great trust by citizens. It is well known that politicians are viewed with more 
and more scrutiny by the public opinion. Governments are acknowledging this fact and have reacted 
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accordingly by getting parts of their administrations certified with ISO 14001 or EMAS or having 
their forest management certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). 
 
Bressers and O’Toole have investigated the implications of a network-based perspective of the social 
and political context in which policy makers have to work. Bressers and O’Toole (2005) claim that 
instruments should be considered as potential shifters of ongoing processes of interaction among 
interested parties. They acknowledge that the selection of policy instruments is constrained by the 
political context in which they are to operate. Instruments that reshape the distribution of costs and 
benefits at the disadvantage of powerful actors are unlikely to be implemented. Bressers and O’Toole 
(1998) claim the instrument selection is largely determined and thus constrained by the distribution of 
information in a policy setting, the interests and objectives of the actors involved and the level of 
interaction they have become accustomed to. As such they point to the fact that policy makers are 
constrained by and dependent on the social and political context in which they seek to achieve policy 
objectives.  
 
Aggeri (1999) describes the new role for the state as follows: “Once collective innovation is regarded 
as the chief means of achieving ambitious environmental targets, with the authorities forced to 
abandon their traditional role of unilaterally imposing a regulatory framework because they lack the 
necessary knowledge, we consider that the issue of public intervention is no longer one of defining, 
implementing and controlling measures, but rather one of coordinating innovation.”  
 
Important to notice that social learning and the resulting policy model implies a different, though not 
necessary lesser role for the state (Fiorino, 2001). Indeed, Wallace (1995) gives credit to the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden for sustaining an independent, authoritative government that 
maintains pressure on industry while also creating the conditions that foster a productive dialogue. In 
fact, none of these countries is known to have small government impact on society. Jordan et al. 
(2003) also claim that new instruments may involve more state involvement. This especially holds for 
the central government when compared to the days when most regulation was implemented and 
enforced at a fairly local level. They refer to the UK where the environmental ministry devoted 17 
person years to negotiate just 42 climate change agreements.  
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3. A corporate perspective: a stakeholder view on company behaviour 
 
3.1.  Advantages of voluntary approaches 
 
Why would a company volunteer to exceed environmental performance standards set by regulators? 
Investing in pollution abatement entails costs and the resources spent cannot be used for other 
activities such as marketing, research, or shareholder premiums. Generally, most arguments can be 
categorised in the following three motivations: 
 Cost savings: may be the result of environmental improvements, due to e.g. reduced use of 
raw materials or energy, lower environmental tax bills or less waste to be disposed. These 
improvements are also known as ‘no-regret actions’. This potential exists as companies are 
confronted with imperfect information, cognitive limits and inappropriate organisational 
structures (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). Voluntary programs might help companies to 
discover these gains and to pick up “the low hanging fruits”. 
 Regulatory gains: are savings that result from the avoidance of public regulation. Regulatory 
gains may come in two forms (Higley et al., 2001). Adopting a voluntary action might result 
in the setting of a lower environmental standard or might shape future regulations. Moreover, 
voluntary action might reduce compliance costs by allowing greater flexibility compared to a 
regulation with a similar target level. Besides, governments sometimes grant benefits like 
technical assistance or financial subsidies to companies adopting voluntary approaches.  
 Green reputation building: departs from the premise that some consumers are prepared to pay 
a premium for green products. Recent consumer and marketing research has pointed to the 
importance of the brand image in explaining consumption behaviour. Costumers choose 
between products because they want to identify with the brand and related role models rather 
than looking at price differentials (Klein, 2000). The choice between fair trade coffee or 
traditional brands is rather explained by the norms and values of a consumer instead of by 
price-quality comparisons. In order to build this reputation companies often require similar 
environmental standards from their suppliers and subcontractors. A good company reputation 
might also be beneficial to attract new employees, create goodwill with a large area of 
stakeholders like the local community, environmental pressure groups, the government etc.  
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3.2.  A stakeholder view on company behaviour 
 
Just as the government in the previous section, the stakeholder view on corporate behaviour takes the 
company out of its isolation and explicitly views the company as an actor in society. Nowadays, 
companies have enormous economic power and social impact. Decisions they make not only impact 
their internal stakeholders (employees, shareholders, suppliers, costumers etc.) but also a large range 
of external stakeholders such as regulators, the media, environmental groups, the public at large etc. 
They were successful in expending widthways (e.g. Eastern Europe, South-East Asia) and in depth 
into social life influencing the goods we consume, the panorama of our cities, the media we consult, 
public policy making etc (Klein, 2000). Consequently, public expectations about the role and 
responsibility of companies within society have changed. The company no longer operates in a social 
vacuum but at the centre of a network of actors, commonly called stakeholders. The modern 
corporation is the centre of a network of interdependent interests and constituents, each contributing to 
its performance, and each anticipating benefits (or at least no uncompensated harm) as a result of the 
corporation’s activities. There is a continuous interaction between the company and stakeholders of 
which the company’s long-term survival depends. Effective stakeholder management develops and 
utilizes relationships between a corporation and its stakeholders for mutual benefit. Ignoring their 
interests will in the long term undermine the company’s ‘social licence to operate’ (Post et al. 2002). 
Social acceptance is a necessary resource just like employees, raw material and money. This modern 
perspective on company behaviour is captured in the notion of “corporate social responsibility” which 
is situated at the junction between the activities of a company, how it considers and implements its 
responsibilities and the expectations in this regard of society and stakeholders in particular (Wood, 
1991, Klok, 2003). This modern view holds a rejection of the conventional ‘ownership’ model that 
places primary emphasis on investors’ return (Post et al, 2002).  
 
Figure 2-4 draws an image to enable a better comprehension of how stakeholder pressures influence 
company decisions. At the left a number of external stakeholders (who involuntary impact the 
company) are pictured, in the larger square in the middle contains some internal stakeholders (who 
voluntary associate with the company). Both provide inputs (e.g. pressure, regulations, product 
requirements, information requests) in the company’s decision process. As argued by Neumann (1995) 
there is no straightforward way of how these inputs will be turned into an output, i.e. environmental 
policies. In contrast, the decision-making process is complex en context-specific. No two companies 
will react exactly similar on identical stakeholder requests. The small arrows within the company 
square resemble this complexity. As well company structures as cultures explain such differences. Is 
there a separate environmental division or are environmental responsibilities integrated in other 
management functions? Is the company structured centralized, bureaucratic and hierarchic or rather 
 57
Chapter 2 – Explaining the introduction of voluntary approaches 
decentralized, cooperative and horizontal? Is the company an open and learning organization, is there 
a culture of innovation, is top management fully committed?  
 
Figure 2-4: Stakeholder perspective on a company’s environmental policy 
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The differences in which companies respond to these challenges is being captured in environmental 
strategy models. Companies are classified from re-active (defensive, compliance) to pro-active 
(offensive or excellence). An interesting model is provided by Roome (1994).  
 
The model combines companies’ environmental strategies with organizational change models. When a 
company only pursues compliance, a mere follow up of new technologies to keep up with tightening 
environmental regulations suffices. A company that takes an additional step and searches for new 
management systems or structures to re-organise the decision-making process, is classified as 
‘compliance plus’. To achieve excellence, the company needs to re-identify itself; it needs to 
reconsider its values and culture in correspondence with stakeholder requests. The previous step only 
influences ways of doing, the third step involves a reconsideration of underlying motivations. It is 
about creating new values, beliefs, cultures that penetrate the structures of companies that steer 
behaviour.  
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Table 2-1: Environmental strategies and organizational change 
 Excellence Compliance plus Compliance 
Fist-order 
Techniques and greener technology 
X X X 
Second-order 
Management systems and structures 
X X  
Third-order 
Organization and individual values/culture 
X   
 Source: Room (1994) 
 
 
Research paper 1 
 
What determines the decision to implement EMAS? A European firm level study 
R. Bracke, T. Verbeke and V. Dejonckheere 
 
Section 3.2. indicated that the environmental strategy of companies ranges from defensive to 
proactive. Voluntary approaches are to be expected especially within the subset of environmental 
leading companies. The question that emerges is what distinguishes proactive companies from 
companies that seem to prefer a defensive strategy? This first research paper contributes to the 
related literature by empirically analysing the determinants of companies’ participation decision in 
EMAS based on a sample of large, publicly quoted companies. As well the subject under study, 
EMAS, as well as the European scope of the research distinguish this paper from related literature 
and both are elements that could point to diverging results from previous studies.  
 
Abstract. Empirical research on the characteristics of environmentally responsive companies 
has focussed on US and Japanese firms. For Europe, which is commonly considered as the 
greenest of the three major markets, similar research is lacking. This paper seeks to fill this gap 
by empirically investigating business and financial characteristics, stakeholder pressures and 
public policies to distinguish companies that have implemented the European Eco-Management 
and Audit System (EMAS) from a unique firm-level dataset of European publicly quoted 
companies. We find that the EMAS participation decision is positively influenced by the solvency 
ratio, the share of non-current liabilities, the average labour cost and the absolute company size 
as well as the relative size of a company compared to its sector average. The profit margin exerts 
a negative influence. We further find that companies whose headquarters is located in a country 
that actively encourages EMAS have a higher probability of participation. Finally, this paper 
suggests that whereas a favourable institutional context has little influence on the kind of 
companies that participate, it influences the amount of similar companies that participate. 
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4. The regulation dilemma 
 
Both the network-oriented government perspective as the stakeholder view on companies merge 
naturally. By shaping the playing field in which companies may operate, the government becomes an 
important stakeholder for the company. The enormous (economic) power and social impact of 
companies on the other hand makes their interests and concerns an important input in the 
government’s policymaking task. The regulation dilemma shows the potential benefits for both parties 
if they take on an open and responsive stance to each others requests.  
 
The regulation dilemma was developed by Scholz (1991) and is used by Potoski and Prakash (2004) to 
analyse potential gains of voluntary approaches and regulatory relief programs. It shows how 
governments and firms can avoid lose-lose conflict and instead achieve win-win cooperation. Drawing 
on a simple prisoners’ dilemma game to illustrate the regulation dilemma, Potoski and Prakash (2004) 
suggest how to transform a deterrence-based regulation into a cooperation-based one. An example 
with hypothetical payoffs is shown in table 2-2 below (the numbers on the left indicate the firm’s 
payoff; the numbers on the right that of the government). 
 
 Table 2-2: The regulation dilemma 
GOVERNMENT 
Deterrence Flexible 
Evasion (2,2) (5,1) 
FI
R
M
 
Self-policing (1,5) (4,4) 
 Source: Potoski and Prakash (2004) 
 
The game is played as follows. The government can choose between adopting a deterrence 
enforcement style or a flexible approach. In a deterrence strategy, governments strive to inspect and 
audit every firm in order to discover and fully punish every violation. This is the prominent approach 
to go with traditional command-and-control policy. Problems, as seen, include the complexity of 
regulations, limited resources, creating adversarial relations etc. In the flexible approach, regulators 
neither rigidly interpret the law nor penalize firms for every violation. Instead, regulators forgo 
punishing self-discovered violations, particularly minor ones, reduce the level of sanctioning and 
provide positive incentives such as technical assistance to help firms achieve compliance (Scholz, 
1991).  
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Firms on the their side can choose their compliance style: evasion or self-policing. In the evasion 
approach, firms look for opportunities to skirt environmental regulations to save on compliance costs. 
In the self-policing approach, firms monitor their environmental activities and report and promptly 
correct violations, hoping the regulator takes a lenient view towards (minor) violations.  
 
The dilemma consists in the fact that both firms and governments have incentives to behave 
opportunistically creating lose-lose interactions. The Nash-equilibrium is situated in the upper-left 
corner where the firm plays evasion and the government plays deterrence. No matter which approach 
the company chooses, the government is always better off choosing deterrence. If the company plays 
evasion, a flexible approach from the government would play in the company’s cards leading to major 
non-compliance. Thus governments should play deterrence to increase their payoff from 1 to 2. If the 
company self-polices, government’s payoff equals 4 if a flexible approach is adopted as only minor 
non-compliance, which is promptly corrected, occurs. A deterrence strategy is however more 
beneficial as governments can exploit firms’ self-policing by fully punishing regulatory violations that 
are voluntarily disclosed in good faith.  
 
Companies on the other hand are always better off evading. Companies may exploit governments’ 
regulatory relief by evading regulations even more effectively under more lax monitoring. Obviously, 
in case the government plays deterrence, there is no use for the company to voluntary report non-
compliances. In addition, critical citizens and environmental groups might criticize the government’s 
flexible enforcement style as granting a permit to pollute or might fiercely attack firms that voluntarily 
disclose violations. Thus, the Nash equilibrium occurs when the government plays deterrence and the 
company chooses evasion. No party has an incentive to deviate and both know the other party has no 
incentive to deviate. Consequently, mutual suspicion about the other party’s opportunistic incentive 
undermines cooperation. Once trapped in, there is no (easy) way out. Unfortunately, this outcome is 
sub-optimal. Command and control pits regulators and firms in a contentious stance, resulting in more 
lawsuits and larger societal costs. Rigidly enforcing regulations and “going by the book” increases 
firms’ compliance costs, and creates incentives for firms to evade regulations. In a vicious cycle, 
regulators may respond with more monitoring, stricter enforcement and harsher penalties. 
The dilemma described above is the expected game theoretical outcome of the game, especially when 
it is considered as a one-shot game. Clearly, the outcome in which government regulators choose the 
flexible enforcement style and firms adopt self-policing compliance strategies would be preferential. 
Regulators win because self-policing lightens their enforcement burden while achieving superior 
environmental outcomes. Firms win because the regulatory incentives that governments provide under 
cooperation (forgiveness for minor violations, technical assistance, flexibility with meeting standards) 
make compliance easier and improve bottom-line profits. This outcome will only occur if each actor is 
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confident the other side will cooperate. Each however has an incentive to cheat and above, both know 
the other has a good reason (at least in the short run) to deviate. For cooperation to occur, both actors 
need to credibly assure the other they will not behave opportunistically. Both firms and regulators 
must find ways to credibly signal to the other that their cooperative intentions are genuine. Incentives 
to cooperate increase when players engage in long-term, face-to-face, repeated interactions that 
become informally institutionalized in players’ reputation. Because reputation building takes time and 
is expensive, the desire to benefit from an existing trustworthy reputation may create incentives to 
shun short-term opportunism. Moreover, as trust begets more trust over time and good reputations 
become solidified, a virtuous circle of cooperation may evolve. Whereas repeated interaction and 
reputation will probably keep players in the cooperative solution, concrete proves might be needed to 
get them there in the first place. Fortunately, real world solutions exist and are available to firms and 
regulators. Regulators can establish regulatory relief programs and environmental audit policies that 
grant significant immunity to companies’ violations discovered through self-audits. Firms on their part 
can establish credible commitments by participating in voluntary approaches such as ISO 14001, 
EMAS or Responsible Care requiring self-policing and being audited by external parties. Bressers and 
O’Toole (1998) describe how the Dutch environmental policy style changed from legalistic to more 
cooperative during the 1980s. By establishing intermediary organizations, intensifying contacts, 
creating a government with a high likelihood of a cohesive relationship with target groups, the 
preferred policy tools switched from legal instruments to covenants. This example proves that a the 
policy context can be manipulated to achieve the cooperative outcome.  
 
In fact, we believe that in real-world settings this outcome is rather likely to occur for a number of 
reasons. First of all, one of the main lessons from game theory is that communication between the two 
players might result in the preferential outcome. Unlike the prisoners’ dilemma, communication 
between the government and the firm is very likely. Bressers and O’Toole (2005) describe policy 
making as ongoing interactive processes between policy makers and interest groups. Authorities and 
target groups often exert influence on each other before – sometimes long before – the policy that is to 
be implemented is introduced. In addition, they often meet each other not only on a certain 
environmental issue but also in other social and economic arenas. Related to this is the lesson from 
game theory that when a game is played multiple times, the more likely it is that the cooperative 
outcome will be played. Environmental policy-making can certainly not be regarded as a one shot 
game. Finally, it should be reckoned that the bottom-right cell is the long-term optimal situation for 
both parties. Deviating will only result in short-term gains. When the firm knows the government will 
play “flexible”, it might consider playing evasion to increase the pay off from 4 to 5. However, in the 
next stage of the game the government is likely to switch her strategy to deterrence in order to increase 
the pay off from 1 to 2. This results in the dilemma situation in which both the firm and the 
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government are worse off. As such, it can be concluded that if both players are rational and adopt a 
long-term perspective, they will refrain from short-term opportunistic behavior. To conclude, the 
(social) optimal situation results even if the players only look at their own long-term benefit. And as 
claimed above, in many political settings, the probability that players adopt a long-term vision is high.  
 
 
5.  Summary 
 
The rather spontaneous development of voluntary approaches as an alternative to more traditional 
modes of environmental policy making raises the question on the underlying drivers of their 
introduction. This chapter offered three, mutually complementary, explanations. The instrumental 
perspective primary points to the disadvantages of command-and-control and MBI in pursuing 
environmental goals. It departs from a disillusioned premise on these instruments; the costs and 
limitations of these instruments triggered the introduction of alternative instruments. As such, 
voluntary approaches are considered as pragmatic responses to problems faced in the practice of 
drawing environmental regulations.  
 
Both the government as the business perspective presents a modern view on the most prominent actors 
that shape environmental policies. The government is pictured as the centre of a network of actors 
aiming at societal change. Horizontal governance by cooperation replaces the vertical governance 
model in which the government unilaterally imposes regulations by cooperation and consultation. 
Companies on their side are seen as institutions aiming to create wealth for a large array of 
stakeholders. Incorporating stakeholders’ requests on environmental issues becomes a strategic 
opportunity that might be crucial for a company’s long-term survival. Finally, the regulation dilemma 
shows how an environmental policy conducted along the perspectives described in this chapter might 
be beneficial both for the regulator as for the companies involved. 
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Chapter 3 - The diffusion of voluntary approaches 
 
 
“Although the countries share a common set of drivers, the resulting pattern of NEPI (New 
Environmental Policy Instruments) use is highly differentiated across and within countries and 
sectors. States have used different NEPIs for different reasons, in different contexts, at different 
times… There is a continuing debate whether national policies are converging towards a common 
model. To the extent that states used to apply different variants of the same instrument 
(regulation) but now apply different variants of different instruments, national environmental 
policies have probably diverged in the last 30 years in spite of the EU’s attempts to promote 
greater harmonisation and hence convergence.”  
 
Jordan, Wurzel and Zito (2003), ‘New’ Instruments of Environmental Governance? National 
Experiences and Prospects, p. 220. 
 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the worldwide uptake of voluntary approaches and the 
geographical diffusion thereof. The first section starts by showing some examples of the growing 
interest in self-regulatory and cooperative initiatives over the last decades. Section 2 examines the 
geographical diffusion of voluntary approaches. First, an overview of the interest in these substitutes 
to traditional environmental regulation in different countries is provided. It highlights that different 
countries have embraced these new modes of soft regulation with varying intensity. Moreover, in their 
search for alternatives to overcome the disadvantages of the traditional environmental policy 
approach, each jurisdiction followed its idiosyncratic pathway. Some types of voluntary approaches 
are adopted with enthusiasm while other types are largely absent. Next, we provide an institutional 
perspective to explain the diverging diffusion patterns that were identified in the first part of this 
section. Section 3 draws the attention to a qualitative shift concerning the way voluntary approaches, 
and especially negotiated agreements, have been implemented in European countries. Section 4 
resumes the findings of this chapter. 
 
 
1.  The growing interest in voluntary approaches over time 
 
Over the last decades, governments and businesses throughout the world have expressed growing 
interest in various forms of soft environmental regulation. A sharp increase has occurred since the 
beginning of the 1990s (OECD, 1999). The drivers of this increase have been discussed in the 
previous chapter. Here we start by depicting some prominent examples of the growing popularity of 
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voluntary approaches over time: (1) voluntary environmental reporting; (2) ISO 14001 certificates; (3) 
fair-trade certified producer organizations; (4) participation in EPA’s voluntary programs and (5) 
negotiated environmental agreements in the EU. 
 
 
2B1.1.  Voluntary environmental reporting 
 
Since 1993 KPMG reports, on a triennial basis, on the frequency of corporate responsibility (CR) 
reporting amongst major companies. The 2005 report includes the top 250 companies of the Fortune 
500 list (G250) and the top 100 companies in 16 countries (N100). As such, it provides a global 
picture of non-financial reporting trends over the last decade. Table 3-1 shows the results of these 
studies. The results clearly illustrate the growing interest in voluntary reporting social and 
environmental performance data to stakeholders and the general public. It appears that by the year 
2005, over half of the G250 companies published a separate corporate responsibility report. For the 
N100 sample, the percentage has risen from 13% in 1993 to 33% in 2005. 
 
0BTable 3-1: Evolution of corporate responsibility reporting  
 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 
9BSample 10 
countries 
13 
countries 
11 countries 
+ G250 
19 countries  
+ G250 
16 countries + G250 
N100 
(% of companies 
with CR report) 
13% 17% 24% 23% 
(28% for 11 
countries of 1999) 
33% 
(41% including CR information 
in annual reports) 
G250 
(% of companies 
with CR report) 
  35% 45% 52% 
(64% including CR information 
in annual reports) 
 Source: KPMG (2005) 
 
 
1.2.   ISO 14001 certificates  
 
Developed in 1996 by the International Organization for Standardization, ISO 14001 has become the 
worldwide standard for environmental management. The uptake of the standard is high with over 
110.000 certified organizations in 138 countries by the end of 2005 (see figure 3-1). In a growing 
number of industrial sectors, ISO 14001 is becoming a prerequisite for doing business. A number of 
multinational corporations like IBM, Xerox, Honda, Toyota, Bristol-Myers have encouraged their 
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suppliers to become ISO 14001 certified. Ford Motor Company and General Motors required all their 
suppliers to be certified by 2003 (Bansal and Bogner, 2002).  
 
10BFigure 3-1: Worldwide number of ISO 14001 certificates 
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 Source: 1995-2000: ISO (2001); 2001-2005: ISO (2006) 
 
The number of sites that have registered under the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), the 
European counterpart to ISO 14001 developed by the European commission, has reached is highest 
number ever in the beginning of 2007 with over 5.500 registered sitesF1F. However, it should be 
acknowledged that the diffusion of EMAS is almost negligible compare to ISO 14001 (an in-depth 
analysis of the diffusion of both standards can be found in research paper 2 presented further in this 
chapter). 
 
 
1.3.  Fair-trade certified producer organizations 
 
The growing success of fair-trade labeled products provides another indicator of changing consumers’ 
and producers’ conduct. Fair-trade standards establish requirements for producers and traders but also 
include requirements to continuously improve working conditions, environmental sustainability and 
organizational development for workers and small farmers. In 2006, consumers worldwide bought 1,6 
billion Euros worth of fair-trade certified products, a rise of 42% compared to the year before. 
Between 2004 and 2006 the growth in the number of licensees (companies selling certified fair-trade 
products) was 68% (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 2007). An increasing number of 
‘mainstream’ companies and major supermarkets are embracing the fair-trade concept (e.g. Sainsbury, 
Marks&Spencer, Scandic and Hilton Hotels, Ryanair and Air Berlin). Figure 3-2 shows the evolution 
of the number of fair-trade certified producer organizations.  
                                                 
1 HUhttp://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/documents/articles_en.htm#statisticU 
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11BFigure 3-2: Evolution of the number of fair-trade certified producer organizations 
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 Source: International Labelling Organizations International (2007) 
 
 
1.4.  Participation in EPA’s voluntary programs. 
 
By 1996, 31 public voluntary programs were initiated by the EPA in the US. Companies are invited to 
participate in these programs that aim to improve their environmental performance. Public recognition 
and technical assistance by the state are the major drivers to induce company-participation. Some 
examples are Green Lights, Climate Wise, Energy Star, Waste Wise and the 33/50 program. As Figure 
3-3 shows, these programs are successful in terms of company participation with about 7.000 
participants in 1996 (Mazurek, 2002). EPA estimates the total number of partners in 2002 to be about 
11.000 (Mazurek, 2002). 
 
Figure 3-3: Number of firms participating in EPA’s voluntary programs 
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 Source: Mazurek (2002) 
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1.5.  Negotiated agreements in the EU-15 
 
Negotiated agreements signed between public authorities and branch organisations are the most 
popular type of voluntary approach used in the EU (OECD, 1999). In 1996 an inventory made by the 
European Commission estimated the number of negotiated agreements at 305 (EC, 1996a). The actual 
number was however higher as agreements concluded at sub-national level were not included and 
because the informal character hindered the collection of data. As figure 3-4 shows, the amount of 
agreements concluded was on the rise since the beginning of the nineties. The average number of 
agreements signed annually was less than 5 in the period 1980-1985. The average became 12 in the 
period 1986-1994 and the numbers were 47 and 34 for 1995 and 1996 (EEA, 1997). Unfortunately, no 
encompassing inventory studies have been undertaken after 1996, so it is difficult to confirm whether 
this trend has carried on after 1996. An attempt has been made by Jordan et al. (2003) for eight 
countries: Australia, Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. 
However, for many countries they do not really provide new information but refer to the sources 
indicated above. Nevertheless the picture that emerges is that countries where negotiated agreements 
have become popular in the eighties and nineties, like the Netherlands and Germany, continue to use 
this instrument (see also Bressers et al. forthcoming). In countries like Ireland, France or Finland 
where negotiated agreements only played a minor role, there are no signs that the use of negotiated 
agreements is accelerating. As such, there is growing divergence instead of convergence with respect 
to the use of negotiated agreements in Europe. 
 
Figure 3-4: New environmental agreements in EU member states by year 
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Source: EC (1996a) 
 
The fact that negotiated agreements operate in the shadow of law in many countries makes it difficult 
to obtain reliable data. In addition, in many countries agreements are also concluded at lower 
government levels (e.g. regions or provinces). The OECD/EEA database on economic and voluntary 
 71
Chapter 3 – The diffusion of voluntary approaches 
instruments (HUhttp://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/index.htmUH) provides a good example of the lack of 
reliable data. As well for Germany as for the Netherlands only one negotiated agreements can be 
found, whereas almost all other sources report these countries as having implemented over a hundred 
agreements.  
 
 
2.  The geographical diffusion of voluntary approaches 
 
2.1.  A worldwide diffusion pattern 
 
The previous section presented some illustrations of the growing interest in various forms of business 
self-regulatory initiatives and negotiated rulemaking. However, there are huge differences in the extent 
to which this trend has occurred in different countries over the globe. Moreover, one notices profound 
divergence with respect to the types of voluntary approaches that are adopted within different 
countries. However, in fact the opposite observation (i.e. equal adoption among countries) would 
come as much more astonishing surprise. Countries simply differ with respect to institutional setting, 
socio-economic context, informal habits, norms, values etc. As such, it is to be expected that they 
differ regarding the preferred instrument mix in environmental policy as well. Capturing some of these 
determining differences will be the aim of section 2.2. As yet, we give a snapshot of the geographical 
diffusion of voluntary approaches. 
 
To our knowledge, the most encompassing study on the worldwide use of voluntary approaches is still 
the OECD report of 1999, which provides a useful starting point. The report concludes that the US 
predominantly uses public voluntary programs developed by the EPA, whereas negotiated agreements 
dominate in Europe and Japan. In Japan, the agreements are especially concluded at the local level as a 
means to overcome the lack of regulatory competences of the local authorities. In Europe, most 
agreements are concluded at the national level between the regulator and a branch organisation in the 
context of a regulatory reform seeking for improved efficiency of environmental policy. In the 
upcoming subsections we will discuss the main findings of the OECD report and add some 
complementary information found in the literature along our threefold categorisation of voluntary 
approaches. Regarding unilateral commitments we limit the scope to ISO 14001. 
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3B2.1.1.   Unilateral commitments: the worldwide uptake of ISO 14001 
 
The ISO 14001 environmental management standard is by far the most popular form of self-regulation 
to which companies can voluntary engage. In contrast to many other unilateral commitments, which 
are by their nature very diverse, ISO 14001 is uniform all over the world and this makes it an 
interesting case to consider regarding the international diffusion of voluntary approaches. Figure 3-5 
shows the top-31 countries with respect to the number of ISO 14001 certified companies. The figure 
shows that the uptake is virtually worldwide. With the exception of Africa, all continents have 
representatives in the top 31. Moreover, also less-developed countries like Iran, Brazil, Rumania, India 
and China occur in the list.  
 
Figure 3-5: The uptake of ISO 14001 certificates (top-31) 
 
 Source: HUhttp://www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analy14k.htmU 
 
Of course, the list above is influenced by the size of a country. Nevertheless, the list includes smaller 
countries like Sweden, Finland, the Czech Republic, Austria and Belgium. Russia on the other hand is 
not amongst the top-31. A more interesting picture emerges when the certification numbers are 
corrected for the size of the economy. Figure 3-6 shows the top-20 of the OECD countries when GDP 
is used as a proxy for the country size. One notices that two major economies, the US and France, are 
not on the list. Less-developed countries like Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republic surpass 
them. Moreover, these countries list above some countries that are known to be environmental 
forerunners like the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Finland. The same holds for Spain and Italy. 
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Figure 3-6: ISO 14001 certificates/GDP: the OECD top-20 
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 Source: ISO 14001 certificates from HUhttp://www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analy14k.htmUH;  
GDP (2006, at current process and exchange rates) from OECD Main Economic Indicators, 
July, 2007. 
 
This distribution pattern has drawn the attention of many researchers (see e.g. Delmas, 2002; Kollman 
and Prakash, 2002; Corbett and Kirsch, 2004; Potoski and Prakash, 2004; Vastag, 2004; Moon and 
Deleon, 2005; Prakash and Potoski, 2006). Before we move on trying to provide a more encompassing 
explanation of the geographical diffusion of voluntary approaches in subsection 2.2., we point to some 
results from the literature referred to above. First, large sample econometric analysis revealed the 
significance of determinants like export ratio, economic structure (e.g. industry or services), the 
number of ISO 9001 certificates, public pressure and government’s adherence to sustainable 
development. Second, there is some “anecdotic” evidence (see e.g. Klok, 2000). The huge uptake in 
Japan could be explained by the negative economic impact resulting from the refusal of Japanese 
companies to adopt ISO 9001 in the beginning of the 1990s. The Japanese were convinced they 
possessed leading quality management practices and had little faith that they could learn from the ISO 
standards developed largely under the influence of their American competitors. Without stating that 
ISO 9001 is the better standard, companies all over the world adopted the standard that soon became a 
necessary asset for doing business. The eager to avoid a similar negative impact on their exports in the 
wake of the introduction of ISO 14001 resulted in a wide business uptake and government support in 
Japan. The low uptake rate in the US on the other hand is partly attributed to the litigious atmosphere; 
giving information on environmental impacts and legal non-conformities of the company is dangerous 
there (Klok, 2000). 
 
 74
Chapter 3 – The diffusion of voluntary approaches 
7B2.1.2.  Public voluntary schemes: EPA voluntary programs and EMAS 
 
This subcategory of voluntary approaches is especially popular in the US. The OECD inventory of 
1999 identified 42 voluntary approaches in the US, of which 31 were public programs, 9 unilateral 
commitments by industry organisations and only 2 negotiated agreements (the Common Sense 
Initiative (1994) and Project XL (1995)). The EPA administers these public programs. The EPA 
typically uses this approach when the agency has no statutory authority to take formal regulatory 
actions. They appear as a complement to existing regulations. The agency attracts business 
participation by offering technical information and/or public recognition.  
 
Of the public voluntary schemes, the majority arose from the Clinton Administration’s Climate 
Change Action Plan (e.g. Green Lights, Climate Wise, Motor Challenge and Energy Star Buildings). 
Lyon and Maxwell (2003) characterise them with the following features: (1) they can be implemented 
at little or no cost to at least some subset of firms; (2) they arose in an era in which the regulatory 
authorities did not have a statutory mandate to require any actions; and (3) the heterogeneity of the 
offenders would have made command and control regulation complex and costly for regulators to 
administer. 
 
In Europe there are two well-known voluntary schemes: EMAS and the Eco-labelling Scheme. None 
of either is unanimously considered a success. Especially the Eco-labelling scheme has failed to attract 
company participation. EMAS (see figure 3-5 above) is somewhat more popular in terms of 
participation. Compared to the private counterpart ISO 14001, however, the uptake is minor with only 
1 EMAS registered site for every 7 ISO 14001 certifications in the EU-15 (see research paper 2 
introduced further in this chapter for an in depth analysis of the uptake of ISO 14001 compared to 
EMAS in the EU). The top 5 consists of Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria and the UK. On Japan, the 
OECD report (1999) does not contain any information. It only refers to the use of eco-labels. Most 
probably, public voluntary schemes will not play a dominant role like in the US. 
 
4B2.1.3.  Negotiated agreements 
 
Concerning negotiated agreements, Japan clearly takes the lead. It has a long experience in 
implementing so-called Environment and Pollution Control Agreements. The first agreement was 
signed in 1964 between the city of Yokohama and the Electric Source Development Corporation 
(OECD, 1999). Tstutsumi (2001) reports that 31.074 agreements have been signed by 1996. They are 
generally concluded at the local level between the local authorities and businesses. In many cases they 
only involve just one company. They were originally developed as tools to overcome the lack of 
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regulatory powers of local authorities confronted with severe pollution problems. The expectation was 
that the agreements were implemented as a temporary measure to be superseded by national 
environmental laws and regulations in a latter stage. However, the agreements became institutionalised 
as a policy tool in many local contexts, going far beyond their original bridging function (Tsutsumi, 
2001). 
 
An inventory from the European Commission (1996a) counted 305 negotiated agreements in the EU-
15. The spread within the union is however very uneven with about two-thirds situated in Germany 
(93) and the Netherlands (107). Roughly stated, the inventory shows that agreements are more popular 
in the Nordic part with Austria taking the third place with 20 agreements, followed by Denmark (20) 
and Sweden (11). Exceptions to this observation are Finland with only 2 agreements and to some 
extent Italy with 11 agreements and Portugal with 10. All other EU-15 members have less than ten 
agreements but on the other hand each member state has made use of this policy tool at least once. The 
North-South observation comes with little surprise (also noted by e.g. Grepperud, 2002; and 
Grepperud and Pedersen, 2003) as it is a well-established fact the Scandinavian countries together 
with The Netherlands and Germany are known for their advanced environmental policies.  
 
More recent data are scarce and fragmented, but confirm the above picture that The Netherlands, 
Germany and the Scandinavian countries are pioneers in the use of negotiated agreements. Jordan et 
al. (2001) estimate the number for Germany at 130 by 2001. Austria had adopted some 30 agreements 
by 2000 (Brückner, 2001). Most studies on Britain put the number somewhere between 10 and 20 by 
the late 1990s (Jordan, 2001). The agreements concluded in Europe share in common that they are 
usually signed between the regulator and a branch organisation against the threat of future legislation. 
The dissimilarities however might be even more profound with some member states using them as 
non-binding gentlemen’s agreements in anticipation of or as an alternative to legislation whereas 
others aim at binding agreements to support existing environmental regulations. We will deal with this 
point in the following section.  
 
 
2.2.  An encompassing view on the diffusion pattern 
 
2.2.1. The institutional perspective 
 
We already hinted to some fragmental explanations for the (lack of) popularity of some voluntary 
approaches in some countries (e.g. the litigious climate of the US hindering companies to adopt ISO 
14001; the economic impact of the refusal to adopt ISO 9001 in Japan). The aim of this subsection is 
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to offer a more encompassing ‘macro’ perspective in which these ‘micro’ explanations might be better 
understood. Why do certain explanations reveal themselves in some countries and not in others?  
 
One of the prominent conclusions of the literature on policy innovation and diffusion is the influence 
of a countries’ institutional structure on the diffusion of policy instruments. “Institutions are the 
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of 
both informal constraints (Sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal 
rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) (North, 1991, p 97). In other words, the formal and 
informal rules that guide the interaction between executive, legislative, judiciary, industry, and NGOs 
shape a country’s institutional structure. Institutions show resistance to change, preferring incremental 
alterations to substantial change. This leads to the notion of path dependency, which suggests that past 
decisions shape new outcomes in a way that maintains existing arrangements. As such, instruments 
that fit into the institutional structure of a country (including routines and policy styles) are more likely 
to be adopted than those that challenge these norms and structures (Tews et al., 2003). Governments 
looking to substitute or supplement the command-and-control type of regulation with new instruments 
based on voluntarism and cooperation will be attracted by those instrument-types that suit their 
institutional context (the “goodness-of-fit” concept). In Bressers and O’Toole (1998), a theory is 
developed that links the selection of instruments by policy makers with policy networks. They argue 
that the degree to which several instrument characteristics match with network features influences 
their likelihood of being implemented. In addition, the transfer of policy instruments is likely to be 
limited to those aspects that ‘fit’ and instruments will be implemented differently in different countries 
while convergence around the same policy instrument mix in different jurisdictions is the exception 
rather than the rule. As such, policy innovations are likely to take place only gradually and unevenly 
(Jordan et al., 2003).  
 
Given the voluntary character of the policy instruments under study, this might especially hold. As 
Tews et al. (2003) argue, the special features of a policy innovation can either facilitate or hinder its 
widespread adoption. They show the case of the energy/carbon taxes that spread difficultly despite 
their support by international organisations like the OECD, the UN and the EU and their widely 
recognised effectiveness. The lack of political feasibility due to energy-intensive industry’s protests 
and national competitive concerns is a major implementation barrier. National environmental policy 
plans and strategies for sustainable development on the other hand diffuse rather easily as they can 
easily be added to existing environmental policies and do not necessarily induce any fundamental 
policy change. The same goes for eco-labels, which spread relatively quickly as well (Tews et al., 
2003) 
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Next to the econometric literature on the diffusion of ISO 14001 referred to in subsection 2.1, there are 
a number of case studies focussing on the institutional, political or socio-economic context to explain 
the diffusion of some subtypes of voluntary approaches in some countries. Delmas (2002) analyses the 
regulatory, normative and cognitive aspects of the institutional environment in explaining the 
difference in ISO 14001 adoptions in the US compared to Europe. Kollman and Prakash (2002) look 
at the diffusion of ISO 14001 and EMAS in Germany, the UK and the US. Perkins and Neumayer 
(2004) investigate the uptake of EMAS in the EU-15. With respect to negotiated agreements, Delmas 
and Terlaak (2002) analyse the institutional features that facilitate or hamper the implementation in the 
US, Germany, The Netherlands and France. Welch and Hibiki (2002) focus on the regulatory and non-
regulatory bargaining context in Japan, and include a comparison with voluntary policies in the US 
and the Netherlands. Jordan et al. (2003) take on a more challenging approach by studying the 
diffusion of ecotaxes, tradable permits, voluntary agreements, eco-labels, environmental management 
systems and regulation in seven EU-Member States (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, The 
Netherlands and the UK) and Australia. These studies deliver interesting understandings on how 
country differences favour or hinder the uptake of the voluntary instruments studied.  
 
By presenting a short description of the findings of each study, we risk to obtain only a fragmented 
understanding of the research question at hand. Instead, we choose to integrate the findings of these 
studies in a country typology distinguishing four different institutional settings. This typology will be 
used as an encompassing framework for grasping the diffusion pattern of voluntary approaches. The 
country typology is drawn from Jepperson (2002). This typology is also used in research paper 2 
(introduced at the end of this section) to analyse the uptake of ISO 14001 and EMAS in Germany, the 
Sweden, France and the UK. Here, we take on a more general approach and use this typology to 
develop expectations on the difference in the uptake of voluntary approaches in different countries.  
 
5B2.2.2.  Jepperson’s country typology 
 
Drawing on the literature on state polity formation, Jepperson (2002) makes a distinction between 
countries based on two dimensions: the organisation of society and the organisation of authority. 
Disentangling and then cross-classifying them yields four distinct polity models (see figure 3-7): state-
corporate, liberal, state-nation and social-corporate. These polity models correspond quite well with 
the political cultures of respectively Germanic, Anglo, French and Nordic orbits.  
 
The horizontal axis focuses on the organization of collective authority and contrasts statist from 
societal models. Societal visions locate purpose and authority in society at large, with government 
seen as an instrument and expression of society. Interest groups can actively engage in, and their 
 78
Chapter 3 – The diffusion of voluntary approaches 
opinions are incorporated into, the policy-making process. As such, these countries feature more 
imagery of thinking, interest formation, representation and bargaining. The UK is a classic example. 
Statist visions, in contrast, locate collective authority in a differentiated, insulated, and charismatic 
organizational state apparatus. They take on an image of a steering government, an inspired 
officialdom. Governments possess autonomous authority over interest groups (or societal actors) to 
produce policies. There is more organizational integration of administrative, parliamentary, juridical, 
executive, and planning powers. Germany and France typically fit into this category. Regarding 
voluntary approaches, negotiated agreements correspond most with the statist model as such 
agreements are closest to traditional regulations (Jordan et al., 2003). In societal models more 
differentiated alternatives to traditional command-and-control policies might be expected as the 
involvement of third parties in the policy making process might be provocative to more radical policy 
innovations and opens the road to modes of self-governing initiatives by social actors.  
 
8BFigure 3-7: Jepperson’s country typology 
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The vertical axis represents the organization of society and distinguishes between corporate and 
associational models. In associational visions of society, society is looked upon as a system of action 
generated by subunit “actors”. Social structure is pictured as arising from their communications and 
exchanges. “A large number of interest groups compete for influencing the policy agenda. Individual 
organizations having different levels of resources and information compete to gain access to the 
policy-making process. Multiple organizational interests prevent government from easily accessing 
and negotiating with the organizations in the policy-making process. Relations between government 
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and interest groups are rather adversarial; interest groups do not act as policy participants, rather, 
they act as issue advocates. Government agencies are independently responsible for making policies, 
that is, to balance the competitive demands inherent in pluralism” (Moon and Deleon, 2005, p. 42). 
Jepperson (2002) labels Britain, the US and France as typically associational. In corporate models a 
communal order of differentiated roles and collective functions is established. Social organization is 
envisioned as rational and planned, rather than natural and emergent as it is depicted in associational 
models. In corporate models, the sub-elements of society are typically themselves groupings or orders, 
with group rights accorded to them, like a sort of delegated polities. “In corporatism, interest groups’ 
concerns are organized and represented by a small number of national interest representations, called 
peak organizations. The monopolistic organizations, whose activities are divided along functional 
interests (e.g. sectors, class), have hierarchical structures of their constituents, and their leaders have 
a strong control over them. The organizations in these authoritative structures can effectively 
coordinate and represent interests of their members in the policy-making process. The represented 
interests can help the government to negotiate and reach agreement with the organizations. 
Government generally recognizes monopolistic organizations as an official venue through which 
interest groups pursue their favour. In exchange, government acquires a comprehensive agreement 
with the organizations in terms of accessing specialized information and obtaining political support. 
The result is cooperative and exchanging relationship between interest groups and government” 
(Moon and Deleon, 2005, p. 41). Germanic central Europe, Scandinavian Europe and parts of southern 
Europe produced the modern corporate system based on a functional theory of society. With respect to 
voluntary approaches, corporatist features will provide a fertile ground for implementing negotiated 
agreements. In contrast, instruments relying on individual company participation like public schemes 
are more compatible with associational models. 
 
We believe this country classification offers valuable insights on the way in which the institutional 
context influences the reaction of a country’s policy makers, companies and society at large to the 
introduction of voluntary approaches. As such we adopt the ‘goodness of fit’ concept from the new-
institutionalist school. According to this concept the correspondence between an instrument on the one 
hand and the institutional structures of a country on the other determines the varying level of 
implementation in countries. In the following, we give a short description of each polity model and 
integrate the knowledge on the use of voluntary approaches in countries that are typical examples of 
the specific model. 
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 The state-corporate model 
 
This model combines an authoritative government with a corporatist organization of society. The 
government acts as an enlightened officialdom that determines policy objectives and instruments to 
achieve them based on a normative interpretation of common welfare with corporations acting as 
(often state-financed) mediators between the state and the public. Society is organised in a small 
number of corporate groups with hierarchical structures and leaders with strong control over their 
members. These groups can effectively coordinate and represent interests of their members in the 
policy-making process. Public participation is limited to some privileged groupings that receive a 
rather large extent of influence in policy making on the condition that they support the policies. 
Government generally recognizes these organizations as an official venue through which interest 
groups pursue their favors. In exchange, government acquires a comprehensive agreement with the 
organizations in terms of accessing specialized information and obtaining political support (Moon and 
Deleon, 2005). The result is a cooperative and exchanging relationship between corporate groups and 
government.  
 
When looking at the evidence of voluntary approaches, we notice that both in Germany and Japan, two 
typical examples of state-corporate models, negotiated agreements are popular instruments. The 
existence of strong industry branch organisations and a history of close contacts between public and 
private actors are major explanations in this regard for Germany (Jordan et al., 2001) and Japan 
(Imura, 1998). Another interesting finding is that in both countries, the agreements are implemented as 
gentlemen’s agreements (Tsustumi, 2001, OECD, 1999). Apparently, the tradition of institutionalised 
bargaining and the fact that corporations acknowledge their responsibilities enables compliance with 
non-binding arrangements. Finally, a common characteristic is the usual exclusion of third party 
involvement in the negotiation and the limited information provided on the results (Welch and Hibiki, 
2002; Öko-Institut, 1998).  
 
The observation that the uptake of ISO 14001 is high in both countries does not fit nicely in this 
framework. As figure 3-6 however pointed out, when relating the certification numbers to the GDP, 
Japan and certainly Germany are not ‘top-adopters’. In addition, it is worth pointing out that 
governments play a crucial role in creating a fertile ground for ISO 14001 implementation by 
companies. Both in Germany and Japan the government actively stimulates ISO 14001 
implementation by providing regulatory relief and technical as well as financial assistance (e.g. 
Delmas, 2002; Kollman and Prakash, 2002). Moon and Deleon’s (2005) empirical results show that 
corporatist policy networks are an important determinant influencing a company’s decision to certify 
ISO 14001. A long and successful cooperative government-business interaction creates confidence 
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about governments’ commitments for ISO 14001 adopters. Finally, the high number of registered 
EMAS sites reveals that in a European perspective, Austria and Germany seem to prefer the 
government-led environmental management standard to its private alternative, ISO 14001 (see also 
research paper 2). The German government offers greater incentives to companies joining EMAS 
compared to those that choose ISO 14001 (Clausen et al., 2002). 
 
 The social-corporate model 
 
The social-corporate model is close to the previous one. It employs extensive governmental activity 
but this is envisioned as intermediating the organized interest of society rather than steering society 
according to the government’s vision. Government is seen as a useful instrument, created to 
coordinate, facilitate and motivate social change. Policymaking is based on an ideology of consensus. 
Extended participation is encouraged but with emphasis on incorporating voices into a harmonious 
community discussion, not a pluralist system in which interest groups battle to get their interests on 
the policy agenda. The corporate organization is rationalized and functional rather than hierarchical 
and historically grounded as in the state-corporate model.  
 
Negotiated agreements fit nicely in this model due to the corporatist setting and the cooperative policy 
making climate. This is confirmed by the observation in the previous subsection that the Nordic 
European countries are forerunners, especially when we incorporate the Netherlands in this modelF2F. In 
this regard, Grepperud (2002) points to the history and the institutionalisation of bargaining, over a 
wide range of policy issues, between labour unions, producer organisations, and government in the 
Netherlands and the Nordic countries. When contrasting the German with the Dutch agreements, there 
are important qualitative differences. In contrast to the almost secretive and closed-door way of 
implementing negotiated agreements in Germany, the Dutch system is open and democratic with many 
organised access points for third party interests. The agreements are systematically planned and 
integrated in a long-term policy strategy resulting in binding agreements. The approach is formally 
organised and supported by society at large. In Germany, the agreements stem from friendly 
government-business partnerships and are used as pragmatic ad hoc policy solutions; witch creates 
third party frustration. Also in Denmark, the government created a legal framework for concluding 
negotiated environmental agreements in 1992 with the aim to formalise the implementation of 
agreements and to create third party access and support. These characteristics correspond nicely to the 
differences in these two polity models. 
                                                 
2 Jepperson places the Netherlands rather in the liberal model. However by the introduction of the National 
Environmental Policy Plan in 1989 and the corresponding emphasis on target group policies and covenants, we 
believe that, especially for environmental policy, it corresponds more with the Scandinavian countries.  
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In addition, the Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands are known to be pioneers with respect to 
environmental policy innovations. Jordan et al. (2003) found that new environmental policy 
instruments are most popular in the Netherlands and Finland (and Germany). They have a high 
implementation rate of ISO 14001 certificates, the ‘statist’ EMAS is implemented remarkably lower, 
except in Denmark. Tews et al. (2003) attribute the first big rise in the use of eco-labels to “the Nordic 
Swan”, the first multinational label developed by the four Scandinavian countries in 1989, although it 
must be mentioned that Germany pioneered with the Blue Angel already in 1977. With respect to 
other instrumental innovations, these countries are ahead in implementing eco-taxes. The Netherlands 
and Denmark had the highest share of environmental tax revenues on total revenues from taxes and 
social contributions in the EU-15 in 2001 (Eurostat, 2003). Moreover, pollution and resource taxes 
were most pronounced in these countries. These observations point to the ‘imaginary of thinking’ 
described to this polity model as well as the ability to implement them due to the cooperative stance 
from public and private actors.  
 
 The liberal model 
 
The liberal model combines a societal authority and an associational organization of society. State 
intervention in the model is to be kept to a minimum; there is distaste for officialdom and bureaucracy. 
Notions such as free capitalism, individual rights and economic liberalism are central. The interaction 
between public and private actors is characterised as adversarial and legalistic instead of cooperative 
and informal as in the previous models. Jurisdiction has an important role to play. Citizens can easily 
challenge government and its rules in court. Freedom of speech and information are emphasized. 
Interest differentiation is thought to be natural and is highly legitimated. Policymaking is reactive 
making it interesting for groups to lobby for their interests into the policy arena. There are multiple 
access points, not only for privileged corporations, resulting in a pluralistic system in which interest 
groups are in a constant struggle to influence the policy level.  
 
With only 2 agreements in the US (Mazurek 1998) and between 10 and 20 in the UK (Jordan, 2001), 
negotiated agreements are rather seldom. First explanation is found in the associational organization of 
business. Vogel (1986) argues that the notions of free capitalism and the individualistic ethos of the 
American business culture severely limit the role of trade associations as a vehicle for industry self-
regulation and collective commitments. Second, Delmas and Terlaak (2002) point to the adversarial 
attitudes between US business and authorities to explain why many companies are reluctant to engage 
in collaborative actions. Finally, the fragmentation resulting from a complex overlay of federal, state 
and local laws together with the wide range of opportunities to challenge decisions in court hinder 
policy-makers to credibly commit themselves or to provide regulatory flexibility in an informal 
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manner (Delmas and Terlaak, 2002). Regarding the UK, Jordan (2001) claims British negotiated 
agreements are usually non-binding and often more akin to codes of best practice than formally 
negotiated agreements between the government and industry. Britain’s pluralistic interest group 
system with weak industry-wide or sector-wide umbrella organisations is sometimes seen as an 
important explanatory variable for the low adoption of agreements within this jurisdiction.  
 
Voluntary approaches in the form of take-it-or-leave options for individual firms are more in line with 
an associational society and are more popular compared to negotiated agreements. Almost all 
approaches in the US are of the ‘public scheme’-type and one negotiated agreement (Project XL) 
requires companies to sign in on an individual basis (Muzarek, 1998). The UK has been a forerunner 
in environmental management with its BS7500, but takes only the fourteenth place on the 
ISO14001/GDP ranking of OECD countries. The cradle of environmental auditing is situated in the 
US (Watson and Emery, 2004a) but currently the US leave only Iceland and Mexico behind in our 
ranking. Delmas (2002) claims the US institutional environment seems acting as a deterrent to ISO 
14001 adoption as US companies are fearful of the certification process which lays their performance 
open to public scrutiny. Third parties can easily obtain environmental reports and easy access to courts 
enables juridical actions. 
 
Next to the voluntary approaches adoption pattern that seems in line with the expectations resulting 
from the institutional setting, these countries took some market-based environmental policy 
innovations that are in line with the focus on economic liberalism. Well-known examples are the US 
emission-trading scheme for SO2 (1990) and the Toxic Release Inventory (1986) obliging companies 
to publicly report emissions of toxic substances. Jordan et al. (2003) indicate that the UK is especially 
enthusiastic about tradable permits but fairly uninterested in other new environmental policy 
instruments. A recent example of the UK’s preference for market-based instruments is the climate 
change levy introduced in 2001. 
 
 The state-nation model 
 
Our last model combines a centralist, statist government with an associational organization of society. 
Combining both results in public-private rivalry. State officials operate in a vacuum isolated from 
society. Their acts are driven for the ‘sake of the nation’, which does not necessarily correspond with 
publics interests. The higher civil servants see themselves as representing third party interests because 
they act for the state and the state acts for the general interest. In fact, public participation in the 
policymaking is limited as much as possible and interest group formation is discouraged. Citizens are 
not granted extensive access to information or cannot easily challenge government decisions in court 
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as in the previous model. Consultation is said to take place so that the administration can explain its 
decisions to the groups affected by them. Demands for participation are interpreted as interference and 
depictured as irresponsible protest. The authority is hierarchically structured with emphasis on formal 
rules and titles. Besides, the state has a large stake in major corporations and this gives rise to a culture 
of collaboration between a limited number of industry and government top-elites. 
 
Not many studies focussed on the use of voluntary approaches and the institutional setting in France or 
other semi-typical state-nation countries (Italy, Belgium). All in all, it is quite safe to state that 
negotiated agreements are not that popular in these countries with 8 in France, 6 in Belgium and 11 in 
Italy (EC, 1996a). In France, agreements serve as a basis for the development of national legislation 
and standards in a latter stage to replace the agreements (Jordan et al, 2001). For some issues the 
government needs business cooperation as it lacks information to draw up legislation from scratch. 
This was the case for the end-of-life vehicles agreement (Aggeri, 1999). Like in ‘statist’ Germany, 
agreements are non-binding and third parties are largely excluded from the development process 
(Delmas and Terlaak, 2002). Italy is quite active in EMAS as well as in ISO 14001 certification, 
France and Belgium not. However, research on these observations is too limited to attach institutional 
explanations to these observations. 
    
Concluding, state-nation countries did not took a lead in developing or implementing voluntary 
approaches. This corresponds with the picture of a steering government that has more interest in 
suppressing social action than in encouraging voluntary self-regulatory initiatives. Some negotiated 
agreements can be identified which are used to prepare coming legislation and especially in sectors of 
major economic interest where the boundaries between public and private are blurred due to the close 
relations of the authoritative and business elites in these milieus.  
 
Research paper 2 
 
Competing environmental management standards: How ISO 14001 outnumbered EMAS 
in Germany, the UK, France and Sweden 
R. Bracke and J. Albrecht 
 
The previous section pointed to the importance of the socio-institutional context of a country in 
explaining the popularity of different types of voluntary approaches. A country typology 
developed by Jepperson was introduced in this regard. The research paper presented here builds on 
this background to analyse the differences in the uptake rate between the two most common 
environmental management standards (ISO 14001 and EMAS) in four European countries: 
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Germany, the UK, France and Sweden. Each country provides a prototype example of the four 
distinct polity models.  
 
Abstract. In the middle of the nineties two international environmental management standards 
became available for European companies: the European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS) and the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 14001. Companies that 
wanted to implement a standardized environmental management system were confronted with the 
choice between their national standard, the European or the international one. In the past 
decennium, the national standards have been abolished and the number of ISO 14001 certified 
companies has outnumbered the number of EMAS registered organisations. The speed at which 
and the extent to which ISO 14001 has outnumbered EMAS however differs between countries in 
the EU-15. We argue that a country classification based on the degree of statism of the collective 
agency on the one hand and the degree of corporatism of society’s organization on the other, 
offers a valuable perspective for analysing the evolution of the uptake of both standards in a 
country. We present the case of Germany, the UK, France and Sweden and conclude that in 
countries characterised by a more societal organisation of authority, private alternatives for 
national regulations like ISO 14001 are welcomed and adopted with enthusiasm. In countries 
characterised by a rather statist organisation, such alternatives are looked upon with more 
suspicion resulting in a delayed take-up. Whereas ISO 14001 is a purely private initiative, 
voluntary registration to the EMAS regulation creates a link between the company and the 
authorities. In contrast to corporatist settings, this frightens off business participation in 
associational countries.  
 
 
6B2.2.3.  Explanatory value of the Jepperson’s country typology 
 
Some observations found when linking the literature on the diffusion of voluntary approaches with 
Jepperson’s country typology in the previous section, matched nicely with the predictions that result 
from the typology e.g. the high number of negotiated agreements in corporatist settings, the informal 
character of such agreements in the state-corporate countries compared to the social-corporate 
countries, the preference for “individualistic” approaches (EMS, EPA’s public schemes) in liberal 
countries and the rather low uptake of voluntary approaches in state-nations. However, likewise it is 
possible to point to some observations that do not correspond with expectations. Whereas eco-labels 
would rather be expected in liberal countries, the first eco-label was introduced in Germany (Blue 
Angel in 1977) and the most successful scheme, the Nordic Swan, runs in the Scandinavian countries. 
A somewhat similar remark can be made with respect to EMS. Whereas they, as expected, originated 
in the liberal countries many corporatist countries have surpassed them when it comes to uptake rates. 
Regarding negotiated agreements, it is puzzling that the first agreement in Europe has been signed in 
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France, which has now become a laggard when it comes to the use of negotiated agreements. These 
observations point to the fact that our institutional approach (i.e.. Jepperson’s typology) is unable to 
fully explain the differences in the geographical uptake of voluntary approaches.  
 
The finding that the suggested country typology only partly enables to explain the geographical 
diffusion of voluntary approaches is however not that surprising. The Jepperson typology 
distinguishes countries based on two dimensions: the organization of authority (societal versus statist) 
and the organization of society (associational versus corporate). This results in an interesting but 
nevertheless quite general and basic country typology that takes into account only a limited number of 
institutional characteristics. Accordingly, for a number of countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Italy) there is discussion amongst academics about where these countries fit in. One critique is that the 
framework ignores internal and temporal differences within countries. Regarding the internal 
differences, evidence suggests large variation in style across sectors within a given nation (for 
instance, Howlett, 1991; Howlett and Ramesh, 1993). Furthermore, the typology fails to acknowledge 
shifts in instruments over time. Sometimes these occur over relatively brief periods (Bressers and 
O’Toole, 1998). They refer to the introduction of negotiated agreements in the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, empirical case studies point to the fact that the introduction or non-introduction of a 
certain instrument is certainly not always the results of a well considered policy choice (see Jordan et 
al., 2003 for some examples). Sometimes the political party or person that is in charge of the 
environmental Ministry determines the instrument selection or sometimes instruments are pushed on 
the national agenda by some exogenous factor like the European Commission. Finally, Tews et al. 
(2003) claim that the diffusion of policy instruments is largely influenced by the characteristics of the 
instrument at hand. Instruments like national sustainability plans, that do not really affect the core of a 
countries policy making, spread rather easily, but the reverse holds for instruments that deeply affect 
national routines e.g. eco-taxes.  
 
Basically, there are two schools of thought that try to explain the diffusion of policy instruments: the 
institutional perspective and the policy leaning perspective. The Jepperson typology is an application 
of the institutional perspective. In short, this perspective claims that only those instruments that fit into 
the existing institutional and political characteristics are likely to be adopted. (see 2.2.1). The second 
perspective emphasises the importance of policy learning (see e.g. Hall, 1993). Ideational theories 
regard shifts in ideas and interests as the most prominent drivers of policy development and policy 
instrument selection. Ideational theories assume that policy makers are fairly unencumbered by 
institutional constrains and rationally oriented in their objectives (Jordan et al., 2003). The instrument 
choice results from an understanding of how a certain policy problem should be tacked, i.e. the 
suitability of particular instruments to act as solutions. There is a cognitive struggle between social 
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groups to become the dominant paradigm. When certain instruments fail to work properly or if new 
ideas emerge and become dominant, the repertoire of instruments will be adjusted accordingly. The 
introduction of MBI for instance can be understood from this perspective (support by OECD, EU, UN 
and academics has overcome initial scepticism of environmental pressure groups). Similarly, the 
breakthrough of new ideas like sustainable development, pollution prevention pays etc. had an impact 
on the general thinking about which instruments should be implemented. 
 
Regarding the diffusion of voluntary approaches, ideational theories would point to a rather wholesale 
switch to voluntary approaches on the condition that these are supported by a transnational community 
of experts and organizations. In addition these theories call for a rather uniform adoption among 
countries where these experts are dominant. The institutionalist perspective rather predicts the overall 
pattern of use will be fairly heterogeneous, reflecting the resilience and longevity of national 
institutional traditions.  
 
Jordan et al. (2003) tested the validity of both theories based on a comparative case study analysis of 
four new environmental policy instruments (NEPI) (i.e. eco-taxes, tradable permits, voluntary 
agreements and eco-labels) in eight countries: Australia, Austria, Finland, Germany, France, Ireland, 
The Netherlands and the UK. In line with our finding, they conclude that none of both can adequately 
explain the diffusion pattern that is observed. Ideational theories struggle to explain the highly 
differential pattern of NEPI use. Second, they struggle to explain the difficulty of replacing regulations 
with NEPIs. Third, the pattern of change in many countries was far more chaotic and chance-like than 
ideational theories might imply. Concerning the institutional theories, they claim that these cannot 
explain that whereas countries are not responding to NEPI in precisely the same manner, they 
nevertheless are proceeding along broadly similar tracks which suggests some exogenous factor is at 
work in pushing adoption. Second, institutional theories offer an insufficient explanation for the 
direction in which change is occurring. Finally, they claim that a number of factors at work are rather 
political (e.g. the weaknesses of environmental political parties and pressure groups) than entirely 
institutional. As such they conclude that (p. 219) 
 
“neither perspective offers an entirely satisfactory explanation for the pattern of NEPI 
use revealed by our case studies. Ideational theories are better at explaining the motives 
and dynamics of change, whereas institutional theories concentrate more upon the 
filtering effect of national institutional forms.”  
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3.  The changing nature of negotiated agreements 
 
The first section of this chapter pointed to the quantitative growth of voluntary approaches in the last 
decades. The cross sectional analysis of the second section highlighted that countries adopt different 
approaches in varying levels. In this final section, we will point to a general, qualitative shift that has 
occurred over time but, as Aggeri (1999) noted, to which only little attention is paid in the literature.  
 
Whereas in the beginning voluntary approaches were rather flexible, informal policy arrangements, 
there is a shift towards a more formal approach in the use of this instrument. This especially holds for 
the subcategory of negotiated agreements and concerns aspects such as the legal status, the contents, 
the legitimacy and the problems dealt with (Aggeri, 1999). Regarding the legal status there is a move 
from non-binding gentlemen’s agreements towards binding agreements. It is reckoned that only in 
Denmark and Flanders a legislative framework enabling the authorities to sign binding agreements is 
installed (Barth and Dette, 2001). However, also in other jurisdictions there is a trend to back 
agreements with sanctions in case of non-compliance. Besides, instead of negotiating agreements 
based on a lenient legislative threat, more and more agreements are integrated within existing 
regulatory schemes. Both the UK climate change agreements (Ekins and Etheridge, 2006) and the 
Danish scheme on greenhouse gas emission (Wier et al., 2005) for instance, are implemented in 
tandem with a tax system. Participating companies are granted a discount in the tax on the condition 
that they meet the agreed upon targets. Moreover, as companies had to sign in on an individual basis, 
free-riding problems associated with collective liability systems are avoided. Second, in drawing 
negotiated agreements, more attention is given to the contents of the document with respect to clearly 
defined targets, responsibilities, monitoring and reporting requirements. Strengthening the design of 
environmental agreements was one of the main aims of the guidelines set out in the Communication 
on Negotiated Agreements from the European Commission (EC, 1996b). Thirdly, legitimacy concerns 
that were raised in the beginning are being dealt with. Increased transparency on and formality of the 
negotiation, the implementation and the results of negotiated agreements are set forward to gain 
support from critical policy observers like environmental organisations and trade unions. In addition, 
the European Commission supports this way of governance and in the Netherlands negotiated 
agreements are the key instrument to achieve the long-term objectives set forward in the National 
Environmental Policy Plans. Finally, concerning the problems dealt with, there is a shift from acute 
and localised pollution from easy identifiable polluters towards more complex and diffuse problems. 
There is a move from implementation-oriented agreements aiming to diffuse BAT towards innovation-
oriented agreements with a focus on collective learning and awareness raising (Aggeri, 1999).  
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Without doubt, the most well-known illustration of this trend can be found in the Netherlands. As in 
the rest of Europe, the agreements concluded in the 1980s were non-binding, ad hoc arrangements 
characterised as gentlemen’s agreements (Jordan et al., 2001). However, in the 1990s, the Dutch 
negotiated agreements, called covenants, were transformed into legally binding agreements that are 
negotiated within a relatively transparent decision-making process (Mol et al., 2000; Zito, 2001). The 
National Environmental Policy Plan of 1989 marks the turning point. This plan set out long-term 
targets based on a broad consensus of industry, national and local regulators and environmental and 
political groups. The methods and timetables to achieve these targets are negotiated with industry. 
Companies enter into these covenants on an individual basis by signing binding contracts that are 
enforceable under civil law. In addition, the covenants are tightly linked to the permit system as 
follows. Each company has to draft a Company Environmental Plan in co-operation with the local 
permit authorities. These plans indicate the pollution abatement targets, their time schedule and the 
measures for implementation. These plans are eventually integrated into the permit requirements and 
revised every four years. As such, individual monitoring and sanctioning of firms in the covenant 
scheme is executed via the permit system (OECD, 1999). Companies producing acceptable plans are 
granted flexibility in permitting procedures; companies drafting unacceptable plans are penalized 
through increased stringency of operation licenses (Khanna, 2001). Bressers at al. (forthcoming) 
however play down this “theoretical” enforceability when looking at the actual practice. According 
their evaluation study on the Dutch covenants there are serious doubts about the motivation of local 
authorities to really implement this formal safeguard via the licensing system. In general however, 
they conclude that most actors are rather positive towards the results of the covenants. Maybe this 
makes that there is only little pressure to adopt a strict stance in the permitting process by local 
authorities.  
 
Another, yet less known, example of a clear shift in the way negotiated agreements are implemented in 
environmental policy is found in Belgium/Flanders. The transfer of environmental competences from 
the federal level to the regions in the wake of the state reform of 1993 and the subsequent legal 
framework for environmental agreements that was implemented in Flanders in 1994 are pivotal in this 
regard. Apart from Denmark, Flanders is the only jurisdiction where a legal framework for the use of 
negotiated agreements was installed. We refer to the third research paper, presented below, for an in-
depth analysis of this case.  
 
To conclude, this section claims that a shift towards more formal and stringent negotiated agreements 
is taking place. In a way, negotiated agreements are moving in the direction of public voluntary 
schemes in which targets are determined to a large extent by the government and to which individual 
companies can subsequently subscribe. The Danish scheme on greenhouse gas emissions, the UK 
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climate change agreements, the Dutch covenants or the Flemish Benchmarking agreements are just 
some examples of this trend. Similar trends can be spotted within the so-called unilateral 
commitments. There is a lively debate whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) should be left 
totally to the discretion of individual corporations or whether there is a need for involvement of 
multinational organisations to develop guidelines, set basic requirements and to monitor progress (see 
e.g. Christmann and Taylor, 2002; Warhurst, 2005; Jenkins, 2005; Clapp, 2005). As the KPMG report 
(2005) notices, more and more corporations are following external guidelines for developing their 
CSR policy in general and their voluntary sustainability or environmental reports in particular. Some 
of the leading initiatives include the United Nation’s Global Compact (a framework for business 
operations and strategies related to human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption), the 
OECD guidelines for multinational organisations and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Moreover 
the report notices that companies have growing interest in seeking external validation of the reported 
non-financial data. The number of sustainability reports with a formal assurance statement has 
increased slightly between 2002 and 2005 both for the G250 and the N100 companies (KPMG, 2005). 
The OECD report on voluntary approaches notices the same for the chemical industry’s Responsible 
Care Program. Over the years the provisions for monitoring and sanctioning in the program have been 
strengthened in order to render the initiative more credible by including third party participation in 
monitoring procedures and the possibility to exclude deviators from the professional association 
(OECD, 1999). Finally, the success of ISO 14001 is another indicator of the progress towards more 
uniformity and formality within voluntary approaches. Environmental management and auditing 
practices already started in the 1980s when industries and individual businesses created systems that 
suited their own needs (Watson and Emery, 2004a,b). They were created to cope with the fast growing 
environmental legislations at that time. Again, standardization and formalisation of these practices 
occurred by the introduction of widely recognised standards like BS7500, ISO 14001 and EMAS and 
the external validation thereof.   
 
Research paper 3 
 
Twenty years of negotiated environmental agreements in Belgium: from gentlemen’s 
agreements to binding contracts 
 
R. Bracke and M. De Clercq 
 
This third research paper presents the evolution of the use of negotiated environmental 
agreements in Belgium and Flanders. Due to changing institutional arrangements with regard to 
environmental policy competences, the use of negotiated agreements has shifted from the federal 
to the regional level. Besides a general overview of negotiated environmental agreements in 
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Belgium/Flanders, this paper focuses on the implications from the changing character of the 
agreements due to the implementation of a legal framework for the use negotiated agreements in 
Flanders. It contrasts the rather lose ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ that were concluded in the 
beginning at the federal level to the binding contracts that the Flemish level aims at. 
This paper builds heavily from the insights gained during two research projects. The first “The 
use of voluntary instruments for the realisation of a sustainable development” was financed by the 
Federal Science Policy Office and carried out in the framework of the Scientific Support Plan for a 
Sustainable Development Policy (see De Clercq et al. 2001b). This project was carried out 
between 1997 and 2001 and evaluated all agreements concluded in Belgium and Flanders. The 
project ran parallel to the European NEAPOL project (Negotiated Environmental Agreements in 
Europe: Policy Lessons to be Learned from a Comparative Case Study Analysis; see De Clercq 
2002) funded by the European Commission. The second “The implementation of the duty of 
acceptance in Flemish waste policy: the role of negotiated agreements” was financed by the 
Flemish Environmental Agency (VMM) in the framework of the MIRA-BE 2003 project (Report 
on Nature and the Environment: Policy Evaluation) (see De Clercq and Bracke 2005). Here we 
studied a group of waste management agreements that were concluded under the legislative 
framework. 
 
Abstract. When negotiated environmental agreements entered the policy arena they were 
characterised as gentlemen’s agreements containing only vague targets, little monitoring 
provisions and hardly any sanctions in case of non-compliance. This brought about much 
criticism towards the effectiveness and legality of this instrument and lead to the development of 
guidelines towards more enforceable agreements. As this reduced the attractiveness for industry, 
this policy shift is questioned. Flanders is one of the few jurisdictions where a legislative 
framework was introduced and provides an illustrative case. The implications of the swing from 
gentlemen’s agreements to binding contracts were not limited to the legal status, but also affected 
the perspectives of the actors involved and the institutional context in which agreements are 
concluded and implemented. Whereas at first the policy shift resulted in a deadlock, the second-
generation agreements now seem to deliver the improvements hoped for. 
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4.  Summary 
 
After looking at the drivers of new governance patterns in the previous chapter, this chapter provided 
some data on the use of voluntary approaches. The first section presented indications of the growing 
popularity of voluntary environmental reporting, fair trade, EPA’s voluntary programs, ISO 14001 
certification and negotiated agreements in the European Union. With regard to the use of negotiated 
agreements we also pointed to a qualitative trend that prominently manifested itself in some countries 
(e.g. the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium): whereas agreements were used formerly used as non-
binding, ad hoc policy arrangements, more recent agreements are embedded in a long-term policy 
strategy and contain provisions to ensure their environmental effectiveness.  
 
When looking at the geographical diffusion of voluntary approaches, it appeared that their uptake 
differs significantly between countries. More specifically, the picture that different countries seem to 
prefer different sorts of voluntary approaches emerged. Japan has a large number of negotiated 
agreements concluded at the local level and is the worldwide number one in terms of ISO 14001 
certification (in absolute numbers). In the US, both ISO 14001 and negotiated agreements are rather 
seldom, but voluntary public schemes are quite popular. In Europe negotiated agreements concluded at 
the national and regional level with industrial branch organisations are frequently implemented. 
However, they spread unevenly. Fewer agreements are concluded in the South and two-thirds are 
concluded in Germany and the Netherlands. Finally, it is worth pointing to the fact that there are major 
differences between the German and the Dutch agreements.  
 
In search of alternatives to overcome the problems of command-and-control regulation, each country 
clearly follows an idiosyncratic trajectory. The final aim of this chapter was to shed some insight on 
the determinants that can explain the difference in these trajectories. We took the institutional 
‘goodness of fit’ concept from the literature on policy diffusion, which states that the correspondence 
between a policy instrument on the one hand and domestic institutional, economic and social 
structures on the other determines the varying level of implementation in countries. Four polity models 
were distinguished depending on the organization of collective authority on the one hand and on the 
organization of society on the other. In corporatist settings, negotiated agreements were rather 
widespread but differed in nature. In state-corporate models non-binding agreements are concluded 
without much transparency. In the social-corporate model on the contrary, there is more third party 
involvement and policy consideration when concluding negotiated agreements that contain stringent 
enforcement provisions. In addition, other approaches like ISO 14001, eco-labels and MBIs are 
implemented more often. In associational settings, negotiated agreements occur less, especially in the 
liberal model. The existence of negotiated agreements in the state-nations could be due to intertwined 
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relationships between the authoritative and business elites in industries with a major economic 
importance. In the liberal model, approaches relying on individual participation like public schemes 
and environmental management systems are more popular. Additionally, they have been pioneers with 
respect to some market-based environmental policy instruments. Whereas the institutional perspective 
we adopted provides an interesting way to look at the diffusion of voluntary approaches between 
different countries, it is acknowledged that not all observations fit nicely within the expectations 
resulting from the theoretical framework. One important limitation of using a country typology is that 
it cannot account for differences that occur within countries due to for instance variations of policy 
style across sectors or changes in the preferred instrument type due to a change of the parties in power 
or pressures from multinational governments and think tanks like the EU or the OECD. 
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Chapter 4 - Evaluating Voluntary Approaches  
 
 
“You can fool some people sometimes, but you can’t fool all the people all the time’  
 
Bob Marley (Get up, Stand up) 
 
 
This chapter evaluates the merits and drawbacks of voluntary approaches from a societal point of 
view. Section one starts by raising two basic issues in the evaluation of policy instruments: the 
evaluation criteria to be used and the reference against which to estimate the impacts of an instrument. 
Next, we will present an overview of the theoretical as well as the empirical literature structured along 
the classic tripartite classification: unilateral commitments, public voluntary programs and negotiated 
agreements. Section two summarises the main findings of the literature review along the three “E’s” 
evaluation criteria: effectiveness, efficiency and equity. As this leads to a rather disappointing picture, 
this summary is followed by some background considerations that should be taken into account before 
judging on the appropriateness of voluntary approaches to reach environmental objectives. Finally, 
section two questions whether voluntary approaches offer a promising strategy in striving towards a 
long-term transition to a sustainable society. It is argued that if voluntary approaches are implemented 
in this regard, there might be a need for new evaluation frameworks that take into account the crucial 
criterion of creating a base for future advances. Again, the last section summarizes the main findings 
of this chapter.  
 
 
1. The literature on the evaluation of voluntary approaches 
 
1.1.  Key issues in evaluating policy instruments 
 
When evaluating the impact of a policy instrument, two key questions should be raised: by which 
criteria should one evaluate the outcome of the instrument and against which baseline should the 
evaluation be carried out? 
 
For the evaluation of environmental policy instruments, there is no widely accepted set of evaluation 
criteria (Mickwitz, 2003). Mickwitz (2003) makes a distinction between three groups of criteria: 
general criteria (relevance, impact, effectiveness, persistence, flexibility and predictability) economic 
criteria (cost-benefit efficiency and cost-effectiveness) and democracy-related criteria (legitimacy, 
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transparency and equity). Mickwitz (2003) acknowledges that this list does not form an inclusive list 
of possible criteria, but believes these criteria are generally the most important ones.  The instrument 
that is to be evaluated might also influence the selection of evaluation criteria. In its evaluation of 
voluntary approaches, the OECD (1999) uses seven criteria (see table 4-1). These criteria somewhat 
differ from the ones the OECD (1997) used for evaluating market-based instruments. Here the 
criterion ‘revenues’ is added to the list and the criterion ‘viability and feasibility’ is dropped. Besides, 
some other criteria (competitiveness implication, innovation and learning effects) are interpreted 
slightly different.   
 
Table 4-1: Evaluation criteria for voluntary approaches used by the OECD 
Evaluation criteria 4BDescription 
 Environmental 
effectiveness 
 Economic efficiency 
 Administration and 
compliance costs 
 Competitiveness 
implications 
 Soft effects 
 Innovation and 
learning effects 
 Viability and feasibility 
 Refers to the goal attainment of the environmental target and the 
environmental impact thereof. 
 Refers to the level of economic costs incurred to achieve the target. 
 Refers to the organisational costs necessary for devising and 
implementing the policy. 
 Refers to anti-competitive impacts due to e.g. collusion in domestic 
markets or erecting non-tariff barriers to trade in international markets 
 Refers to behavioural changes that stem from a voluntary approach 
 Refers to the incentives of the voluntary approach on innovation and 
the diffusion of innovations 
 Refers to the political and social acceptance of voluntary approaches 
 Source: OECD (1999) 
 
In this overview, we choose to limit the number of evaluation criteria by focussing on the three E 
evaluation criteria: effectiveness, efficiency and equity. When considering these criteria with respect 
to voluntary environmental approaches, we can describe them as follows. Effectiveness refers to the 
extent to which the environmental objective, for which the instrument was implemented, has been 
reached. Efficiency concerns the costs associated with the way in which the target was achieved. At 
best, these should be minimized. Equity is harder to define but in general it concerns providing a 
minimum level of benefits (or a maximum level of costs) across persons, groups, or places that are 
affected by the instrument. According to Mickwitz (2003), equity also refers to the degree in which all 
participants have equal opportunities to take part in and to influence the processes used by the 
administrators.  
 
Compared to the OECD (1999) we thus use a limited number of evaluation criteria. The evaluation 
framework for voluntary agreements developed by Cabugueira (2001) however also only includes 
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these three criteria. On the one hand we believe that environmental effectiveness and economic 
efficiency are highly important criteria for the evaluation of policy instruments. The last criterion, 
equity, is especially relevant for voluntary approaches as they are developed with less third party 
involvement and in a less institutionalised setting. On the other hand, we think that, depending on the 
specification of these criteria, many other evaluation criteria can be seen as sub-elements of these 
three. Practical feasibility which concerns administrative ease and costs is actually a part of the 
efficiency question, impacts on competition are linked to the equity criterion, dynamic effects and 
innovation incentives can be considered with regard to the effectiveness and so on. The analyses in 
this section will primary focus on the environmental effectiveness of voluntary approaches, as we 
believe this to be most important and controversial.  
 
Now we know on what to determine our judgement, we need a reference for our judgement. From 
which level can one say that an instrument scores well with respect to the efficiency criterion? Against 
what do we need to compare the effectiveness of an instrument? Do we compare with the situation 
before the implementation of the instrument, with the expected evolution without the instrument (the 
so-called business-as-usual scenario) or with the expected evolution in case another instrument would 
have been applied? Figure 4-1 gives an impression of the issue with respect to the environmental 
effectiveness criterion. It pictures the imaginary evolution of the performance of an environmental 
indicator before the start of a voluntary approach and presents three different trends from the start of 
the approach. The dotted line below just keeps the environmental performance constant from the 
moment when the instrument was put in place. The line in the middle presents the business-as-usual 
scenario. This is the best estimate of the evolution that would have occurred in case the instrument 
would not have been implemented. It is not a straightforward extrapolation of the historical trend, but 
it incorporates all additional information and expectations to predict the future evolution. The upper 
line presents the actual evolution of the environmental indicator over time.   
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Figure 4-1: Measuring the environmental effectiveness of a voluntary approach 
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This already provides four scenarios against which to analyse the environmental impact of the 
instrument: 
 the stand-still scenario: measures the difference between the actual performance at the end of 
the voluntary approach and the level at the beginning. It should however be reckoned that 
many environmental parameters have an inherent (stochastic) trend. CO2-emissions of a 
company, for instance, fluctuate over time with changes in the energy demand due to new 
production techniques, substitutions of energy drivers, changes in the output level due to 
business cycle fluctuations, the average outside temperature etc. Given this trend the stand-
still scenario makes as rather poor reference standard. However, its ease of use makes it a very 
common reference. The targets of many voluntary approaches are expressed this way. 
 the target scenario: measures the difference between the actual performance and the target of 
the instrument. Figure 4-1 pictures a situation of overcompliance. Of course, a situation of full 
compliance or undercompliance is also possible. It might however be the case that the 
environmental improvement of an approach with an unambitious target that was achieved is 
actually below the improvement of an approach with a more ambitious target that was not 
complied with. As such, this approach only provides an incomplete picture. It is however 
often used in evaluation studies. 
 the business-as-usual scenario: measures the difference between the actual performance and 
the level that would have occurred without the voluntary approach. This offers a better 
estimate of the actual impact that is attributable to the voluntary approach. Unfortunately, in 
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contrast to the above, this reference is hard to determine and to some extent always 
hypothetical.  
 the related instruments scenario: is relevant when the voluntary approach is implemented as a 
part of a policy mix. In many cases voluntary approaches are used in tandem with other 
(regulatory) instruments. In this case the related instruments scenario measures the difference 
between the actual performance and the level that would have occurred when the voluntary 
approach would not have been included in the instrument mix. This scenario is even harder to 
estimate compared to the business-as-usual scenario.   
 
Finally, one more reference scenario exits: 
 
 the first-best scenario: measures the difference between the actual performance and the level 
that would have been achieved in case the first-best policy instrument would have been 
implemented.F1F This is relevant when a voluntary approach was selected as second-best 
solution. The first-best option might have been considered infeasible due to e.g. political or 
economic constraints. This reference probably provides the best picture of the actual impact of 
the voluntary approach but its estimation is difficult and accompanied with more uncertainty 
compared to the previous scenarios. First, one has to determine what the first-best instrument 
would look like and second, one has to assess its expected impact.     
 
Before the researcher can proceed, he needs to answer these two issues: the evaluation criteria and the 
evaluation baseline. In contrast to the latter, the researcher has quite some discretion to choose on 
which criteria he would like to focus. This might depend on his personal interest or be bound to the 
instrument itself. For instance, an agreement aiming at the diffusion of BAT in an industry should be 
judged on different criteria compared to an agreement that aims to provide incentives to innovate. The 
second question is rather determined by the availability of data and the resources of the project. The 
limitedness of both explains why many evaluation studies focus on the target or the stand-still 
scenario. Studies aiming to provide insight on the business-as-usual, the related instruments or the 
first-best scenario are commonly only able to provide answers within a certain margin of error. A 
valuable compromise and practical solution might be to use multiple evaluation baselines. Bressers et 
al. (forthcoming) for instance use this technique when evaluating the Dutch covenants. Instead of 
estimating the environmental impact, they ask referents to judge (agree-disagree) various statements 
on the environmental effectiveness like ‘the objectives were clearly beyond business as usual’; ‘the 
                                                 
1 In case the voluntary approach is considered first-best, on can compare the results with the results that would 
have been achieved under the second-best option to get an impression of the additional benefits of the voluntary 
approach. 
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objectives are attained in time’; ‘the agreement led to a positive break with the past in the 
environmental performance’. Especially when a quantitative evaluation proves difficult, such an 
approach delivers interesting information on the environmental performance of the voluntary 
approach. 
 
 
1.2.   Theoretical literature 
 
Below, an overview of the theoretical literature on voluntary approaches in environmental policy is 
presented. Theoretical work can be considered as an ex ante evaluation that departs from a limited 
amount of assumptions and reaches conclusions based on rational deduction. The next section 
discusses empirical work which can be seen as an ex post evaluation of the theoretical expectations. In 
this review we restrict ourselves to the studies we believe are most important. We mainly look for 
articles that are often cited and are published in peer-reviewed journals or books. Furthermore, we are 
most interested in studies that draw some implications on the impacts of voluntary approaches on 
social welfare rather than studies on business strategy or management. After a short description of the 
studies, we present a short summary of the main findings. 
 
1.2.1. Unilateral commitments 
 
Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) analyse how low- and high-quality firms react to the imposition of 
minimum quality standards. They assume a situation in which consumers value environmental quality 
but differ in their willingness to pay depending on their income level. Full information enables the 
consumers to distinguish the “green” product from the other. Firms play a two-stage duopoly game 
where they first choose their levels of cleaning technology and next engage in price competition. Their 
theoretical analysis shows that if the government imposes a minimum standard that is not too high (i.e. 
that keeps both firms in business), the dirty firm will meet the standard exactly while the cleaner firm 
will improve its performance over the mandated standard level. The intuition behind this finding is 
that the additional cost of increasing environmental performance does not outweigh the positive 
impact of product differentiation and higher prices. As such, they explain the growth in 
overcompliance by changes in consumers’ preferences combined with the increasing availability of 
environmental information.  
 
Lutz et al. (2000) however cast doubts on the benefits of pro-active environmental leadership. In 
contrast to Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) they develop a model in which the firms do not react to 
the imposition of minimum standards but move first. They also use a duopoly model where products 
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are vertically differentiated, but the companies can choose their level of (environmental) quality before 
the government adopts minimal quality standards. It is shown that if the high-quality firm can commit 
to a quality level before regulations are promulgated, this firm will strategically exceed the anticipated 
standards by a limited amount and as such induce the regulator to set a lower minimum quality 
standard. This results in a situation where both firms produce a lower quality than if the government 
had adopted minimal quality standards first. While this results in higher profits for them, it lowers 
consumers’ welfare and results in lower social welfare. As such, they conclude that substantial delays 
in the regulatory process of standard setting can be damaging to social welfare as this creates 
opportunities for firms to move first and negatively influence the minimum quality standard. 
 
Maxwell et al. (2000) present a model in which companies in an oligopoly might opt to self-regulate in 
order to pre-empt consumer groups from lobbying for more stringent government regulation. Their 
model shows that self-regulation occurs depending on the coordination and lobbying costs.  Industry 
as well as consumers are better of in the self-regulation case as both save on lobbying costs and 
consumers get some level of pollution abatement on top. Despite the fact that the abatement level is 
sub-optimal, it Pareto dominates the social welfare that would have arisen if the government had 
issued mandatory regulations driven by both consumers and industry lobby activities.   
 
Whereas the welfare implications found by Maxwell et at. (2000) are rather positive, those of Lutz et 
al. (2000) are not. Lutz et al. (2000) point to the difference between the welfare effects of corporate 
quality leadership that pre-empts mandatory regulations and leadership that shapes regulations that 
cannot be pre-empted. Maxwell et al. (2000) found that pre-emptive self-regulation can have socially 
beneficial, but not optimal, effects. This is because self-regulation eliminates the transaction costs of 
using the regulatory process. Once new standards have been legislatively mandated, however, these 
costs can no longer be avoided, and this explains the socially detrimental outcome of Lutz et al. 
(2000). Their model also results in a sub-optimal environmental protection level without saving on the 
costs involved in the regulatory process. Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) provide a theoretical model 
of overcompliance, but their study does not include social welfare implications. 
 
1.2.2. Public voluntary schemes  
 
Stranlund (1995) builds a model to compare two regimes to support compliance to an environmental 
norm: a mandatory regime supported by a fine and a voluntary program supported by government 
efforts to reduce compliance costs. He shows that the voluntary program is superior depending on 
whether the public effort is rival, the degree of excludability of public effort and the relative prices of 
private and public effort. Stranlund concludes that voluntary policies will be most effective when they 
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provide nonrival efforts such as technical information about pollution abatement technologies. This is 
because it avoids wasteful duplication of this effort that occurs when each company needs to collect 
the information on its own. If, however, public effort is rival in nature and non-excludable, then a 
mandatory program can achieve a higher social welfare. The mandatory program is more efficient 
because public efforts are not wasted on those who will not comply under the voluntary regime. In this 
case a voluntary program will dominate only if the cost of public effort is significantly lower than the 
cost of private effort. Stranlund builds this model in the context of a voluntary recycling program. 
Applied in this context, the paper concludes that a voluntary approach is welfare improving if the 
public effort is nonrival (e.g. information) and excludable (e.g. recycling bins are not to be paid for 
people that will not recycle) and the cost of the public effort is lower (e.g. government can purchase 
the bins at a lower price compared to individuals). 
 
Segerson (1998) develops a model to analyse the use of a policy that combines a voluntary, cost-
sharing program designed to induce farmers to undertake pollution control measures with a 
background threat of mandatory controls or taxes to reduce nonpoint pollution. The results suggest 
that depending on (i) the magnitude of the transaction costs associated with implementing a first-best 
mandatory instrument, (ii) the likelihood that a mandatory approach would be imposed if there is no 
voluntary approach or if the voluntary approach is unsuccessful and (iii) the social cost of funds used 
to finance any subsidy that is paid for participation in a voluntary approach, a subsidy-based voluntary 
program might be more efficient and thus preferable for a welfare-maximising regulator compared to a 
pure regulatory approach. The idea is that by inducing voluntary participation, the regulator saves on 
information and transaction costs incurred when having to design a first-best mandatory approach. 
This is especially relevant for nonpoint and heterogeneous pollution sources as cost-minimizing 
abatement levels vary across firms making first-best policy approaches information intensive. 
 
Wu and Babcock (1999) analyse the relative efficiency of a mandatory regulation and a voluntary 
program that grants technical and financial assistance to producers who adopt a land conservation 
practice. They found that the voluntary program is more efficient if the deadweight losses of 
government expenditures bound to the voluntary approach are below the difference between the 
private and public costs of government services plus the additional implementation costs of the 
mandatory program. The model shows that this is more likely when (i) the deadweight loss from 
raising government revenue is zero or small, (ii) government services are less rival, (iii) the costs of 
government services are lower that what farmers would have to pay for equivalent private services, 
(iv) the number of farms in the program is large, and (v) the saving in implementation costs under the 
voluntary program is large and increases rapidly with program acreage. These conclusions are in the 
line of those found by Stranlund (1995) and again point to the importance of nonrival benefits in 
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voluntary schemes. Logically, these benefits increase with the number of participants and the 
additional costs to obtain these benefits by private effort.  
 
Lyon and Maxwell (2003) develop a model in which both unilateral actions as well as public voluntary 
programs can be analysed. More specifically, in the first stage, firms choose a level of unilateral 
abatement. After observing this level, the regulator chooses whether to impose a welfare-maximising 
pollution tax that is passed with some probability. If the tax proposal is not approved, the regulator has 
the option of proposing a voluntary program that subsidizes firms’ technology adoptions. The results 
are quite positive for unilateral actions but negative for public programs. They find that when 
unilateral action occurs, it pre-empts taxation but enhances social welfare. A voluntary program on the 
other hand can reduce welfare by increasing industry resistance to socially beneficial tax proposals and 
by discouraging welfare-enhancing self-regulation by firms so as to not pre-empt the subsidies 
resulting from the voluntary program. Taxation is superior to the voluntary program because taxation 
induces inefficient firms to exit while subsidizing under the voluntary program does not. Political 
opposition to taxation might however create a situation where unilateral actions pre-empt taxation. 
However, when there is a possibility of a voluntary program, no unilateral action will be undertaken. 
As such, they come up with a very sceptical view on voluntary public programs.  
 
Maxwell and Decker (2006) look at self-regulation in the form of voluntary environmental 
investments. In fact, they analyse a sort of public program in which the regulator commits to reduce 
enforcement oversight on the condition that the firm engages in some voluntary environmental 
investments. They find that such investments unambiguously increase when the enforcement regulator 
acts “responsive”, i.e. takes into consideration companies’ voluntary investments in establishing 
monitoring and enforcement effort. The firm is motivated to voluntary invest as this will cause the 
regulator to reduce the frequency with which he monitors the firm leading to a reduction in the firm’s 
expected fine. Both the regulator and the firm benefit from the increase in the voluntary investment.  
 
Again the results of different studies provide a mixed picture. Stranlund (1995), Segerson (1998) and 
Wu and Babcock (1999) draw up a rather positive picture, more recently, Lyon and Maxwell (2003) 
however reach a negative conclusion on voluntary public schemes. The latter is explained because the 
mere possibility that a public program might be offered increases the opposition to the imposition of 
taxation by firms and decreases their incentives to initiate unilateral commitments. One should 
however point to the crucial assumption that the public program is modelled as a subsidy for 
participants in reaching this conclusion. In the former mentioned studies, public programs might entail 
beneficial effects depending on some conditions to be met. These occur especially when the 
probability that a first-best mandatory approach will be implemented is low or when it is expected to 
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be expensive to implement (Segerson, 1998) and when the benefits of the voluntary public program 
have characteristics similar to public goods, e.g. the provision of non-rival technical information on 
pollution abatement technologies. 
 
1.2.3. Negotiated agreements 
 
Segerson and Miceli (1998) draw up a model to evaluate the impact on environmental quality of 
voluntary agreements where polluters are induced to participate either by a mandatory threat or by 
cost-sharing subsidies. The results suggest that the impact can be positive or negative depending on 
the allocation of bargaining power, the magnitude of the background threat and the social cost of 
funds. As they assume the agreement to have lower abatement and transaction costs, they find an 
agreement is the likely outcome of the interaction game between a polluter and a regulator. Not 
surprising, they find the level of abatement is positively correlated with the strength of the background 
threat and the bargaining power of the regulator (this is also found in Segerson and Miceli, 1999). The 
assumed cost-efficiency however creates the possibility that an abatement level is reached higher than 
the one that would have been imposed by law. In any case, the abatement target is higher than the 
expected level under the legislative threat. Including subsidies in the model to induce participation in 
the agreement increases the acceptable abatement level. This is especially useful when the background 
threat is weak and the social cost of subsidies low. To conclude, voluntary agreements might enhance 
social welfare if the regulator has substantial bargaining power, the background legislative threat is 
strong and the cost of using subsidies low. A crucial assumption for this conclusion to hold is the 
efficiency advantage of negotiated agreements on pollution abatement and transaction/administrative 
costs. If these conditions are not met, the welfare implications are expected to be negative. 
 
Schmelzer (1999) takes on a similar approach. He models the interaction between an industry and a 
regulator in which an emission tax is used as alternative threat. Similar to Segerson and Miceli (1998) 
the agreement is preferred to the tax but in this case this is explained by avoided costs of monitoring 
and delays in the regulatory approach. The results suggest an agreement is the likely outcome of the 
bargaining process if the regulatory threat is credible. The emission level of this agreement however 
will always be below the one that occurs by the imposition of the tax. This is explained by the strategic 
advantage of the industry as it controls the emissions. Nonetheless, social welfare under the 
agreements might be superior insofar as the more limited reductions in emissions are traded against 
the efficiency gains of avoiding financial and non-financial regulatory costs.  
 
Hansen (1999) develops a model in which the regulator and the legislator might have different 
objectives. The model suggests that if the regulator is biased towards promoting the interests of the 
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industry, this might result in weak voluntary agreements that preempt regulations that would have a 
superior effect on social welfare. The agreement however is concluded as it offers benefits to the firms 
and the regulator. This is however rather trivial as two parties would never sign an agreement on a 
voluntary basis if it did not entail a net benefit for them. The model yields no conclusions with regard 
to social welfare. Next, counter primary intuition, Hansen shows that when environmental interest 
groups are included in the model, this can reduce environmental quality relative to the level that would 
have been obtained under a regulatory policy. This occurs because the pressure from environmental 
interest groups increases the incentives of policy makers to sign agreements. As such, he concludes the 
analysis is consistent with the view that voluntary agreements are policy instruments used by less 
environmentally concerned regulators and industries who are faced with increasing public concern for 
the environment.   
 
Grepperud (2002) departs from a similar approach by assuming that the regulator has preferences over 
employment due to the presence of layoff costs. In the model, industry and regulators negotiate over 
pollution abatement targets under the background threat of introducing emission licenses. It is shown 
that agreements provide gains for both industry and the regulator relative to the use of licenses, but at 
the expense of lower environmental objectives within the agreement solution. In fact, the regulator 
makes concessions with respect to pollution abatement in return for more employment from industry. 
Whereas both parties in the agreement are better off, the paper holds no conclusion with regard to 
overall social welfare. This will depend on the valuation of environmental compared to employment 
concerns. Grepperud (2002) argues that the reluctance to accept layoffs may produce inefficiencies, 
especially in the long run. It is however argued that next to environmental effectiveness and 
efficiency, a range of motivations like competitiveness and employment concerns might provide better 
explanatory factors for the instrument choice that has occurred in the history of environmental 
regulation.    
 
Golombek and Moen (2002) model a negotiated agreement between government and industry against 
the background of imposing emission taxes if the agreement fails. More specifically, the authors 
model the coordination game of dividing the aggregate abatement target between the firms in the 
industry to investigate whether emissions are allocated efficiently between firms. As such, they 
investigate the effects of industry-wide negotiated agreements on the behaviour of individual firms. 
The paper shows that such agreements are possible in the sense that all firms have an incentive to 
reduce emissions in response to the taxation threat. However, if firms differ in size this is not achieved 
in a cost-efficient way. Large firms stand for a disproportionately large part of the reductions in 
emissions. The intuition behind this result is that small firms that do not reduce emissions only 
contribute marginally to the increased risk of the imposition of industry wide taxes. Smaller firms thus 
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have a greater incentive to free-ride on the results of larger companies. This cost-inefficiency leads to 
conclude that environmental agreements are inferior to environmental taxes. The authors however 
point to the fact that this is only the case for taxes imposed on emissions and implemented without 
administrative costs. If firm-specific emissions are hard to measure in contrast to aggregate industry 
emissions (e.g. by judging water quality), this might plead in the advantage of negotiated agreements 
with industry-wide targets.  
 
Grepperud and Pedersen (2003) build a model in which the authorities and industry bargain over a 
negotiated agreement with emission licenses as a background threat. The paper focuses on the initial 
positions both parties can take to strengthen their bargaining position. Both parties, the authorities by 
signalling the nature of the emission licenses and the industry by lobbying, can increase the share of 
voters that prefers voluntary agreements over emission licenses, making it politically costly for the 
authorities to regulate by law. The authors find that the most likely situation is the one where the 
authorities signal a moderate threat, causing the industry to select a low level of lobbying. In this case, 
social welfare increases compared to the initial situation without regulations but the emission level of 
the agreement will be below the first-best, implying a loss of social welfare compared to this 
reference. Concluding, they provide evidence on negotiated agreements as suboptimal policy 
solutions.  
 
Manzini and Mariotti (2003) model firm-regulator negotiations in an oligopoly focussing on the 
bargaining process. They claim there main finding is the fact that the ‘toughest firm principle’ holds: 
the outcome of the negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude 
towards environmental control. Interestingly, Manzini and Mariotti (2003) challenge the conclusion 
from previous studies that stricter threats lead to more ambitious negotiated targets. In their view, an 
increase in the probability of legislative intervention makes firms more eager to agree with more 
stringent voluntary abatement targets. However, this is counteracted by the fact that the increased 
threat also makes the regulator keener to agree with the voluntary approach.  
 
Hansen (2005) presents a model that offers three explanations for the existence of negotiated 
agreements: the efficiency explanation (lower abatement costs), the policy disagreement explanation 
(the regulator and legislator have different policy priorities) and the responsibility shifting explanation 
(the government wants to avoid criticism from green pressure groups). Only the first explanation leads 
to unambiguous welfare improvements relative to a mandatory approach. Based on a meta analysis of 
case studies, Hansen argues that negotiated agreements are chosen most frequently in order to shift 
responsibility for implementation to industrial organizations that are less sensitive to criticism from 
powerful environmental interest groups. In this case the model predicts a reduction in social welfare as 
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the agreement will be less cost effective and achieve lower environmental performance than the 
traditional regulatory alternative.  
 
Glachant (2005) analyses whether a negotiated agreement concluded under the threat of a pollution 
quota is able to deliver an efficient level of pollution abatement. In the model, the threat is 
endogenously determined resulting from a rent-seeking contest between a green and a polluter lobby 
group influencing the legislator. Glachant finds that the outcome of the game results in the emergence 
of a negotiated agreement. The agreement achieves a more efficient level of pollution abatement 
compared to the politically distorted pollution quota but also that this level is below the first-best 
abatement level. The underlying intuition is that the polluter is ready to accept an agreement that is 
more stringent than the legislative quota as the agreement allows polluters to avoid rent-seeking costs.  
 
Finally, Glachant (2007) examined whether non-binding voluntary agreements concluded under the 
legislative threat of a pollution quota, are able to achieve an efficient level of environmental 
protection. The outcome of the model shows that agreements can improve social welfare relative to 
legislative intervention when lobbying is very effective and when the polluter and the regulator do not 
discount futures costs and benefits heavily. The latter condition is needed because it may take several 
years before non-compliance to the voluntary agreement is discovered and the legislative threat 
installed. The former condition favours the agreement by the fact that effective lobbying strongly 
reduces the strictness of the legislative quota to be implemented. Glachant shows that when the 
legislative threat is credible (i.e. lobbying is ineffective) negotiated agreements are inferior to the 
mandatory quota. This finding nuances the recurrent policy recommendation that agreements should 
be developed under credible legislative or regulatory threats. According to Glachant there is no reason 
to resort to voluntary agreements when a credible regulatory threat exists. The regulation should be 
implemented instead of the agreement. Concluding, the key message of the paper is that non-
enforceable agreements are weak instruments, which are potentially useful in adverse political 
contexts.  
 
The overview shows there is lively debate on the relative merits of negotiated environmental 
agreements compared to other instruments. Table 4-2 presents an overview of the studies described 
above. We distinguish three categories. The first column groups studies in which the negotiated 
agreement results in some improvement of the environmental performance compared to the situation 
at beginning of the agreement. Commonly, in these studies the agreements occur because the regulator 
is biased towards industrial interests, employment or competitiveness concerns. In these settings, the 
environmental impact is below the one that would occur under the legislative alternative. Whether 
social welfare increases is usually not investigated. This will depend on the weight that is given to the 
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different objectives (e.g. employment, environmental protection, competitiveness) in the welfare 
function.  
 
The middle column incorporates studies where negotiated agreements are preferred above the 
legislative alternative. However, the agreements do not achieve a first best level of environmental 
protection. Rather, an agreement is superior as the regulatory alternative is hindered by political 
(Glachant, 2005 and 2007) or administrative constraints (Schmelzer, 1999).  
 
The last column groups studies which conclude that negotiated agreements are the first-best policy 
option in the sense that the regulatory alternative implemented without hindrances would only achieve 
inferior results. This is only found by Segerson and Miceli (1998) and is explained by the assumption 
of lower abatement and administrative costs under the negotiated approach. To conclude, table 4-2 
shows that the stricter the baseline against which negotiated agreements are assessed, the lower the 
number of studies in support for negotiated agreements. 
 
Table 4-2: Theoretical studies on the evaluation of negotiated agreements 
Some environmental 
improvement 
Preferred above regulatory 
alternative 
Negotiated agreement as  
first-best 
Hansen (1999) 
Grepperud (2002) 
Grepperud and Pedersen (2003) 
Golombek and Moen (2003) 
Hansen (2005) 
Schmelzer (1999) 
Glachant (2005) 
Glachent (2007) 
Segerson and Miceli (1998) 
 
 
Table 4-2 should be interpreted with caution. First, when a study reaches diverging conclusions, 
depending on the values of different parameters in the model, we classified it according to its best 
result with regard to negotiated agreements. The superior outcome of Segerson and Miceli (1998), for 
instance, only holds given that (i) the regulator has strong bargaining power, (ii) there exits a stringent 
regulatory threat and (iii) the social cost of government funds is low. If these conditions do not hold, 
they come to inferior conclusions. Second, one should be aware of the context in which these 
conclusions occur. In Schmelzer (1999), for example, the agreement is preferred over the tax due to 
avoided monitoring and control costs but results in a lower level of environmental protection. Finally, 
the fact that a negotiated agreement results in some environmental improvement not necessarily 
legitimates its use. As pointed by Lyon and Maxwell (2003) the mere possibility of a voluntary 
approach being initiated, might jeopardize the probability of better instruments being implemented.   
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1.2.4. Final remarks on the theoretical literature 
 
The picture emerging from the overview of theoretical articles is mixed and only modestly positive at 
best. We find three arguments that frequently recur to explain why voluntary approaches might 
nevertheless be the preferred policy instrument: 
 
 Abatement efficiency gains: this argument claims that voluntary approaches are flexible in 
nature and this allows industry to exploit gains from reduced abatement costs compared to 
mandatory approaches (e.g. Segerson and Miceli, 1998). 
 Regulatory gains: claims that the political or administrative costs of alternative instruments 
might be too high to legitimate their implementation. Voluntary approaches might present an 
advantageous route to avoid these costs (e.g. Maxwell and Lyon, 2000; Schmelzer, 1999; 
Glachant, 2005). Another argument is that the voluntary approach delivers non-rival benefits 
(e.g. information) which is not the case in the legislative alternative (e.g. Stranlund, 1995; Wu 
and Babcock, 1999)   
 Regulatory bias: In this case, a public choice perspective is adopted and the regulator is not 
fully committed to achieve the socially optimal level of environmental protection. Next to 
genuine competitiveness or employment concerns, the regulator might be influenced by 
industry or other lobby groups’ initiatives (e.g. Hansen, 1999; Grepperud, 2002; Grepperud 
and Pedersen, 2003).  
 
Rather than being disillusioned with the different conclusions found in the literature, one should 
regard these studies as a collection of different settings resulting in different outcomes. The articles 
reach different conclusions because the conditions under which they study voluntary agreements 
differ. In other words, the outcomes differ as they result from different assumptions (e.g. is there a 
legislative threat?; who has the bargaining power?; is free-riding considered?; is the regulator biased 
towards industry interests?; does the voluntary approach offer lower abatement cost?; does the 
voluntary approach creates additional benefits like public recognition?; is the sector homogenous or 
heterogeneous?; competitive or oligopolistic?; is product differentiation considered?; is there one 
single abatement technology or a range of possibilities?; do costumers have green preferences? etc.). 
On similar issues, most studies reach converging conclusions. For instance, most agree that the 
strength of the threat increases the effectiveness of the voluntary approach or that if a MBI can be 
implemented with little difficulties, it is likely to lead to a higher level of social welfare.  
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1.3.  Empirical literature 
 
The review of the theoretical literature learned that there is, ex ante, no consensus on the expected 
merits of voluntary approaches. As is the case with modelling exercises, the outcomes are strongly 
influenced by the assumptions made by the researcher. Whereas it is the aim to set assumptions that 
correspond to reality as closely as possible, to a large extent they remain arbitrary set by the researcher 
and represent his or her idiosyncratic view on the organisation of society (e.g. government maximising 
social welfare or public choice perspective). Besides, reality is far too complex to capture in a 
theoretical model, no matter how numerous the assumptions or advanced the methodology. Finally, 
there might be a discrepancy between the theoretical predictions and the actual outcome of a policy 
instrument due to the impact of the implementation phase. Given these inherent restrictions of 
theoretical analysis, ex post empirical analysis might be valuable to shed some additional light on the 
desirability of voluntary approaches in environmental policy. Again, we only present some of the most 
prominent evaluation studies. 
 
1.3.1. Unilateral commitments 
 
Firm specific unilateral commitments established in the context of corporate social responsibility are 
hard to evaluate. Such initiatives vary significantly between companies and frequently only contain 
qualitative objectives (e.g. codes of conduct). Moreover, the information advantage of the companies 
concerned and the confidential character of much of the information make that even in an in-depth 
case study analysis it might prove difficult to reach incontestable conclusions. There is however some 
evidence that companies which face higher stakeholder pressure (e.g. situated near cities, wealthier 
neighbourhoods, regions with larger environmental pressure groups), regulatory pressures or have a 
poor environmental performance record are more likely to take initiatives and reduce pollution (e.g. 
see Alberini and Segerson, 2002 or Lyon and Maxwell, 2004 for an overview). We will not consider 
these kinds of initiatives here.  
 
Industry- or business wide initiatives like Responsible Care or ISO 14001 on the other hand provide 
testable cases of unilateral commitments by comparing the environmental performance of participants 
with non-participants. Ideally, one employs a two-stage methodology in which the first stage predicts 
the probability a given firm participates in the program, and the second stage estimates the firm’s 
environmental performance controlling for the likelihood of participation derived in the first stage. 
This method avoids the self-selection bias that arises if one simply includes program participation as a 
variable without controlling for the antecedents that explain participation. In other words, the decision 
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to participate in a voluntary initiative and the performance outcome are endogenously determined and 
likely to be influenced by the same observable and unobservable factors. 
 
King and Lenox (2000) evaluate the results of the chemical industry’s Responsible Care program 
based on a sample of 3.606 US facilities and the data on the emissions of 246 chemicals between 1987 
and 1996 as reported in the Toxic Release Inventory. They conclude that participants in the program 
did not reduce emissions more rapidly than non-participants. In fact, they find evidence that 
participants are improving their emissions more slowly than facilities not participating in Responsible 
Care. In addition, the data suggests that the program attracted a disproportionate number of dirty 
companies. On the other hand, they find that the environmental performance of the facilities in the 
sample improved faster after the adoption of the Responsible Care program. However, this holds even 
more for non-participants. To conclude, King and Lenox cast doubt on the effectives of Responsible 
Care and question whether it might serve as a smokescreen that reduces companies’ incentives to 
reduce emissions.  
 
Dasgupta et al. (2000) analyse the impact of companies’ environmental strategies on their compliance 
record. They use data gathered through a survey of 236 Mexican firms in the food, chemical, non-
metallic mineral and metal industry. The results show that plants that adopted an ISO 14001-type of 
environmental management system exhibit a superior (self-reported) compliance status. Potoski and 
Prakash (2005) reach the same conclusion for a sample of 3.709 facilities in the US. The found that 
adopting ISO 14001 reduces facilities’ time spent out of compliance by about 7%, or about 25 days a 
year. 
 
Anton et al. (2004) investigate the impact of the comprehensiveness of a firm’s environmental 
management system (EMS) on the intensity of toxic releases in the US. The sample consists of the 
S&P 500 companies and they use data from the Toxic Release Inventory of 1994 and 1995. This 
results in 313 observations. The comprehensiveness of a company’s EMS is measured based on a 
survey inquiry in which companies were asked whether they adopted 13 different environmental 
management practices (e.g. the firm has a formal written policy; the firm evaluates its environmental 
risks when selecting its clients; the firm conducts audits etc.). The econometric tests show that the 
extent of EMS adoption has a significant negative impact on the intensity of toxic emissions and that 
this impact is greater on firms that have inferior past environmental records. As such, they conclude 
that promoting the adoption of EMSs can be considered as an effective policy tool. 
  
 
 
 114
Chapter 4 – Evaluating voluntary approaches 
1.3.2. Public voluntary schemes  
 
The possibility to compare the performance of participants with non-participants makes public 
voluntary programs very suitable for empirical evaluation. This especially holds for the US since the 
EPA has initiated a high number of voluntary programs (see chapter 3) and the Toxic Release 
Inventory provides publicly available data on the environmental performance on company-level. This 
explains why there are quite some evaluation studies available. We provide a short overview in table 
4-3. 
 
1BTable 4-3: Empirical evaluation studies on public voluntary programs 
Authors Program 
evaluated 
Main conclusion Positive 
impact 
Khanna and 
Damon (1999) 
33/50 Participants reduced emissions between 1991 and 
1993 significantly more than non-participants.  
Yes 
Gamper-
Rabindran (2005) 
33/50 Relative to non-participants, participants do not 
reduce their health-indexed emissions of target 
chemicals in several key industries.  
No/moderate
Vidovic and 
Khanna (2007) 
33/50 Found that participation had no impact on emission 
reductions between 1991 and 1995. They explain the 
contradiction with Khanna and Damon’s (1999) 
finding by emission reductions in the two years before 
the inception of the program in 1991. 
No 
Welch et al. 
(2000) 
Climate 
Challenge 
Program  
Participation had no impact on CO2 emission 
reductions; some results even suggest a detrimental 
impact. 
No 
Morgenstern et 
al. (2007) 
Climate Wise 
program 
A transient effect on fuel use and emissions, with the 
best estimate being a 3% reduction during the 
program’s initial phase. There is some evidence that 
participants actually increased their electricity use.  
No/moderate
Rivera and de 
Leon (2004) 
Sustainable 
Slopes 
Program  
Participating ski areas appear to be correlated with 
lower third-part environmental performance ratings.  
No 
Rivera et al. 
(2006) 
Sustainable 
Slopes 
Program 
Participating ski areas show a significant positive 
correlation for only one out of five environmental 
performance criteria (natural resource conservation) 
No/moderate
 
 
All in all, the balance bends to the negative side. Only one study (Khanna and Damon, 1999) firmly 
concludes that participants of the 33/50 program significantly reduced their emissions compared to 
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non-participants. This result is however not confirmed by subsequent studies of the same program. It 
could however be the case that the initiation of a voluntary program contributes to the general 
awareness and willingness to address an environmental issue that stretches beyond the participants or 
the program targets. For instance, Khanna and Damon (1999) find that the 33/50 program leads to a 
significant impact on releases not targeted by the 33/50 program. Maxwell and Lyon (2007) elaborate 
this point and argue that when these programs enhance the diffusion of cost-effective techniques for 
pollution abatement that is not competitively sensitive (which is often the case in EPA’s programs), it 
may be difficult to identify the results of these programs econometrically as the effects are likely to 
diffuse to non-participants in a latter stage. As such, even for successful programs, it becomes 
impossible to detect a difference in the performance of participants and non-participants. In their 
review of the literature, they conclude that most empirical studies find that either participation made 
no difference in environmental performance or that any difference occurred only in early periods and 
quickly disappeared. This line of thinking might explain the difference between the results on the 
33/50 program. In the early stage of the program, a significant effect was found by Khanna and 
Damon (1999) but as the information about best-practices spread to non-participants, latter studies like 
Gamper-Rabindran (2005) and Vidovic and Khanna (2007) were unable confirm this observation.  
 
1.3.3. Negotiated agreements 
 
Finally, we present some prominent evaluation studies of negotiated agreements. As agreements are 
commonly implemented at sector level, the evaluation of negotiated agreements requires a different 
methodological approach. Here, it is not possible to compare the performance of participants with non-
participants by econometric methods in order to estimate the impact of the instrument. For negotiated 
agreements the most promising road is to conduct in-depth case studies. Ideally, one should assess the 
environmental effectiveness against the first-best scenario (see 1.1.). Unfortunately, due to the 
speculative character of this scenario and the prevalent lack of data, one often has to resort to other 
reference scenarios. Moreover, it is difficult to draw general conclusions on the appropriateness of the 
instrument due to large variation in terms of objectives and obligations as well as variations in the 
institutional, social and economic context in which the agreements are applied. Finally, as agreements 
are usually concluded as part of a larger policy package or against the threat of legislation, it is hard to 
disentangle the effect that can be attributed to the agreement (EEA, 1997). 
 
The report from the European Environmental Agency (EEA, 1997) was one of the first attempts to 
evaluate a number of agreements along a common assessment framework. The results are shown in 
table 4-4. Six agreements from different European countries were included and the effectiveness was 
compared to the situation at the start of the agreement (called environmental improvement; second 
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column) and to the business as usual scenario (called environmental effectiveness, third column). As 
turns out from table 4-4, in only two cases the EEA was able to find a clear environmental 
improvement compared to the situation prior to the agreement. In only one of the six cases there is 
limited evidence that the agreement pushed the environmental performance above the trend scenario. 
The fact that all cases entailed additional benefits such as raising awareness, enhancing co-operation 
and trust, increasing information exchange etc., throws in weight at the positive side of the balance. 
 
Table 4-4: Environmental effectiveness of six negotiated agreements evaluated by the 
EEA 
Negotiated agreement Environmental 
improvement 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
Technical 
change 
 French end of life vehicles 
 German CO2-emissions 
 Swedish packaging waste 
 Dutch chemicals 
 Portuguese pulp paper 
 Danish transport packaging waste 
? 
? 
+/? 
+++ 
++ 
+/? 
? 
? 
? 
+/? 
? 
? 
+ 
0/? 
? 
+ 
+ 
+/? 
 +/++/+++ = slightly positive / positive / very positive 
 0 = absent or negligible 
 ? = uncertain outcome (no data available, unknown effect) 
 Source: EEA (1997)  
 
In 1998, the Environmental Law Network International (ELNI) published the book 'Environmental 
Agreements: The Role and Effect of Environmental Agreements in Environmental Policies’, in which 
some hypotheses are tested based on 8 case studies from Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and the 
USF2F. Regarding the evaluation of whether the targets have been met, it should be noted that some 
agreements were still running at the time they were evaluated. In these cases, the evaluation was made 
against interim targets when available. The evaluation of the environmental effectiveness is shown in 
table 4-5. With two agreements in each evaluation category (low, medium, high) the results are clearly 
mixed. The authors conclude that based on the results from the case studies, they were unable to reject 
or confirm the postulated hypothesis that “environmental agreements lead to a higher level of 
environmental protection than other especially regulatory instruments”. A more negative evaluation 
                                                 
2 We will not discuss the results from the 2 US cases here, as they do not really fit in our typology of voluntary 
approaches. The 33/50-program case is rather a public voluntary program and the Alcoa agreement case 
considers an agreement between a single company and an NGO and thus does not really correspond to the 
negotiated agreements we are considering.  
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was found on the second hypothesis, which stated that, “environmental agreements are more cost-
effective than other instruments of environmental protection”. It is stated that the scare data available 
as well as theoretical considerations provide no evidence to support this hypothesis. 
 
2BTable 4-5: Evaluation of negotiated agreements by ELNI 
Germany Belgium Netherlands  
EDTA Batteries River Cement SUBAT Ceramics 
 Targets reached 
 Ambition of targets 
relative to potential 
 Ambition of targets 
relative to baseline 
No 
No assessment 
possible 
Nil 
(controversial) 
Partly 
Neutral 
 
Nil 
Partly* 
Low 
 
Positive 
Not* 
Low 
 
Negative 
(controversial) 
Partly 
High 
 
Positive 
Partly 
High 
 
Positive 
Overall effectiveness Low Medium Medium Low High High 
* in process 
Source: ELNI, 1998 
 
The “Voluntary Agreements Implementation and Efficiency” (VAIE) research project investigated the 
impact of five different agreement schemes as a means of promoting industrial energy efficiency and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (the French Voluntary Agreements on CO2 Reductions; the Danish 
Agreements on Industrial Energy Efficiency; the Declaration of German Industry on Global Warming 
Prevention; the Swedish ECO-Energy Programme; and the Dutch Long-Term Agreements on Energy 
Efficiency). The review of Krarup and Ramesohl (2002) holds two main conclusions. First, whereas 
the objectives of the agreements have been reached almost completely, the agreements generally had 
only a limited impact on investment criteria. The agreements rarely represented the decisive initial 
impulse to introduce energy efficient management practices. Raising general awareness and increasing 
management motivation are indicated as the most significant impacts. Second, they point to a positive 
correlation between the implementation costs and the effectiveness. Most effective agreements are 
quite costly in terms of administrative effort and the provision of an appropriate policy background. 
Krarup and Ramesohl (2002) conclude that agreements should be effectively integrated within a 
structured climate policy mix with attention given to the availability of strong incentives for 
compliance, backed by a process of monitoring and evaluation. This typically imposes significant 
institutional demands and requires lengthy preparations.  
 
In the “Negotiated Environmental Agreements: Policy Lessons to be learned from a comparative case 
study analysis” (NEAPOL) project, twelve negotiated agreements were assessed on a 1 to 5 scale 
against four evaluation criteria: specification, application, impact and resource development (for an in 
depth description see De Clercq, 2002 or research paper 4 presented below). Figure 4-2 presents the 
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results of two criteria: the application and the impact of an agreement. The application criterion refers 
to the compliance with respect to the targets and obligations of an agreement. The impact criterion 
refers to the environmental impact compared to the business as usual scenario and to the economic 
efficiency of an agreement. As figure 4-2 shows, the study contained successful as well as 
unsuccessful agreements. The average of the twelve agreements on the application and the impact 
dimension was 3.35 and 3.14 respectively. This indicates that the overall conclusion on the 
performance of the agreements was moderately above the neutral (3) score.   
 
3BFigure 4-2: The performance of negotiated agreements in the NEAPOL project 
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Source: De Clercq (2002) 
 
 
Research paper 4 
 
On the assessment of environmental voluntary agreements in Europe: Lessons to be 
leaned from a comparative case study analysis 
 
M. De Clercq and R. Bracke 
 
Evaluating environmental policy instruments is not an easy task. The impact is context 
dependent, partly determined by changing circumstances and hard to distinguish from other 
evolutions taking place. To complicate the exercise, instruments and especially negotiated 
agreements are hardly ever used in isolation from other instruments. Consequently, the literature 
on the evaluation of voluntary agreements shows mixed results and these results are hard to 
compare due to the different socio-economic context in which they were concluded and due to 
different internal characteristics of the agreements. 
 119
Chapter 4 – Evaluating voluntary approaches 
This research paper presents the results of a quite unique evaluation study of negotiated 
agreements as 12 agreements in six European countries have been evaluated according to a 
common evaluation framework. In addition, the paper points to four socio-economic factors that 
influence the performance of the agreements. The paper results from a broader research exercise 
carried out under the NEAPOL-project (Negotiated Environment Agreements: POlicy Lessons to 
be learned from a comparative case study analysis). NEAPOL is a research project financed by the 
European Commission – DG XII, and is part of the EC Environment and Climate Research 
Programme (1994-1998) – Research Theme 4: Human Dimensions of Environmental Change 
(project number ENV4- CT97-0560). For further information see Negotiating Environmental 
Agreements in Europe: Critical Factors for Success, 2002, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. edited by 
M. De Clercq.   
 
Abstract. The aim of this study is to gain insight on the factors leading to success or failure of 
environmental voluntary agreements. To do this we relied on a comparative case study covering 
twelve voluntary agreements from six different European countries. First, a general evaluation 
framework for assessing the performance of environmental voluntary agreements is presented. 
This framework takes into account three different evaluation dimensions: application, impact and 
resource development. Second, we focus on the factors explaining the level of performance. Four 
external preconditions for success were identified: the general policy style, the readiness to use 
severe alternative instruments in case of non-compliance with the agreement, the potential of the 
sector to negotiate and act as one collective actor and the potential for market success triggered 
of by the implementation of the agreement. Next to these external factors related to the 
institutional-economic context wherein a negotiated agreement is used, the specification of an 
agreement is considered to be an internal factor influencing the performance. The comparative 
case study shows that taken individually each of the factors is not as such a necessary condition 
for the success of an environmental voluntary agreement. Rather it is the combination of these 
success factors that is ultimately decisive for the performance of an agreement.  
 
 
De Bruijn et al. (2003) report on their evaluation study carried out in 2002/2003 on the effectiveness 
of negotiated agreements (covenants) in the Netherlands. By including 59 covenants it is the most 
encompassing evaluation study we are aware of. An overview of the main results is provided in figure 
4-3 below. Overall, the conclusion on the use and effects of covenants is quite positive. Almost all 
scores are above the neutral zone (score 3).  
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Figure 4-3: Overview of the results of the Dutch Covenants by de Bruijn et al. 
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Source: De Bruijn et al. (2003)  
 
In the related article Bressers et al. (forthcoming) confirm the positive results regarding environmental 
effectiveness in terms of ambition, compliance, goal attainment and environmental behavioural 
change. Remarkable is the finding that on average, a high level of ambition of the targets did not result 
in a lower level of compliance. More ambition seems to provide at least as much a stimulating 
challenge rather than a de-motivating hurdle. Also interesting is the fact that only one quarter of the 
respondents to the study thought that direct regulation could have led to comparable results. The fact 
that the agreements did not really lead to clear orientation towards radical innovations, throws in 
weight at the other side of the balance. Next to the positive evaluation on multiple criteria for 
environmental effectiveness, the authors stress the importance of efficiency and side effects including 
learning and more general resource development effects. Efficiency, in terms of cost minimisation of 
total costs, turned out less positive than environmental effectiveness. This is especially due to 
bureaucratic and administrative costs and the limited incentives to develop new methods and 
technology. Finally, the study points to the importance of side effects, i.e. the improvement of the 
initial position for a further development of environmental benefits. The great majority of the 
respondents had a positive view on nearly all side-effects (e.g. improved target group attitude, mutual 
understanding, more knowledge). The authors point to the importance of follow-up consultations in 
this regard. The authors conclude that “given that the environmental results of negotiated agreements 
can be characterised as reasonably successful, but not creating radical innovations, these resource 
building side-effects is where the main long term advantage of negotiated agreements over other 
government instruments can be sought.” 
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Important to notice is that it is claimed that the implementation context (including accompanying 
policy instruments) is highly relevant in explaining the relatively positive conclusion on the Dutch 
covenants. In fact the Dutch context is quit unique (see also 3.2). The tradition of negotiation and co-
operation with target groups, the corporatist institutional setting and the linkage of the covenants with 
the permit system are important in explaining why negotiated agreements are in no country more 
embedded in environmental policy making than in the Netherlands. 
 
A similar picture emerges from the evaluation of the Dutch negotiated agreements on industrial energy 
efficiency (Bressers er al., 2007). Most respondents were positive towards the use of these agreements 
as a policy strategy. Regarding environmental effectiveness, it turned out that participating companies 
had significantly earlier, quicker and more gains in energy efficiency during the period 1998-2002 
than companies in the same sectors that did not. Again the support for the statement that the 
agreements cause real innovations is weakest. The same holds for the, so-called, expansion themes 
(sustainable products, sustainable industrial estates, sustainable transport and logistics and sustainable 
energy) of the second generation of agreements on energy efficiency. In addition, the study paid 
attention to the importance of side effects. The responses on various statements in this regard confirm 
the overall support for the idea that all kinds of positive side effects occur that improve the 
opportunities for follow-up successes in later phases like raising responsibility of companies; building 
mutual understanding and trust, improved collaboration and knowledge. An important role is played 
by the consultation groups on energy efficiency. These groups work as communication platforms to 
guide the actual implementation process and discuss the general targets, the monitoring by companies, 
the reporting of results etc. About 85% of interviewed participants label the atmosphere as 
‘constructive cooperation’.  
 
 
2. Towards a synthesis 
 
Our overview of the theoretical and empirical literature shows that there is still lively debate on the 
relative merits of voluntary approaches. Positive signals alternate with less bright ones. This contrasts 
strongly with the other two broad categories of environmental policy instruments, especially regarding 
the theoretical analysis. For various types of direct regulation as well as for market-based instruments, 
the pro’s and contra’s have been mapped out quite clearly regarding a wide range of impacts like e.g. 
economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness, technological innovation etc. From a theoretical 
perspective, not many question the preference for market-based instruments. Market-based 
instruments are able to achieve a similar level of environmental protection as direct regulation at a 
lower abatement cost. Moreover, they provide an ongoing incentive for technological innovation and 
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shift responsibility to the polluter who is stimulated to put in question his day-to-day operations and 
his long-term strategy. Evaluation studies of real world examples might somewhat deviate from the 
theoretical expectations but this is usually attributed to implementation deficiencies like insufficient 
control and enforcement efforts, technological difficulties to monitor emissions at source or the 
political inability to design the optimal instrument out of competitiveness concerns. At this point of the 
story, voluntary approaches come in. In the coming subsection, we will try to synthesize the main 
findings of our literature review along the three E’s evaluation criteria.   
 
 
2.1. Evaluating voluntary approaches on the three E’s 
 
2.1.1. Effectiveness 
 
On average, voluntary approaches appear able to deliver moderate results. However, there are few 
theoretical studies stating that they might achieve more than alternative instruments. Often these 
studies come to this conclusion because they start from the premise that voluntary approaches allow 
more efficient political-administrative (e.g. Schmelzer, 1999; Glachant, 2005) or pollution abatement 
processes (e.g. Segerson and Miceli, 1998). This argument is however not really confirmed by 
empirical work. This work rather points to a positive correlation between political effort and 
environmental effectiveness (e.g. Krarup and Ramesohl, 2002; De Clercq, 2002; De Bruijn et al. 2003; 
Bressers et al., 2007; Bressers et al., forthcoming). In other words, most successful voluntary 
approaches require considerable political and administrative resources related to e.g. negotiating, 
implementing, controlling, monitoring and evaluating these programs. Moreover, the fact that business 
is more intensively involved in the policy implementation points at the direction of inferior 
environmental performance compared to hierarchical political modes. Business involvement implies 
they can influence the environmental target levels more easily. Again, this assumption is not supported 
in all empirical work. In the evaluation of the Dutch negotiated agreements for instance, Bressers et al. 
(forthcoming) found that most respondents believed that the same results would not have been 
achieved by regulatory means.  
 
The literature offers little examples of initiatives that completely failed but provides a number of 
studies that were unable to identify a superior performance of participants compared to non-
participants of public voluntary schemes in the US (e.g. Welch et al. 2000; Rivera and de Leon, 2004; 
Vidovic and Khanna, 2007). This might be explained by the fact that these programs attract a 
disproportional level of worse performers (e.g. Khanna, 2001; Alberini and Segeron, 2002) or because 
the programs also stimulates non-participants (Maxwell and Lyon, 2007). Besides, there is evidence 
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that companies which face higher stakeholder pressure (e.g. situated near cities, wealthier 
neighbourhoods, regions with larger environmental pressure groups), face higher regulatory pressures 
or have a poor environmental performance record are more likely to take initiatives and reduce 
pollution without any formal established programs (e.g. see Alberini and Segerson, 2002; Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2004). Finally, programs that failed completely are more often than not followed by new 
regulatory initiatives.  
 
To sum up, properly designed voluntary approaches are capable to deliver environmental 
improvements that, however, often do not much deviate from business as usual expectations. The 
OECD (2003) report concludes with ‘There are only a few cases where such approaches have been 
found to contribute to environmental improvements significantly different from what would have 
happened anyway’. Whereas voluntary approaches seem able to achieve what is fairly feasible, they 
are certainly not the panacea many hoped for. Whether they ought to be applauded for achieving 
intermediate environmental results depends on ones’ perspective. On the one hand, one might value 
every step towards a sustainable society no matter how small. This especially holds when the 
government has little power to impose alternative instruments. On the other hand, one might argue that 
what is needed is a giant leap forward and that voluntary approaches are a business strategy that 
retards or keeps off urgently necessary business transitions. In this perspective it is argued that 
voluntary approaches only provide lip services to the environment and are used by companies to 
greenwash their operations in order to restore public trust in corporations that was undermined due to a 
number of environmental disasters like the Bhopal incident, the Chernobyl nuclear accident or the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill. In this regard voluntary instruments aim to influence the behaviour of 
environmental activists, legislators and regulators rather than firm behaviour. 
 
2.1.2. Efficiency 
 
With respect to pollution abatement, there are some considerations that point to increased efficiency. 
Voluntary approaches provide opportunities to grant flexibility in pursuing environmental targets. 
Companies might be offered more freedom to choose the means to achieve a given pollution reduction 
goals. This is important since companies have an information advantage on their pollution abatement 
possibilities compared to the regulator. Economic theory predicts this will lead to cost-minimization, 
since abatement strategies can be tailored to the specific characteristics of the firm. We will call this 
firm-level efficiency. While the rationale behind this reasoning is quite convincing, empirical 
verification is needed to confirm this claim. Unfortunately, data and methodological limitations make 
this task extremely difficult and to our knowledge there is little literature available. For negotiated 
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agreements some efforts can be mentioned like the EEA study (1997) or De Clercq (2002) but they 
were not able to reach solid conclusions on the superiority of this instrument in this regard. 
 
Moreover, the argument above only holds compared to some forms of command-and-control 
regulation. After all, regulations can be designed to reach the same kind of firm-level efficiency (e.g. 
by establishing emission ceilings instead of prescribing technologies). Market-based instruments on 
their side are known to possess this firm-level efficiency feature and besides they can deliver sectorial 
efficiency or even macro-economic efficiency by allocating pollution abatement efforts between 
companies (and sectors) until marginal costs are equalised. Voluntary approaches that rely on 
individual company participation are in principle unable to deliver this outcome and in negotiated 
agreements a burden sharing mechanism that might achieve such an allocation is often lacking. 
Moreover, there is no argument to explain why such a mechanism (e.g. bargaining between companies 
under the supervision of the industrial association?) would be more effective in doing this than a 
market system. Thus, whereas voluntary approaches are able to deliver firm-level efficiency, much 
higher expectations are not build on solid grounds.  
 
Another argument put forward by advocates of voluntary approaches is increased efficiency of the 
regulatory process as the flexibility attached to this instrument enables faster and smoother 
policymaking. Economic theory has little to offer on this view and as mentioned above, our reading of 
empirical work points to the opposite direction: implementing successful voluntary programs requests 
considerable political and bureaucratic resources. For instance, the UK environment ministry 
apparently devoted an incredible 17 person years to negotiate forty-two climate change agreements 
(Jordan et al., 2003). Ashford and Caldart (2001) refer to a study of Coglianese (1997) which 
concluded that on average, the promulgation of EPA rules through negotiated rulemaking took no less 
time than did the promulgation of a “control” group of similar EPA rules through traditional notice 
and comment rulemaking. Just as for the Netherlands, Welch and Hibiki (2002) conclude that a strong 
government involvement is crucial in explaining the success of the Japanese negotiated agreements. 
Finally, the next paragraph argues that saving on policy transaction costs probably comes at the 
expense of equity considerations.  
 
2.1.3. Equity  
 
Neither the theoretical nor the empirical economic literature has much dealt with this issue. 
Nevertheless, some important issues regarding the equity aspect can be raised from the more general 
work published on voluntary approaches as a policy instrument. Most importantly, one might expect 
that voluntary approaches especially favour the business community while causing concerns for the 
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public at large. In the evaluation study of Bressers et al. (forthcoming), for instance, it is found that 
negotiated agreements work well in terms of legitimacy among the business community. Compared to 
traditional legislation, voluntary approaches offer fewer possibilities for third party involvement in the 
implementation process. Unilateral commitments are established at the discretion of companies or 
business associations and in many countries, negotiated agreements are signed without parliamentary 
control. Increased flexibility with voluntary environmental regulation comes at the expense of 
participation and transparency on the design and on the results if monitoring and control requirements 
are inadequately designed. Basic democratic principles are surpassed to develop alternative regulatory 
modes in line with business’ requests. Consequently, NGO’s like trade unions, environmental pressure 
groups and consumer organisations regard these initiatives with suspicion (e.g. EEA, 1997; WWF, 
2000). Of course, much of these concerns can be tackled by establishing procedures and guidelines on 
their implementation (e.g. EC, 1996; OECD, 1999). This would add to the much-needed credibility of 
this instrument but might jeopardise some important advantages and brings them closer to traditional 
regulation.  
 
Also within the business community, the advantages of voluntary approaches might be distributed 
unevenly. First of all, small and medium sized companies can be expected to possess less financial and 
non-financial resources to invest in convincing politicians and the public that voluntary approaches 
offer valuable alternatives to traditional regulations. As such, they are less likely to be able to 
influence or even avoid additional regulations compared to large corporations and powerful industrial 
associations. Second, to the extent that voluntary approaches are an easy strategy to greenwash a 
company’s environmental operations, firms with inferior performance records are offered an easy way 
out of increasing stakeholder pressure. Moreover, as the amount of voluntary initiatives and their 
participation rates keep rising, they become less suitable for leading companies to signal their superior 
environmental behaviour. In this regard, there is quite some evidence that companies with a worse 
environmental track record volunteered disproportional in environmental programs (e.g. King and 
Lenox, 2000). However, this is likely to be largely due to the design of the program itself (e.g. targets 
expressed against past environmental performance like the 33/50 program are more easily achieved by 
laggards). To conclude, the large actors in the business community and especially those seeking an 
easy solution have the highest potential gain. It will require sufficient political and administrative 
effort combined with critical public scrutiny to prevent this gain being fetched in easily.    
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2.1.4. Background considerations 
 
A rather disappointing view evolves from the reading of this chapter up till now. Before sending the 
reader home with a very sceptical view on the merits of voluntary approaches, we would like to draw 
his attention to the following background considerations. Just as it seems unfair to praise the 
superiority of market-based instruments on theoretical grounds without pointing to the rather 
disappointing results they achieved so far, some extenuating circumstances should be taken in account 
when judging the merits of voluntary approaches.  
 
 Match up expectations   
 
We refer once again to the question raised at the beginning of this chapter on the reference against 
what to compare the impact of voluntary approaches with. If one takes achieving sustainable 
development as a reference, it is no surprise that a rather nebulous picture emerges. On the other hand, 
if one asks the question on what would have been achieved with alternative policy actions, the results 
will certainly look brighter. Bringing down the initial expectation pattern is however a cheap way to 
polish the results achieved and can be used in many contexts. However, regarding voluntary 
approaches we believe there is something to say for this argument.  
 
The reason par excellence is that voluntary approaches are in most cases implemented as second-best 
solutions where preferable alternatives proved impossible due to technical, political or economic 
constraints. Examples are numerous. In Europe, negotiated agreements on climate change emerged 
after it proved impossible to reach an agreement between the Member States on the CO2-tax proposal. 
Negotiated agreements on waste management on the other hand originated in the fact that regulators 
did not possess the necessary technical information to promulgate legislative initiatives (OECD, 
1999). Lyon and Maxwell (2003) claim that the US Climate Change Action Plan spawned numerous 
public voluntary agreements because the political will for mandatory controls did not exit. More often 
than not, voluntary approaches are used for a set of more specific tasks like filling ‘cracks’ in 
regulation, tackling emerging or complex issues, encouraging best practice, rewarding pro-active 
behaviour or stimulating innovation (Jordan et al., 2003). 
 
Realising that voluntary approaches were not created as ultimate solutions, but rather as a pragmatic 
response to escalating political and resource costs of creating and enforcing traditional command-and-
control regulations sheds a different light at their merits. As has been mentioned by many, there are 
simply little arguments to justify the belief that voluntary approaches might be more effective than 
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regulations. However, rather than settling the score on environmental achievements solely, it should be 
recognised that they are especially initiated to reconcile environmental, social and economic concerns.  
 
 Intertwined instruments share gains and pains 
 
The notion ‘voluntary’ approaches is somewhat deceptive in the sense that government involvement in 
most of them is intense, from negotiating the precise content of a negotiated agreement over 
determining ecolabelling criteria to establishing institutions to award companies with an EMAS 
registration. Next, voluntary approaches are not often used in isolation. Rather they are part of a 
broader policy mix, working in tandem with a set of regulatory, market-based and communicative 
prescriptions to steer actors’ behaviour. At the limit, they are implemented against the threat of 
regulatory or non-regulatory forces. Substantial problems arise at this point as it is difficult to separate 
the individual effect of each instrument in the policy mix and to estimate how industry would have 
performed without the voluntary approach. As such, whereas voluntary approaches should be 
stringently assessed on their merits, they should not be condemned for a total immobilism on a certain 
policy theme. Or as Bressers and de Bruijn (2005) put it: ‘in the end the question is not whether the 
covenant is effective or not; it is whether the policy system as a whole is effective or not’. 
 
 Context matters 
 
Both the internal and external context in which voluntary approaches are used differs enormously. 
With internal context we refer to the many different subtypes and to the distinct design of each 
element within each of those categories. No two agreements are identical, nor are two ecolabelling 
schemes. As is shown in De Clercq (2002), the specification of a negotiated agreement is a critical 
success factor. To sum up, voluntary approaches make up such a diverse spectrum that it is impossible 
to come up with a single statement on their merits.  
 
Next to the internal context, the external context in which a voluntary initiative is installed influences 
its performance. The external context considers, amongst others, the political context referred to in the 
previous point. In chapter three we discussed, for instance, the difference in which agreements are 
concluded in Germany and the Netherlands. The institutional setting and the bureaucratic capacity are 
often mentioned for explaining the relative successful use of the Dutch covenants. Next to politics, the 
existence of potential competitive gains when going green, the structure of the sector (homogeneous or 
heterogeneous), the number of players etc. all determine the probability that a certain voluntary 
approach is successful. As such, the question becomes, under which circumstances can certain 
voluntary instruments be expected to achieve positive impacts? The fourth research paper presented in 
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this dissertation gives some answers to this question for negotiated agreements. It suggests that the 
following factors might contribute to the success of a negotiated agreement: 
 
 The general policy style: public environmental policy should evolve in a tradition and climate 
of consensus seeking, joint problem solving, mutual respect and trust; 
 The regulatory threat: policy makers should show the readiness to use alternative policy 
instruments, as a stick behind the door to deal with environmental problems, in case the 
agreement would fail; 
 The sector structure: the industry sector involved should be homogeneous, have a small 
number of players or should have a powerful industry association that can speak for all its 
members; 
 The existence of consumer pressure: industry involved should be close to the final markets and 
environmental behaviour should be rewarded due to the existence of consumer pressure. 
 
The same evaluation framework was used by Bressers et al. (forthcoming) for the evaluation of the 
Dutch covenants. In this study, the above hypotheses were (re)tested on a broader sample of 59 Dutch 
agreements. This replication confirmed the validity of these factors for explaining the success or 
failure of negotiated agreements. This is especially relevant for the last factor, as this hypothesis was 
not supported in the NEAPOL research project. De Clercq et al. (2001) have used the same 
methodology on a sample of about 20 negotiated agreements in Belgium and come to similar 
conclusions.  
 
 Target matters 
 
We believe the nature of a problem partly determines the outcome of a policy intervention, 
independent of the instrument put in place. Encouraging results have been achieved by command-and-
control regulations but these have been achieved mostly in a context of local pollution, easily 
identifiable pollution sources and available technical solutions (Aggeri, 1999). Under such 
circumstances, voluntary approaches might have been able to deliver similar results. Many negotiated 
agreements on CFC’s concluded in the aftermath of the Montreal protocol faced such conditions and 
have delivered. The same holds for most other product-related agreements concluded in Belgium (see 
research paper 2). However, most and especially more recent voluntary approaches are developed to 
cope with complex environmental problems involving numerous and diffuse pollution sources, shared 
uncertainties, the need for innovation and no consensus on the road ahead. Climate change and waste 
management are the most prominent examples in this regard. In such circumstances, environmental 
results are so much harder to achieve and elements like increasing knowledge, reducing uncertainty, 
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collective learning, raising awareness, building networks and trust amongst partners might be of a 
higher importance (Aggeri, 1999). As such, different types of instruments risk to be judged on unequal 
grounds: command-and-control regulation is applauded for picking up the easy gains whereas 
voluntary approaches are condemned, as they have to delve much deeper.  
 
 
2.2. Voluntary approaches to escape the techno-institutional complex as the way ahead? 
 
Up till now, environmental policy-making has focussed on optimising inefficiencies of existing 
production processes within the techno-institutional complex. Due to this focus, the existing 
government policy is partially responsible for this inertia to profound technological change. When 
truly aiming at sustainability, a shift away from incremental corrective optimisation-oriented public 
and private policies that reinforce lock-in conditions to evolutionary policies that foster restructuring 
of industries and technological change is needed (Könnölä et al., 2006). The development of 
alternative technological pathways for a discontinuity type of change to escape lock-in conditions 
requires continuous learning among a diverse set of actors, including actors from outside the existing 
techno-institutional complex in order to stimulate technical and organisational innovations. 
  
The objective of breaking with the techno-institutional complex and the background considerations 
mentioned above indicate that the traditional evaluation criteria on which the literature has 
concentrated so far, might be only partly suited to judge the merits of policy instruments. The criteria 
effectiveness, efficiency and to a lesser extent equity are commonly understood in the context of 
corrective, short-term measures. Maybe new evaluation frameworks are needed for instruments that 
have to cope with situations of great uncertainty, involving long periods of time and involving the 
wide range of actors and controversial issues typical of contemporary environmental problems 
(Aggeri, 1999). The contribution the instrument makes in terms of shaping the necessary conditions 
for such transitions to occur comes to the forefront for these complex environmental issues. Factors 
like collective learning, building networks and partnerships and increasing awareness and mutual trust 
that enable alternative pathways to develop in the long run might be more important. Special attention 
to such criteria is paid in the evaluation studies of Bressers et al. (2007; forthcoming).  
 
There is some belief that voluntary instruments, by relying on horizontal modes of governance, are 
preferable for such challenges. Consequently, it has been observed that voluntary approaches have 
been selected to a disproportional degree for these challenges (e.g. climate change and waste 
management agreements). Alberini and Segerson (2002) state for example that  
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“the EEA’s evaluation of the German CO2 agreement suggests at best a cautious applause if one views 
the agreement as an end in and of itself. However, the German government viewed the agreement as the 
beginning of a dynamic process of interaction and cooperation between industry and government to 
improve environmental quality. Clearly, this perspective implies a very different set of criteria for use in 
evaluating the agreement’s success.”  
 
Based on their study of the Dutch covenants, Bressers and de Bruijn (2005) claim that the main benefit 
of covenant-building is found in the concomitant processes. Though these processes mutual trust is 
strengthened, new knowledge is developed, and partners have the option of building their relationship 
in a constructive manner.   
 
It should however be reckoned that most voluntary initiatives have paid only limited attention to the 
generation of alternative pathways and vision-building for the implementation of discontinuity 
innovations. Paton (2001) for instance argues that voluntary approaches may be especially effective to 
overcome existing, but unknown, inefficiencies within firms. Könnölä et al. (2006) consider voluntary 
approaches and especially unilateral initiatives and public programmes as rather contributing to 
continuity change (incremental improvements) rather than to vision-building, technological, social or 
physical changes. Negotiated agreements are considered to offer some more promises in that there are 
more incentives to initiate collective learning processes and to build trust among private and public 
actors. Up till now, however, negotiated agreements have typically aimed at optimisation of 
environmental and economic performance within present production systems. Könnölä et al. (2006) 
justify this claim by the following arguments. First, stakeholder involvement is limited as it is 
typically considered a burden by complicating the negotiations rather than a learning opportunity. 
Second, the objectives tend to be defined at the outset of the process, leaving little space for learning 
and vision-building. Finally, negotiated agreements are constrained by current institutional pressures 
and thus prone to succumb to regulatory capture.  
 
Consequently, Könnölä et al. (2006) propose a new type of negotiated agreements called prospective 
voluntary agreements, which they describe as: 
 
“When confronted by high complexity and uncertainty on the technological and institutional advances 
related to desired discontinuity changes, authorities may broadly engage stakeholders in a systematic, 
future-oriented intelligence gathering and medium-to-long-term vision-building process. This process is 
aimed at creating an agreement between contracting parties, in particular between authorities and 
industry, to facilitate collaborative action directed towards the creation of (i) a diversity of technological 
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options, and (ii) a vision for the implementation of technological alternatives that facilitate (iii) desired 
changes in the physical and social networks. The outcome will ultimately defined long-term targets, 
responsibilities, monitoring, rules and possible sanctions in case of incompliance. 
 
In fact, this is in line with the notion of “innovation-oriented agreements” introduced by Aggeri in 
1999. Both consider agreements as a platform in which a wide range of stakeholders are involved. 
Rather than negotiating concrete sort-term targets, the agreements should initiate cycles of learning 
leading to specific actions for escaping lock-in. The focus is on commitment and effort of stakeholders 
rather than on results. The agreement itself, however, is no more than a formal point in an on-going 
process that commits key stakeholders to desired action. The agreement should be seen as a 
confirmation and reinforcement of the value of the emerged cooperation (Könnölä et al., 2006).  
 
The question can be raised why negotiated agreements would be more suitable to initiate such 
transition management processes compared to more coercive governance modes. In their research, 
Bressers and De Bruijn (2005) found that the indicator that is judged most negatively is the 
development of new technologies (that is technologies that are not already indicated in the agreement). 
As such, they claim there is little evidence to hope for agreements to achieve fundamental innovations. 
Coercive governance modes contain strong mechanisms to alter existing routines. Direct regulations 
might prohibit the use of a specific input, substances, products or technology. Market-based 
instruments have the ability to force companies or industries to exit when the tax is higher than 
adjustment cost and above former profit levels. Voluntary approaches on the other have to rely on 
softer mechanisms. What pleads in their advantage is that they have the ability to initiate collective 
action amongst industry as well as with external partners. Moreover, they have the ability to point a 
direction for change. Finally, Bressers et al. (forthcoming) claim that the main long-term advantage of 
negotiated agreements over other government instruments is in their ability to create side effects that 
improve the initial position for a further development of environmental benefits. The process of 
negotiating an agreement ensures co-ordination of the actors’ opinions and views, both in government 
and private sector. As such, the negotiated agreement approach is an element of interactive governance 
that fits policy situations that require learning and consultation (Bressers et al., forthcoming). A new 
type of negotiated agreement along the lines described by Könnölä et al. (2006) and Aggeri (1999) 
might however by necessary to fully exploit these possibilities and to overcome the conclusion found 
by Bressers and De Bruijn (2005). Table 4-6 resumes the main difference between “traditional” and 
“new” negotiated agreements.   
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Table 4-6: Traditional versus prospective negotiated agreements 
Dimensions Negotiated agreement Prospective voluntary agreement 
 Collaboration 
 Stakeholder engagement 
 Process management 
 Outcomes 
Negotiation and decision-making 
 
Limited to industry and authorities 
Negotiated and mediation 
Commitment to action 
Cycles of learning, negotiation and 
decision-making 
Structured stakeholder engagement 
Facilitation and mediation 
Vision and commitment to action 
 Source: Könnölä et al. (2006) 
 
Both Könnölä et al. (2006) and Aggeri (1999) refer to the French End-of-Life vehicles agreement as 
an illustrative example. Our third research paper presents some corresponding examples of waste 
management agreements concluded in Flanders. In these agreements, a large range of actors are 
involved (e.g. re-use centres, retail companies, recycling companies, producers and importers). The 
agreements have caused a profound change in the waste management system by shifting the 
responsibility from local authorities to the private sector. Next to short-term collection and recycling 
targets, the agreements are initiated to be ‘ever-lasting’ and provide opportunities for collective 
learning processes to develop knowledge on e.g. new waste treatment techniques, market opportunities 
for recycled materials, eco-designed products and the organisation of waste collection (see Bracke and 
De Clercq, 2005 for an analysis of these agreements).   
 
 
3.  Summary 
 
In the discussion on the merits of voluntary approaches, they often start with a disadvantage resulting 
from the perception of limited commitment that arises from the label ‘voluntary’. Basic economic 
theory offers no valuable explanation why voluntary approaches would achieve a higher level of 
environmental performance than the level resulting from regulatory or market incentives. This 
provides the sceptical observer with powerful ammunition. It also contrasts with the attractiveness of 
the simplicity of the direct regulation model that also performs a highly symbolic function through 
moral emphasis on penalising polluters. Neither theoretical analysis nor empirical evaluation studies 
have been able to provide sufficient convincing evidence to overthrow the scepticism on the merits of 
voluntary approaches. We summarised the main literature findings around the three E’s evaluation 
criteria. The environmental effectiveness was found moderate at best and there is little evidence to 
support the proposition that significant steps have been taken towards an increased efficiency of 
pollution abatement or environmental policymaking. Regarding the equity criterion, two critical 
observations were made. First, larger companies with rather poor environmental track records seem to 
 133
Chapter 4 – Evaluating voluntary approaches 
have the highest potential gain with voluntary approaches. Participating in voluntary approaches might 
provide an easy way to respond to growing public criticism for such companies. Second, informal 
policy making by negotiated agreements or self-regulatory initiatives by companies might set aside 
basic democratic principles like transparency, parliamentary oversight and public participation. 
Regarding negotiated agreements for instance, it is often the case that these are concluded behind 
closed doors between regulators and industry representatives without parliamentary control or third 
party involvement.  
 
Before rendering superfluous all efforts from the last decennia to convert the traditional policy 
paradigm to more horizontal and cooperative policy models, we have pointed to some background 
considerations that should be taken in account when judging the merits of voluntary approaches. First, 
voluntary approaches are usually implemented as second-best solution compromising environmental 
with social and economic requests. Second, more often than not these approaches are part of a broader 
policy mix targeting a certain environmental issue. Third, both the internal and external context 
heavily influences the performance of a particular initiative. Finally, voluntary approaches often have 
to deal with complex environmental issues for which there are simply no easy solutions at hand. These 
considerations indicate that the traditional evaluation criteria on which the literature has concentrated 
so far, might be only partly suited to judge to merits of these new policy instruments. Elements like 
awareness raising, collective learning to reduce shared uncertainties and building partnerships might in 
the long run prove to be more important than short-term environmental improvements. However, for 
these advantages to be optimally harvested, a new type of negotiated agreement might have to be 
applied. Such agreements should be regarded as a learning process and should involve a large number 
of committed stakeholders. These agreements should have long-term strategic objectives facilitating 
technical and social change.  
 
 
 
 134
Chapter 4 – Evaluating voluntary approaches 
0BReferences 
 
Aggeri F. (1999) Environmental policies and innovation: a knowledge-based perspective on cooperative 
approaches, Research Policy 28, 699-717. 
Alberini A. and Segerson K. (2002) Assessing voluntary programs to improve environmental quality, 
Environmental and Resource Economics 22, 157-184. 
Anton W.R., Deltas G. and Khanna M. (2004) Incentives for environmental self-regulation and implications for 
environmental performance, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 48, 632-654. 
Arora S. and Gangopadhyay S. (1995) Toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance, Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization 28, 289-309. 
Ashford N. and Caldart C. (2001) Negotiated environmental and occupational health and safety agreements in 
the United States: lessons for policy, Journal of Cleaner Production 9, 99-120.  
Bracke R. and De Clercq M. (2005) Implementing the duty of acceptance in Flemish waste policy: the role of 
environmental voluntary agreements, in Croci E. (Ed.) The Handbook of Voluntary Environmental Voluntary 
Agreements: Design, Implementation and Evaluation Issues, Springer, Dordrecht, 179-202. 
Bressers H., de Bruijn T. and Lulofs K. (forthcoming) Evaluation of environmental negotiated agreements in the 
Netherlands, Environmental Politics. 
Bressers H., de Bruijn T. and Dinica V. (2007) Integration and communication as central issues in Dutch 
negotiated agreements on industrial energy efficiency, European Environment 17, 215-230. 
Bressers H. and de Bruijn T. (2005) Environmental voluntary agreements in the Dutch context, in Croci E. (Ed.) 
The Handbook of Voluntary Environmental Voluntary Agreements: Design, Implementation and Evaluation 
Issues, Springer, Dordrecht, 261-282. 
Cabugueira M. (2001) Voluntary agreements as an environmental policy instrument: evaluation criteria, Journal 
of Cleaner Production 9, 121-133. 
Coglianese C. (1997) Assessing consensus: the promise and performance of negotiated rulemaking, Duke Law 
Journal 46, 1255-1349. 
Dasgupta S., Hettige H. and Wheeler D. (2000) What improves environmental compliance? Evidence from 
Mexican Industry, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 39, 39-66. 
De Bruijn T., Bressers H., Lulofs K. and van der Veer A. (2003) Evaluatie Milieuconvenanten: Eindrapportage, 
CSTM Universiteit Twente, Enschede. 
De Clercq (2002) Negotiating Environmental Agreements in Europe: Critical Factors for Success, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham.  
Environmental Law Network International (ELNI) (1998) Environmental Agreements: the Role and Effect of 
Environmental Agreements in Environmental Policies, Cameron May Ltd., London. 
European Commission (EC) (1996) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Environmental Agreements, COM(96)561 final.  
European Environmental Agency (EEA) (1997) Environmental Agreements: Environmental Effectiveness, 
Copenhagen. 
 135
Chapter 4 – Evaluating voluntary approaches 
Gamper-Rabindran S. (2006) Did the EPA’s voluntary industrial toxics program reduce emissions? A GIS 
analysis of distributional impacts and by-media analysis of substitution, Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 52, 391-410. 
Glachant M. (2005) Voluntary agreements in a rent-seeking environment, in Croci E. (Ed.) The Handbook 
Environmental voluntary Agreements: Design, Implementation and Evaluation Issues, Springer, Dordrecht, 
49-65. 
Glachant M. (2007) Non-binding voluntary agreements, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
54, 32-48. 
Golombek R. and Moen E.R. (2002) Do negotiated agreements lead to cost efficiency?, Journal of Economics 
76, 101-122. 
Grepperud S. (2002) Voluntary environmental agreements: bargaining over more than emissions, European 
Journal of Political Economy 18, 545-559. 
Grepperud S. and Pedersen P.A. (2003) Voluntary environmental agreements: taking up positions and meeting 
pressure, Economics and Politics 15, 303-321. 
Hansen L.G. (1999) Environmental regulation through voluntary agreements, in Carraro C. and Lévêque F. 
(eds.) Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, 27-54. 
Hansen L.G. (2005) Aspects of the political economy of environmental voluntary agreements: a meta study, in 
Croci E. (Ed.) The Handbook Environmental voluntary Agreements: Design, Implementation and Evaluation 
Issues, Springer, Dordrecht, 66-89. 
Jordan A., Wurzel R.K.W. and Zito A.R. (2003) ‘New’ Instruments of Environmental Governance? National 
Experiences and Prospects, Frank Cass Publishers, London.  
Khanna M. and Damon L.A. (1999) EPA’s voluntary 33/50 program: impact on toxic releases and economic 
performance of firms, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 37, 1-25. 
Khanna M. (2001) Non-mandatory approaches to environmental protection, Journal of Economic Surveys 15, 
291-234. 
King A.A. and Lenox M.J. (2000) Industry self-regulation without sanctions: the chemical industry’s 
Responsible Care Program, The Academy of Management Journal 43, 698-716. 
Könnölä T., Unruh G.C. and Carrillo-Hermosilla J. (2006) Prospective voluntary agreements for escaping 
techno-institutional lock-in, Ecological Economics 57, 239-252. 
Krarup S. and Ramesohl S. (2002) Voluntary agreements on energy efficiency in industry – not a golden key, 
but another contribution to improve climate change policy mixes, Journal of Cleaner Production 10, 109-120. 
Lutz S., Lyon T.P. and Maxwell J.W. (2000) Quality leadership when regulatory standards are forthcoming, 
Journal of Industrial Economics 48, 331-348. 
Lyon T.P. and Maxwell J.W. (2003) Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements, 
Journal of Public Economics 87, 1453-1486. 
Lyon T.P. and Maxwell J.W. (2004) Corporate Environmentalism and Public Policy, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Manzini P. and Mariotti M. (2003) A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements, Journal of 
Public Economics 87, 2275-2736. 
 136
Chapter 4 – Evaluating voluntary approaches 
Maxwell J.W., Lyon T.P. and Hackett S.C. (2000) Self-regulation and social welfare: the political economy of 
corporate environmentalism, Journal of Law and Economics 43, 583-617. 
Maxwell J.W. and Decker C.S. (2006) Voluntary environmental investment and responsive regulation, 
Environmental and resource economics 33, 425-439. 
Maxwell J.W. and Lyon T.P. (2007) Public voluntary programs reconsidered, working paper available at 
HUhttp://ssrn.com/abstract=967490U 
Mickwitz P. (2003) A framework for evaluating environmental policy instruments: context and key concepts, 
Evaluation 9, 415-436. 
Morgenstern R.D., Pizer W.A. and Shih J. (2007) Evaluating voluntary US climate programs: the case of climate 
wise, in Morgenstern R.D. and Pizer W.A. (Eds.) Reality Check: the Nature and Performance of Voluntary 
Environmental Programs in the US, Europe and Japan, Resources for the Future, Washington DC, 118-137. 
OECD (1997) Evaluating Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy, OECD, Paris. 
OECD (1999) Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy: An Assessment, OECD, Paris. 
OECD (2003) Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy: Effectiveness, Efficiency and Usage in Policy 
Mixes, OECD, Paris. 
Paton B. (2001) Efficiency gains within firms under voluntary environmental initiatives, Journal of Cleaner 
Production 9, 167-178. 
Potoski M. and Prakash A. (2005) Green clubs and voluntary governance: ISO 14001 and firms’ regulatory 
compliance, American Journal of Political Science 49, 235-248. 
Rivera J. and de Leon P. (2004) Is greener whiter? Voluntary environmental performance of Western ski areas, 
Policy Studies Journal 32, 417-437. 
Rivera J., de Leon P. and Koerber C. (2006) Is greener whiter yet? The sustainable slopes program after five 
years, Policy Studies Journal 34, 195-221. 
Stranlund J.K. (1995) Public mechanisms to support compliance to an environmental norm, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 28, 205-222. 
Segerson K. (1998) Voluntary versus mandatory to nonpoint pollution control: complements or substitutes?, 
Fondazioni Eni Enrico Mattei 92/98. 
Segerson K. and Miceli T.J. (1998) Voluntary environmental agreements: good or bad news for environmental 
protection? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 36, 109-130.  
Segerson K. and Miceli, T.J. (1999) Voluntary approaches to environmental protection: the role of legislative 
threats, in Carraro C. and Lévêque F. (eds.) Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, 105-120. 
Schmelzer D. (1999) Voluntary agreements in environmental policy: negotiating emission reductions, in Carraro 
C. and Lévêque F. (eds.) Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy, Kluwer Academic Publishers: 
Dordrecht, 55-74. 
Vidovic M. and Khanna N. (2007) Can voluntary pollution prevention programs fulfil their promises? Further 
evidence from the EPA’s 33/50 program, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 53, 180-195. 
Welch E.W., Mazur A. and Bretschneider S. (2000) Voluntary behaviour by electric utilities: levels of adoption 
and contribution of the climate challenge program to the reduction of carbon dioxide, Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 19, 407-425. 
 137
Chapter 4 – Evaluating voluntary approaches 
Welch E.W. and Hibiki A. (2002) Japanese voluntary environmental agreements: bargaining power and 
reciprocity as contributors to effectiveness, Policy Sciences 35, 401-424. 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) (2000) Will voluntary agreements at EU level deliver on environmental 
objectives? Lessons from the agreement with the automotive industry, WWF Discussion Paper, Brussels. 
(available at HUwww.uneptie.org/outreach/vi/reports/wwf.pdfUH) 
Wu J. and Babcock (1999) The relative efficiency of voluntary versus mandatory environmental regulations, 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 38, 158-175. 
 138
Chapter 5 - Conclusions 
Chapter 5 - Conclusions 
 
 
The growing importance of voluntary approaches is said to be one of the most remarkable 
developments in modern environmental policy making. Often, voluntary approaches are labelled as the 
third wave next to command and control policy and market-based instruments. This change in the 
instrument preference builds on two trends of contemporary environmental policy making.  
 Firstly, there is growing disbelief in the strong and interventionist government model. As the 
‘easy to fix’ pollution sources have been regulated, policy makers become more and more 
confronted with their restrictions in terms of e.g. information, knowledge, management 
capacities, enforcement resources and political support. Besides, people’s trust in the 
benevolent politician is fading. In turn, hope is put on social organisations like fair trade 
organisations, civil rights movements, environmental pressure groups and even on the 
business community. The government is requested to limit its degree of intervention on 
economic and social issues. This request is formulated by the business community and various 
social organizations that claim a higher degree of involvement in the policy-making process. 
In addition, many of these social actors are willing to take up responsibility and initiate self-
regulatory actions. The government’s role should shift to promoting, fostering and stimulating 
such actions. However, as when the former communist economies turned to market 
economies, this does, in essence, not imply de-regulation but rather re-regulation. Instead of 
prescribing behaviour, regulation is needed to define the boundaries, to develop a legislative 
framework (e.g. creating a market for emission trading, defining liability rules) in which 
societal actors receive a higher degree of freedom and flexibility.   
 Secondly, there is a trend towards a thematic organization of environmental policy. At first, 
environmental policy was media-specific (air, soil, water). Next, an integrated approach was 
put forward (e.g. integrated product labels, environmental management systems). Currently, a 
thematic approach (e.g. climate change, biodiversity, resource depletion, ozone layer 
depletion, waste) is gaining importance. This focus on themes facilitates the creation of public 
support for environmental issues. In addition, the thematic approach supports the 
acknowledgement that many environmental problems are extremely complex. A multitude of 
drivers contribute to e.g. the problem of global warming (e.g. industry, households, services, 
transport) which affects the characteristics of the air, the water and the soil. Next to the 
structure, the goal of environmental policy switched. Our common objective is now 
sustainable development, which combines environmental with economic and social concerns. 
In this context, it is more and more recognized that the current practice of short-term oriented 
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environmental policy-making that aims to correct inefficiencies of current practices, will not 
suffice. Instead, a fundamental and profound shift is required not only in terms of 
conventional consumption and production processes, but also in terms of the existing policy 
structures and the nature of interaction between government, industry and the community. 
Next to short-term oriented product and process innovations there is a growing need for 
system innovations. System innovations seek to escape lock-in situations by initiating more 
fundamental transformation processes. 
 
Voluntary approaches can be seen as new instruments that have developed against this background. 
Voluntary environmental approaches are however just one manifestation of a larger trend observed in 
many modern societies. That is the trend from hierarchical and coercive governance models to more 
horizontal and soft governance models. Instead of a government prescribing technical requirements to 
which companies passively submit, instruments that stimulate corporate responsibility, cooperation 
and joint-action are being developed. These instruments create ownership of the environmental 
problem within the business community. This ownership in turn initiates responsive actions. The 
government’s role changes from a mere regulator of existing behaviour to a facilitator of social 
change. The government is seen as a mediator of a complex network of social actors.  
 
Some prominent examples of voluntary approaches include environmental management standards or 
ecolabels that can be adopted by companies. Some of these have been developed by private 
organisations, others by public bodies or by cooperative public-private initiatives. Negotiated 
agreements form another example. In such agreements, government and business representatives 
engage in a partnership relation in order to achieve certain environmental targets. In contrast to 
traditional environmental policy instruments, these kinds of initiatives have emerged rather 
spontaneously. In fact, the image in which voluntary approaches are depicted as a third category of 
environmental instruments next to direct regulation and market-based instruments is somewhat 
misleading. Contrary to the traditional instruments, voluntary approaches are not simply options 
waiting to be implemented by policy-makers. To a much higher degree, social actors are involved in 
the design and implementation of such approaches. Rather than a government-push strategy, they 
build on initiatives that originate within society. In many cases, the regulator only plays a secondary 
role: acknowledging societal initiatives, stimulating uptake, bringing actors together etc. Actually, the 
idea that the government selects an instrument is deceptive. The government is not a single-unit actor. 
The discretion of national governments for instance is constrained by multinational, regional and local 
authorities. Besides, policy-makers are influenced internally by their administrations and public 
agencies and externally by pressure groups. As such, the choice of instrument is highly determined by 
the policy setting in which multiple actors with diverging interests operate.  
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This dissertation adopts an institutional perspective to analyse voluntary approaches. An institutional 
economic perspective offers a rationale for the integration of voluntary approaches to the regulator’s 
toolbox. In many cases, transactions costs resulting from incomplete or asymmetric information hinder 
the incorporation of external costs in the market system. This results in a sub-optimal allocation of 
resources. Instead of a regulator aiming to gather all the necessary information, it might be a more 
rational option to shift the responsibility to the actors who are in a better position to find the 
information. This explains for instance why governments passed on the task of establishing 
environmental management standards to the business community or why governments support product 
certification schemes from non-governmental organisations. By the notion of trust, institutional 
economics also explains why this occurs more in modern and developed societies. Trust is a highly 
valuable assets needed to facilitate transactions among parties. The more trust, the less one has to 
invest in resources to guarantee the proper execution of the transaction, e.g. screening the contracting 
party or incorporating enforcement provisions into contracts etc. In other words, the more trust the less 
one needs to rely on legislative and juridical mechanisms. As trust is build up over time and through 
repetitive interactions, it is more likely to develop in modern societies where the number of economic 
transactions, often between parties that hardly know one another, is continuously on the rise.  
 
The institutional theory also emphasises that the existing setting largely influences the mechanisms 
that people develop to facilitate social interaction. These mechanisms, called institutions, may take 
various forms ranging from formal organisations, constitutions, and laws to informal values, norms 
and habits. This structural and historical deterministic perspective also implies that institutions are 
relatively stable and that institutional innovation is path dependent. Path dependency refers to the need 
for innovations to fit into the existing institutional infrastructure and to be in line with the objective of 
the most powerful organisations. As such, the institutional perspective explains the observation why 
voluntary approaches developed differently in various countries. The choice of adopting an 
institutional economic perspective on the research topic, voluntary approaches, led to the formulation 
of the following four general research questions.  
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Does the institutional setting influence a company’s decision whether to participate actively 
in voluntary approaches? 
“Which company-specific determinants related to business and financial characteristics, stakeholders 
pressures and public policy distinguish companies that have implemented EMAS?” 
How do differences in countries’ institutional setting influence the diffusion of voluntary 
approaches?  
“How does the domestic socio-institutional setting determine the speed and the extent to which ISO 
14001 has outnumbered EMAS in Germany, France, the UK and Sweden?” 
Can policy makers change the institutional context to alter the characteristics and use of 
voluntary approaches? 
“What are the implications of the regulatory shift resulting from the introduction of the decree on 
environmental policy agreements in Flanders regarding the way in which negotiated agreements are 
used in environmental policy?” 
Which characteristics of the institutional setting influence the performance of voluntary 
approaches? 
“Which specific characteristics of negotiated agreements and which factors within the institutional-
economic context wherein an agreement is used, influence the performance of negotiated agreements?” 
 
 
In the research papers, these general research questions are further specified with respect to a more 
confined case study context. As such, the findings in the research papers should only be regarded as a 
partial answer to the more general research questions. For a more solid answer to these questions, 
additional research is needed to confirm and complement our findings. The figure below presents a 
broad overview of the link between the papers. In short, the first paper empirically shows that 
institutions matter in the sense that they influence a company’s decision to implement EMAS. The 
following papers seek to explain why and how institutions matter for explaining the uptake, the 
characteristics and the performance of voluntary approaches. The second paper looks how institutional 
differences between countries matter for explaining the uptake of ISO 14001 and EMAS. Paper three 
discusses how a juridical institutional shift influenced the characteristics and use of negotiated 
agreements in Belgium. Finally, the last paper analyses the link between the institutional context and 
the performance of negotiated agreements. The most important conclusions of the research papers are 
presented in the section 1. The second section discusses the contribution of our research findings to the 
literature. Finally, the last section offers some perspectives for future research. 
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0BOVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PAPERS 
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RESEARCH PAPER 4 
 
Differences in the 
institutional-economic 
context  
Uptake of ISO 
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agreements 
Performance of 
negotiated 
agreements  
 
 
 
1.  Research findings 
 
1.1.  Does the institutional setting influence a company’s decision to participate actively in 
voluntary approaches? 
 
The research paper on the characteristics of EMAS participants departs from the observation that 
not all companies have embraced the new governance models to the same extent. Whereas responding 
proactively to growing environmental pressure from stakeholders is becoming a widespread trend, the 
level of commitment ranges from environmental leaders to defensive companies. Based on a sample of 
436 European companies from the Dow Jones Stoxx 600, we analysed the decision to participate in 
EMAS. EMAS is commonly considered as the most stringent environmental management standard. 
By empirical analysis, we found that the participation decision is positively influenced by the solvency 
ratio, the share of non-current liabilities, the average labour cost and the absolute as well as the 
relative size of a company compared to the sector average. The profit margin on the other hand exerts 
a negative influence. We further found that companies whose headquarters are located in a country 
that actively encourages EMAS have a higher probability to participate. Consequently, this research 
paper points to company characteristics as well as to internal and external sources of pressure for 
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identifying environmental forerunners. EMAS participants are especially large companies with a solid 
financial structure that have a strong position in their sector. This is not surprising since acquiring an 
environmental management certificate requires considerable resources. The absolute and relative size 
variable might also point to the fact that large companies are more in the public spotlight and as such 
more likely to be blamed for environmental misconduct. Besides, the positive influence of the non-
current liabilities, the labour costs as well as the company location might point to the importance of 
external pressure exerted from respectively financial institutions, employees and the government. The 
negative influence of the profit margin on the other hand might imply that profitable companies are 
less internally motivated and less urged by investors to put in question their daily routines. To 
conclude, these sources of pressure might determine the requests that a company gets to become 
certified whereas the internal factors point to the necessary conditions to be able to answer to these 
requests.  
 
Regarding the general research question, this paper points to the importance of the institutional context 
in explaining the uptake of EMAS by companies. More specifically, the variable ‘public policy’ was 
included in the regression and turned out to be significant. The variable was constructed as a dummy 
that took the value 1 if the country in which a company’s headquarters was located, had adopted a 
rather high amount of supportive measures for EMAS certified companies and the value 0 otherwise. 
This however is a very blunt way to proxy the influence of the political-institutional setting. Moreover, 
the mere amount of supportive measures taken by a government sheds no insight on the factors that 
explain why some governments resort to an active strategy to induce EMAS certification by 
companies while others choose not to.  The following research paper takes on this challenge of 
explaining why different countries react in a distinct manner to the introduction of environmental 
management standards. 
 
 
1.2.  How do differences in countries’ institutional setting influence the diffusion of voluntary 
approaches? 
 
The research paper on the diffusion of ISO 14001 and EMAS aims to deepen our understanding of 
the influence exerted by the institutional setting on the voluntary choice of companies whether to get 
certified with an environmental management standard. To do this, we analysed the adoption rate of 
ISO 14001 and EMAS in four European countries: Germany, the UK, France and Sweden. Both 
standards for environmental management were in operation by the middle of the nineties. Which of 
both would become the dominant standard was hard to forecast. ISO 14001 had the international 
character, the popularity of the related quality standard ISO 9001 and the private nature at its 
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advantage; EMAS on the other hand was largely encouraged by the European Commission and could 
benefit from the first mover advantage. Meanwhile, it turned out that ISO 14001 has gained. However, 
the extent to which and the speed at which ISO 14001 has outnumbered EMAS differs significantly 
between countries. Based on a comparative case study analysis, we investigated the explanatory power 
of the socio-institutional setting of a country in this regard. According to expectations, we found 
evidence to support the hypothesis that environmental management standards are more widely 
supported in societal countries. In societal countries, the collective authority is seen as an expression 
of societal interests. This contrasts with statist countries in which the collective authority is located in 
an insulated state apparatus. It turned out that the societal countries studied, Sweden and the UK, 
welcomed such alternatives to traditional regulation. This is seen from the easy implementation of the 
EMAS regulation and the high uptake of ISO 14001. Concerning the hypothesis stating that 
environmental management standards are more widely supported in associational countries compared 
to corporatist countries, the information did not clearly point in one direction so the hypothesis could 
neither be supported nor rejected. In fact, when we would only take EMAS uptake as an indicator, the 
hypothesis needs to be rejected, as EMAS was only successful in corporatist countries. This is 
explained by the fact that EMAS creates a link between the company and the authorities. In corporatist 
settings, the institutional and historic ties between industry and government are better developed, 
resulting in a climate of trust and partnership that creates a fertile ground for the uptake of EMAS. The 
general policy recommendation of this research paper is that the recognition of the link between the 
institutional setting and environmental policy instruments might assist policy makers in the instrument 
selection stage of the polity cycle. It implies that copying best practices from other countries or 
regions is not just a simple ‘cut-and-paste’ exercise. In other words, the chosen approach needs to fit 
in the existing policy structures and policy styles. 
 
 
1.3.  Can policy makers change the institutional context to alter the characteristics and use of 
voluntary approaches?  
 
The second paper investigated differences in the institutional setting between counties and the 
explanatory power thereof for explaining ISO 14001 and EMAS uptake rates. As these management 
systems are standardized instruments, we could focus simply on the number of certified companies. 
The third research paper however, focuses on negotiated agreements, which appear in various formats. 
As such, this paper analyses the influence of the institutional setting on the characteristics and the way 
negotiated agreements are used in environmental policy. Instead of a cross-sectional approach as in the 
second research paper, the third paper takes a dynamic perspective by comparing two periods that are 
separated by the introduction of a juridical framework for voluntary approaches in Flanders. 
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The research paper on the legislative framework for negotiated agreements in Flanders examines an 
exercise of institutional change that was initiated to increase the effectiveness of negotiated 
agreements. When the first negotiated agreements entered the policy arena, the bargaining power was 
to a great extent in the hands of industry. Agreements were characterised as gentlemen’s agreements 
and were criticized for the lack of transparency and third party involvement, the vagueness of the 
environmental targets, the limited attention paid to monitoring provisions and the lack of sanctions in 
case of non-compliance. Not surprisingly, evaluation studies were not very positive on the results 
achieved by these agreements. Consequently, a trend has occurred in Europe in which regulators have 
sought to increase the effectiveness of negotiated agreements by changing the circumstances in which 
agreements are negotiated. This can be done formally, e.g. by adopting regulations or administrative 
guidelines on the juridical nature and implementation process of negotiated agreements. This can also 
be done informally e.g. by building a climate of trust, developing platforms for engaging actors or 
formulating long-term goals.  
 
The Flemish regulators choose the juridical approach. They modified ‘the rules of the game’. The 
Decree, amongst others, introduces a veto right for parliament, a public inspection period of 30 days, a 
non-binding advice of socio-economic pubic bodies (SERV and MiNa-Raad), the option to convert an 
agreement into regulations, annual reporting obligations to the Parliament and sanctions in case of 
non-compliance. The research paper describes the impact of this legal framework by comparing the 
number and characteristics of the agreements concluded before and after the Decree in terms of 
average length, negotiation time, environmental objective, legislative pressure etc. The opinion from 
diverse observers on the agreements concluded under the legislative framework is rather positive. 
Important to notice, however, is that it took considerable time and profound political and 
administrative resources to get these agreements signed by industry.  
 
One of the main conclusions in this research paper is the fact that creating favourable circumstances 
involves a delicate balance between inducing participation and ensuring environmental effectiveness. 
It seems that the regulators had insufficiently considered the response of industry on the legal 
framework. Changing the rules of the game also changes the players’ behaviour. Different incentive 
structures result in distortions of the costs and benefits of alternative actions. By the Decree, the 
distribution of the costs and benefits when using negotiated agreements has shifted at the disadvantage 
of industry. Consequently, their willingness to engage in such agreements had faded. In contrast to the 
motivation with which the framework was introduced, it nearly ended the negotiated agreements 
strategy as a feasible strategy of environmental policy. Consequently, the regulator had to increase the 
legislative pressure to induce participation. This was done by the introduction of the duty of 
acceptance in the Flemish legislation. The duty of acceptance shifts the responsibility for end-of-life 
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products from local authorities to the producers. This explains why it took about 4 years before the 
first agreement under the legislative framework was concluded and why the scope of environmental 
issues targeted is restricted to waste management.  
 
 
1.4.  Which characteristics of the institutional setting influence the performance of voluntary 
approaches? 
 
The previous two papers looked at the influence of the institutional setting on the uptake and 
characteristics of voluntary approaches. The final paper shifts our attention to the performance of 
voluntary approaches. If there is one conclusion to be drawn from the literature on the evaluation of 
voluntary approaches, it is that their performance is context dependent. Several factors related to the 
institutional context in which voluntary approaches are to operate, might positively or negatively 
influence their performance. Consequently, research should focus on identifying the circumstances 
under which voluntary approaches are expected to be effective. 
 
The research paper on the success factors of negotiated agreements takes up this challenge. The aim 
of the study was to gain insight on the factors leading to success or failure of negotiated agreements. 
This was done based on a comparative case study analysis covering twelve negotiated agreements 
from six different European countries. More specifically, the paper investigates the influence of four 
factors related to the socio-economic context on the performance of negotiated environmental 
agreements. The following external factors were identified: the general policy style (the policy 
hypothesis), the readiness to use severe alternative instruments in case of non-compliance with the 
agreement (the instrumental hypothesis), the potential of the sector to negotiate and act as one 
collective actor (the sector hypothesis) and the potential for market success triggered of by the 
implementation of the agreement (the competitive hypothesis). The instrumental and the sector 
hypotheses are supported by the agreements studied. The policy hypothesis and especially the 
competitive hypothesis are not really supported. However, important to notice is the fact that the 
absence of the expected relation between a socio-economic factor and the performance of an 
agreement can be due to the fact that the performance is positively or negatively influenced by another 
aspect, diluting the influence of the first. When all factors are taken together, a clear positive relation 
between the combined institutional-economic context and the performance of the agreements studied 
occurs. This leads to the conclusion that the favourability of each of the external factors studied is not 
a necessary condition for a negotiated agreement to be successful. Rather it is the combined context 
that determines the performance of the agreements studied. This is important because two factors – the 
sector structure and the competitive structure – are exogenously given. These factors should play an 
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important role in the instrument choice of policy makers. But even if these factors are not favourable, 
the use of negotiated agreements should not necessarily be ruled out in advance. This because the 
other two factors – the general policy style and the alternative instrument – are under control of the 
policy maker and can thus be manipulated to create a more favourable environment for negotiated 
agreements. For the latter factor, this might be a relatively easy exercise compared to the former, as 
the policy style is actually the result of a two-sided interactive process. However, notwithstanding the 
fact that it will probably imply more effort and resources, also the policy style is to some extent 
variable in time and can be ameliorated to achieve a more cooperative stance by e.g. establishing 
communication platforms, appointing target group managers, supporting sector associations and 
jointly developing a long-term vision for the sector. 
 
 
2.  Contribution of our research to the literature 
 
2.1.  Contributions with respect to the data studied 
 
The first research paper on the characteristics of EMAS participants differs from related research on 
the characteristics of green companies by the voluntary approach studied (EMAS) and the European 
scope of the sample. Previous research has especially focussed on ISO 14001 and public schemes 
initiated by the US Environmental Protection Agency. Besides, previous research has mainly looked at 
US or Japanese companies. The differences in the data are relevant as the institutional setting of the 
EU is quite different from that of Japan and the US. As such, it could be expected that other 
characteristics of environmentally pro-active companies are important in Europe. Overall, the results 
of our study are in line with related research. As such, our study to a large extent confirms previous 
research: environmental leading companies are especially large companies with a solid financial 
structure and a highly skilled labour force. Moreover, the European scope of the sample implies that 
companies located in different countries are included. This enabled us to look at the influence of a 
country’s political stance towards EMAS. We found that the national institutional context significantly 
influences company participation. Combining this result with the previous finding that the 
characteristics of pro-active companies are rather independent from the institutional context, leads to 
the conclusion that the institutional setting especially enables to attract ‘more of the same kind’ of 
companies rather than to convince ‘other kinds’ of companies to participate in voluntary approaches.  
 
The second contribution with respect to data gathering is the fact that a number of new case studies on 
negotiated agreements were conducted. From a scientific viewpoint the exercise of gathering empiric 
data is a valuable step to develop theories. This especially holds for new research topics like voluntary 
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approaches. Moreover, when theory is developed, empirical data gathering enables to test the 
predictions of the theoretical model. Research paper three and four build on an in-depth study of about 
25, respectively 12 negotiated environmental agreements. In the former research paper, the cases are 
used to analyse the implications of the institutional shift in the way negotiated agreements are used in 
Belgium/Flanders. In the latter research paper, the cases are used to test four hypotheses with respect 
to the influence of the socio-economic context on the performance of negotiated agreements.  
  
 
2.2.  Contributions with respect to the methodological approach 
 
Next to the study of new data, research can contribute to the existing literature by studying existing 
data with an alternative methodological approach. We believe the second and fourth research paper 
distinguish themselves from related research in this manner. Research paper two contributes to the 
literature on the geographical diffusion of environmental management standards by (i) considering 
both management standards (ISO 14001 and EMAS) together and by (ii) taking a more dynamic and 
comparative research methodology. First, a large part of similar research has taken a static and 
econometric approach and focuses on only one standard. As such, this literature identifies the 
determinants that explain why countries have a high or low number of EMS certified companies. 
However, this research disregards the fact that the uptake of both standards is disproportional in some 
countries: some countries have a rather high adoption level ISO 14001 but a low uptake of EMAS or 
vice versa (e.g. UK, Austria or Germany). As such, this kind of research only partly explains the 
country characteristics that create a fertile ground for EMS uptake. Second, our methodological 
approach is dynamic and comparative and can be situated between a large scale econometric and an 
in-depth case study analysis. The country typology used as a framework for our comparative analysis 
enables to grasp evolutions in time. Next to static differences that stem out of differences in the 
organisation of society and authority, the typology also points how evolutions might evolve due to 
differences in the way ongoing interactive processes between regulators and societal actors are 
organised. This might for instance result in different expectations on the speed at which certain 
innovations will spread in society. We believe that our research, which links existing case study 
information to differences in the way countries are organised, delivers a more general understanding 
of the diffusion of environmental management systems. By looking at the institutional design of a 
country, we are able to explain why certain drivers of a specific EMS-standard (ISO 14001 or EMAS) 
reveal themselves in some countries and not in another. 
  
Our final research paper has contributed to the literature by seeking to identify the circumstances 
under which negotiated agreements are expected to be effective. With respect to methodological 
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issues, the first contribution consists in the fact that a framework for the evaluation of the performance 
of negotiated agreements is developed. The evaluation framework includes efficiency, effectiveness 
and policy resource issues. Next, we developed hypotheses on the socio-economic context that might 
explain differences in the performance. The following step was the development of a framework for 
assessing these hypotheses. The approach was quite unique by studying negotiated agreements from 
six different countries along a common case study design. 
 
The second research paper, which focuses on the implications of the institutional swing in 
Belgium/Flanders, does not really employ a novel methodological approach. However, the research 
paper is unique as it takes a dynamic perspective by studying the way negotiated agreements are used 
over a long-term period. Besides, the introduction of a legislative framework for the conclusion of 
negotiated agreements in Flanders enriches this case study. Together with Denmark, Flanders is the 
only jurisdiction that has adopted a legislative framework for negotiated agreements. 
 
 
3.  Future research 
 
As voluntary approaches are relatively new phenomena in environmental policy and because their 
importance is growing many modern societies, they have become an interesting research topic. The 
findings on the research questions posed in the papers provide an answer to the four general questions 
raised in this dissertation. However, addition research is needed to supplement our knowledge and 
understanding of the issues raised. Besides, we did not explicitly take up the challenge to come up 
with a broad evaluation of voluntary approaches compared to alternative instruments. As such, there is 
clearly a need for additional research on this area to enrich our understanding of this instrument. We 
believe this research would benefit by focussing on the identification of best practices in a country-
comparative setting. Moreover, this kind of research should follow a multidisciplinary approach.  
 
We believe the identification of good examples is a promising route for future research. All in all, the 
evidence on the evaluation of voluntary approaches does not call for a huge swing in environmental 
policy-making. However, at the same time, many share the belief that turning back to traditional 
coercive policy models is not the road to follow. Besides, there are a number of examples of voluntary 
approaches that delivered good results. As such, learning from these examples might deliver valuable 
information for the future implementation of new voluntary approaches. First of all, this kind of 
research should focus on the identification of the factors that explain the success of these examples. 
Our research clearly pointed to the fact that the performance of voluntary approaches is highly context 
dependent. Consequently, implementing best-practices from other countries is not a simple ‘cut-and-
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paste’ exercise. Therefore, this kind of research would benefit much from a cross-country approach. A 
comparison of results of similar approaches in different countries would assist researchers to identify 
important drivers of the success or failure of certain voluntary approaches. Secondly, there is a need 
for a profound and long-term oriented analysis of the merits of successful voluntary approaches. Do 
voluntary approaches especially deliver improvements in the form of the continuity type of change, 
i.e. improvements in current production processes or products; or do voluntary approaches contribute 
to the discontinuity type of change? It may be argued that instruments like environmental management 
systems or ecolabels enforce current practices and as such strengthen lock-in situations.  
  
In addition, there is a need for concerted research on the institutional design that is most appropriate to 
integrate the macro-level of governance with the micro-level, which consists of the multiple actors that 
possess most information and are responsible for taking actions. A more intensified involvement of 
societal actors in the policy-making process within traditional government structures might not suffice. 
The lacking success of EMAS might be an illustrative example where the government did not succeed 
in adequately translating business expectations on environmental management systems. The European 
eco-label and the Flemish legislative framework for negotiated agreements are other examples. As 
such, we call for research that focuses on the institutional setting in which voluntary approaches are 
developed and implemented. In this regard, multi-stakeholder organisations like the Global Reporting 
Initiative might have an important role to play. In such settings, it might be easier to create a sense of a 
common objective compared to settings in which government, business and social organisations come 
together with the main aim to defend their own interests.     
 
Finally, we think this kind of research should be conducted by multidisciplinary teams. In many cases, 
policy makers are confronted with multiple considerations when choosing policy instruments. 
Instruments should for instance be environmentally effective but at the same time economically 
efficient and should be socially acceptable for a diverse range of stakeholders. As such, policy makers 
are required to make holistic choices. At the same time, the scientific input policy makers receive is 
fragmented. Rather than having political scientists, economists and legal scientists producing studies 
on environmental policy-making from different perspectives, much could be gained when their 
insights would be integrated. Moreover, as interactive processes between societal actors are an 
important element in horizontal policy models, this might also call to bring in insights from scientists 
like psychologists, philosophers and sociologists.  
 
We believe it is worth investing in such large-scaled and profound research efforts. As voluntary 
approaches are becoming more and more embedded in environmental policy making, the question 
shifts from whether voluntary approaches should be used to how we should design and implement 
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them in order to optimize their results. There is certainly scope to improve our understanding of this 
latter question. 
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What determines the decision to implement EMAS? A European firm level 
study1,2 
 
 
Roeland Bracke – Tom Verbeke3 – Veerle Dejonckheere4 
 
Abstract. Empirical research on the characteristics of environmentally responsive companies has 
focussed on US and Japanese companies. For Europe, which is commonly considered as the greenest 
of the three major markets, similar research is lacking. This paper seeks to fill this gap by empirically 
investigating business and financial characteristics, stakeholder pressures and public policies to 
distinguish companies that have implemented the European Eco-Management and Audit System 
(EMAS) from a unique firm-level dataset of European publicly quoted companies. We find that the 
EMAS participation decision is positively influenced by the solvency ratio, the share of non-current 
liabilities, the average labour cost and the absolute company size as well as the relative size of a 
company compared to its sector average. The profit margin exerts a negative influence. We further find 
that companies whose headquarters is located in a country that actively encourages EMAS have a 
higher probability of participation. Finally, this paper suggests that rather than attracting other kinds of 
companies, a favourable institutional context succeeds in convincing more of the same kind of 
companies to participate.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In response to increasing stakeholder pressure, companies are embracing the “corporate social 
responsibility” concept evermore tightly. Social, environmental and sustainability reports are being 
published at an accelerating pace. Participation in voluntary environmental approaches is a 
straightforward manner to show a corporation’s involvement. Within the wide scope of voluntary 
approaches, public voluntary programmes have an attractive appeal. In such programmes participating 
firms agree to standards that have been developed by public bodies such as environmental agencies 
(OECD 1999). Well-known examples include environmental management systems (EMS) like the 
worldwide ISO 14001 standard and the European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), 
programmes developed by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) such as Energy Star, 
Green Lights, and 33/50 and numerous environmental or social product labels. The appealing 
                                                 
1 This paper is published in Environmental and Resource Economics (forthcoming) 
2 The authors thank anonymous referees for providing helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this 
paper. 
3 Centre for Corporate Sustainability (CEDON), European University College, Brussels. 
4 Laboratory of Food Technology and Engineering, Ghent University. 
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character lies in the fact that the credibility of these programmes is guaranteed by the initiators’ public 
function and/or the external validation of a company’s compliance with the programme. As most 
programmes allow the use of a logo, they are attractive instruments for companies to signal their 
proactive stance to various stakeholders. Furthermore, some programmes provide participants with 
regulatory relief, subsidies or information sharing initiatives.  
 
Not surprisingly, participation rates are booming. The number of ISO 14001 certified companies has 
risen from 14,106 in December 1999 to 111,162 in five years time (ISO 2006). Participation in EMAS 
has tripled to 3,389 organisations between 1997 and 20065. A growth of 127% of the number of 
fairtrade certified producers has been experienced between 2001 and 2005 (Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International 2006). 
 
The question that emerges, “what causes some companies to pursue a pro-active strategy by 
participating in these programs whereas other companies seem to prefer a defensive strategy?” has 
received considerable attention in the literature. A wide range of internal characteristics (e.g. capital 
intensity, size, profitability and financial structure) as well as external drivers (e.g. pressure from 
regulators, consumers, investors and local community) has been examined. As a literature survey of 
Alberini and Segerson (2002) however points out, the evidence on many determinants is not 
conclusive. Our research seeks to contribute to this line of research in two ways: the focus on EMAS 
and the European scope of the sample.  
 
First, we analyse company participation in EMAS. Related research focused on ISO 14001 (Nakamura 
et al. 2001; Hibiky et al. 2003; Potoski and Prakash 2005) or on the comprehensiveness of 
environmental management practices implemented within firms (Dasgupta et al. 2000; Khanna and 
Anton 2002; Anton et al. 2004; Cole et al. 2006). Other papers focussed on the participation decision 
towards several US EPA’s voluntary programmes such as the 33/50 program (Arora and Cason 1995, 
1996; Khanna and Damon 1999; Videras and Alberini 2000), Green Lights (DeCanio and Watkins 
1998; Videras and Alberini 2000) and Waste Wi$e (Videras and Alberini 2000). King and Lenox 
(2000) studied companies’ participation decision in the Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care 
Program. Finally, Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) examined the motivations explaining firms’ 
formulation of an environmental plan. 
 
The focus on EMAS is relevant in two regards. First, EMAS is a program developed by the European 
Commission (Council Regulation No 1836/93 of June 1993 and replaced in March 2001 by Regulation 
                                                 
5 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/documents/articles_en.htm 
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No 761/2001) and is administered by the Union’s Member States. Compared to other voluntary 
approaches like ISO 14001 or Responsible Care, which are private sector initiatives, EMAS is a public 
regulation to which companies can voluntary subscribe. As such, it can be situated at the junction 
between voluntary initiatives and public regulations. As a result one might expect that other 
determinants become relevant for explaining the uptake compared to private initiatives like ISO 
14001. Benefits might rather relate to aspects like stakeholder communication, regulatory flexibility or 
gaining regulator’s trust whereas ISO 14001 might rather be rewarded in the market place. As such, 
financial and business characteristics might become less influential here. Second, as EMAS is 
perceived as being more demanding than ISO 14001, it may present a better picture of environmental 
responsiveness. In addition to the general requirements of installing an ISO 14001-like EMS, EMAS 
places special attention to the following elements: legal compliance, improvement of environmental 
performance, external communication and employee involvement. EMAS is considered as the 
standard of environmental excellence and is more stringent and demanding than ISO 14001 (e.g. 
Kollman and Prakash 2002; Watson and Emery 2004). As a result, it can be expected that 
implementing EMAS is more costly than ISO 14001. Consequently, the number of EMAS registered 
companies is rather small compared to the number of ISO 14001 certified ones. In December 2005, 
ISO 14001 outnumbered EMAS by a factor 10 in the EU-15. As such, it can be argued that the 
decision to participate in EMAS is taken more thoughtfully. 
 
The second distinguishing feature is the European sample. This is the first study on the characteristics 
of green companies that uses a European firm-level dataset. Previous research has focused principally 
on US companies for the EPA’s voluntary programmes (see above for references). Studies on ISO 
14001 are mainly based on a sample of Japanese companies (see above for references). Henriques and 
Sadorsky (1996) took a sample of Canadian companies and Mexican companies were the subjects of 
the study of Dasgupta et al. (2000).  
 
The focus on European companies might deliver new insights as the institutional context is different 
from that in the US or Japan. Japan is known to possess highly corporatist business structures, and the 
local regulators have an important role in environmental policy making that is based on legal 
informality and business responsibility (Welch and Hibiki 2002). The US on the other hand is 
characterised by an individualistic ethos and free capitalism (Vogel 1986). The environmental policy 
is legalistic and centralised resulting in adversarial private-public relationships (Delmas and Terlaak 
2002). Europe takes a position somewhere in the middle. Environmental policy is rather characterised 
as cooperative with consensus-based consultations entailing many access points for public 
organisations. Especially for voluntary approaches, which are said to produce mainly soft benefits 
 156
Appendix – Research paper 1 
(OECD 1999), these differences could be of some importance. Again one might conclude that sheer 
financial and business drivers will be less important for explaining EMAS uptake.  
 
Within the wide range of potential determinants for environmentally responsive behaviour, this paper 
focuses on business and financial indicators, stakeholder pressures and public policy. The results 
indicate that a company’s financial structure, profitability, size and average labour cost are significant 
drivers of EMAS registration. We also find that the type of a firm’s activities and the location of its 
headquarters influence the likelihood of participation. 
 
The paper is structured in the following sections. Section two presents the data and the model. The 
hypotheses and variables are discussed in section three. Section four presents the estimation results 
and section five concludes. 
 
 
2.  Data and methodology 
 
This paper merges two firm-level datasets that, as far as we are aware, have not previously been 
combined. The first, the Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing, update 131, 
August 2005), provides company-level data. Amadeus (Analyse Major Databases from European 
Sources) is a comprehensive, pan-European database containing financial information on 
approximately 8 million private and public companies in 38 European Countries.  
 
The second consists of the list of EMAS registered organisations (received from the EMAS helpdesk 
on the 25th of October, 2005). Both databases were linked using a companies ISIN (International 
Securities Identification Number) number. The ISIN number is a code that uniquely identifies a 
specific security and is accepted as standard by virtually all countries. EMAS is an environmental 
management standard that seeks to assist firms
 
in evaluating, reporting and improving their 
environmental performance (Honkasalo, 1998). In short, a company seeking EMAS registration must 
comply with the following steps: (1) conduct an environmental review; (2) establish an environmental 
management system; (3) carry out an environmental audit and (4) publish an environmental statement 
on the company’s environmental performance6. Each step has to be approved by an accredited verifier. 
As such, EMAS requires companies to evaluate their environmental impacts and to set targets for 
improvement on a continuous basis. The cost of implementing EMAS might be considerable. Steger 
(2000), for example, reports that the costs of acquiring the standard generally lie in the range €50,000-
100,000. Clausen et al. (2002) report figures for companies with over 500 employees. The estimates 
                                                 
6 Further information can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/index_en.htm 
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range from € 85.000 up to € 322.000. Furthermore, a firm also incurs costs for maintaining the 
environmental management system and follow-up audits.  
 
Our sample consists of the companies listed in the Dow Jones STOXX 600 Monthly Selection list of 
November 20057. This list registers the largest publicly quoted companies from the EU-15, Norway 
and Switzerland. In November 2005 there were 968 companies on this list 74 of which were marked as 
EMAS registered8. From this list, we excluded a number of companies9. First, we eliminated holding 
companies (Nace Revision 1.1 codes 7414 and 7415) because we believe their idiosyncratic 
characteristics might distort the results. Second, due to data limitations, we did not include companies 
not covered in Amadeus (especially banks and insurance companies) or companies with missing 
values on some items. Third, companies with less then 500 employees were eliminated10. This resulted 
in a final sample of 436 observations of which 38 (8,7%) are EMAS participants. The number of 
participants in the total sample (8,7%) is low, but in line with some similar research (e.g. Arora and 
Cason 1996; King and Lenox 2000; Potoski and Prakash 2005). The sample consists of large and 
publicly quoted companies. Due to their visibility it is quite plausible to assume that all of them face at 
least some public scrutiny, receive a lot of cover in the financial press and face financial analysts who 
track and evaluate their performance on a daily basis. Probably most of these companies have several 
environmental and/or social projects running, publish sustainability reports and have, to some extent, 
implemented environmental management practices. Presumably a rather high percentage is ISO 14001 
certified. It should be noted that whereas ISO 14001 and EMAS could, in theory, be considered as 
substitutes, this is often not the case in practice. Although, in contrast to EMAS, data on ISO 14001 
certified companies in the European Union is not available, is safe to assume that a considerable 
number of companies have implemented both standards11. In June 1998, close to half of the companies 
that were EMAS-registered also held an ISO 14001 certificate, while another third intended to go for 
ISO 14001 certification (Hillary 1998). Moreover, with the revision of the EMAS regulation of 2001, 
ISO 14001 is considered as fulfilling the management system element of EMAS. This was done with 
the explicit aim to induce ISO 14001 certified companies to take an additional effort to become 
                                                 
7 Available at www.stoxx.com/info/reports/selection2005.html  
8 The EMAS helpdesk lists all organisations at facility level. Our sample however consists of companies at group 
level. As such, following Nakamura et al. (2001) and Hibiki et al. (2003), an organisation was marked as an 
EMAS participant if at least one of its facilities was registered. 
9 The results presented in this paper do not substantially differ from the results without the sample restrictions. 
These results are available from the authors. 
10 This was done due to our doubts on the accuracy of these data. 53 companies were lost. 
11 A quick scan of the websites of the EMAS registered companies in our sample reveals that the overwhelming 
majority also has subsidiaries that are certified according to ISO 14001.  
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EMAS. As such, our analysis might reveal the characteristics identifying those companies that have 
taken the extra step.  
 
As EMAS is a voluntary scheme, companies’ participation decision will follow from a comparison of 
the monetary and non-monetary costs and benefits. The cost estimates referred to above, indicate that 
adopting EMAS imposes nontrivial costs. Moreover, costs are not limited to the implementation 
process. EMAS is likely to continuously impose costs as it requires greater coordination of activities 
within the company and imposes costs of employee training, environmental auditing and product and 
process improvements (Khanna and Anton 2002). Potoski and Prakash (2005) consider certified EMSs 
as club goods. In return for the costs, participants receive private benefits, i.e. non-participants are 
excuded from these benefits. Benefits might include increased operational efficiency, regulatory relief, 
technical information, and easier access to funds or less tangible rewards such as goodwill from 
consumers, environmental organisations and regulators. As Dasgupta et al. (2000) point out, 
regulatory initiatives to encourage EMS adoption might be a policy option worth considering. They 
argue that EMSs bring down companies’ marginal abatement costs. If the downward shift of the 
marginal abatement curve is sufficiently strong, it might result in a lower level of emissions compared 
to an increase in the control and enforcement budget. Due to heterogeneity of company characteristics, 
the costs and benefits associated with EMAS adoption are likely to vary across companies (Khanna 
and Anton 2002). This explains why some companies have adopted EMAS and why others choose not 
to. 
 
Assume that both discounted monetary and non-monetary costs (C) and benefits (B) are influenced by 
the business characteristics (b) of the firm, the financial characteristics (f) as well as stakeholder 
pressure and public policy (s), i.e. C = C(b,f,s) and B = B(b,f,s). One would expect that a firm would 
implement EMAS if the profits (P) from doing so are positive, i.e. if  P(b,f,s) = B(b,f,s)-C(b,f,s) >0. 
However, a company’s net benefit from EMAS implementation is not directly observed. We only 
observe the participation decision. However, if we assume that for all EMAS registered companies 
discounted benefits outweigh discounted costs whereas for all non-registered companies profits from 
EMAS implementation are negative, we can create a binary choice variable (D(EMAS)) as 
 
( )

 >=
otherwise0
0,,if1
)(
sfbP
EMASD ii      (1) 
 
This variable takes the value 1 if the i-th company was EMAS registered on October 25, 2005 and we 
assume that for these companies the discounted benefits outweigh the discounted costs whereas the 
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opposite holds for all other companies for whom the EMAS variable equals 0. To examine which 
characteristics are important, we use a binary response model and estimate  
 
[ ] (P EMAS x )β= = Λ1   (2) 
 
where  is either the cumulative logistic function (logit model) or normal distribution function 
(probit model), 
Λ
β  is a vector of parameters to be estimated and x  are the characteristics of the firm 
influencing the costs and benefits of EMAS and hence, the decision to implement it.  
 
 
3.  Determinants of environmentally responsive companies 
 
In this section we outline our main hypotheses and define the related independent variables. The 
European scope of the sample limits the independent variables we were able to include and thus the 
hypotheses to be tested. Next to Amadeus, the availability of comparable company-level data in 
Europe is limited. Moreover, the almost non-existence of comparable firm-level environmental 
performance data in Europe hinders testing whether EMAS participants prove superior environmental 
performance.  
 
We found inspiration for the majority of our independent variables in the literature. We used averages 
over a 7-year period (1998-2004) to measure most of the variables. Over 90% of all EMAS registered 
companies implemented EMAS in this period. A 7-year average was not relevant for the sector and 
country dummies and not available for the number of shareholders and subsidiaries. For these 
variables we used data of 2004. In a perfect world one would take the data from year(s) preceding a 
company’s registration to EMAS. However, this might also create a bias as the implementation time 
differs considerably between companies. Based on 140 EMAS sites in 12 Member States, Hillary 
(1998) found it takes some companies over two years while others get registered within 6 months. 
Moreover one would need to make artificial choices about the year(s) to select for the variables of 
companies that have not (yet) implemented EMAS. Finally, 7-year averages might help to control for 
business cycle fluctuations that could influence some variables. 
 
 
3.1.  Business characteristics 
 
Companies with a high number of facilities will face more difficulties in coordinating and monitoring 
all individual plants. As such, the number of subsidiaries might be a determinant of the need for 
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standardisation of a company’s environmental policy and operating procedures. An EMS serves as an 
instrument to structure the inflow of information and to monitor the implementation of the 
corporation’s policy. A higher number of subsidiaries also serves as a proxy for the visibility of the 
company. Finally, companies with a larger number of facilities have a greater likelihood of 
participation since a company was considered a participant if at least one of its facilities volunteered to 
join. The variable (SUBSIDIARIES) measures the number of subsidiaries in 2004. The number of 
subsidiaries was previously examined by Arora and Cason (1996) and Dasgupta et al. (2000).  
 
It is commonly hypothesised that the size of a company positively influences the participation 
decision. Possible explanations include the following. First, larger companies are more visible and 
face greater scrutiny from various stakeholders (Henriques and Sadorsky 1996; Videras and Alberini 
2000; Cole et al. 2006). However, since all the firms in this analysis are publicly quoted and face 
scrutiny in the financial press, this reason might not be as important in our analysis. Second, the key 
role of management is to ensure coordination of all actions of the many individuals and subgroups in 
the organisation. Larger companies face higher coordination costs, as there are more people and 
activities to coordinate. As such, the need for formal structures and procedures to ensure that all 
employees are focussing their efforts towards the goals set by the management rises (Henriques and 
Sadorky 1996). An EMS might serve as an instrument to reduce these coordination costs. Third, large 
companies presumably have more financial and intellectual resources and experience with 
management standards like ISO 9001 (Nakamura et al. 2001; Hibiki et al. 2003; Cole et al. 2006). 
Here, we measure company size in 2 different ways. First, we use the average number of employees in 
the period 1998-2004 (EMPLOYEES). Second, we also created an additional size-variable 
(RELATIVE SIZE) that grasps the relative size of a company compared to the sector average. To do 
this, we divided the number of employees of a specific company by the average number of employees 
in all companies in the same 4 digit NACE category in the sample. As such, this variable compares the 
size of the company to that of its sector-competitors.  
 
Next, we hypothesise that the higher the average labour costs of a company, the more likely it is to 
have implemented EMAS. Higher average labour costs might represent a higher educated workforce 
or might refer to rather unsafe working conditions (e.g. higher wages in the nuclear or chemical 
sector). In the latter explanation, it is obvious that these employees have higher incentives to exert 
pressure on top management for safe working conditions and pollution abatement efforts. The 
proposition that a higher educated workforce values sound environmental practices might relate to the 
fact that higher educated people have a higher environmental awareness and are more capable to exert 
pressure on top management. Moreover, a highly skilled workforce will make it easier to implement a 
complex management system as they are generally more trainable, adaptable, and less resistant to 
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change. We took the average costs of employees and averaged it over the years 1998-2004. We will 
denote this variable with LABOUR COST.  
 
A measure for capital intensity was included under the premise that capital-intensive companies have 
more complex production technologies; require more energy and raw materials input and hence have 
higher emission levels (Cole et al. 2006). This induces the need for mechanisms to control these 
complex and highly polluting processes and in turn provides greater opportunities and scope for the 
introduction of clean technologies. The variable (CAPITAL INTENSITY) is measured by the ratio 
fixed assets per employee. Again the average over the years 1998-2004 is taken. 
 
 Table 1: Sector dummies 
Dummy NACE Description Number of 
companies 
EMAS 
Sector A C 
D 
F 
 Mining and quarrying 
 Manufacturing 
 Construction 
16 
160 
32 
2 
21 
0 
Sector B E  Electricity, gas and water supply 25 10 
Sector C G 
 
 
H 
I 
 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods 
 Hotels and restaurants 
 Transport, storage and communication 
51 
 
 
13 
50 
0 
 
 
1 
1 
Sector D J 
K 
 Financial intermediation 
 Real estate, renting and business activities 
15 
56 
0 
2 
Sector E O  Other community, social and personal 
service activities 
18 1 
Note: For the other NACE classes there were no companies in the sample 
 
Finally, industry sector dummies are included to take into account industry-specific characteristics 
(e.g. Henriques and Sadorsky 1996; Videras and Alberini 2000; Hibiki et al. 2003). As such, industry-
wide differences with respect to, for instance, pollution intensity, regulatory burden and public 
concern are controlled for. Also, it controls for the differences with respect to the possibility to 
implement EMAS. As already noted, some firms were only able to implement it after the revision in 
2001. A company’s activity was grouped based on the NACE classification Revision 1.1 and grouped 
into five industry dummies (SECTOR) shown in table 1. Most companies are found in sector A 
(mining and quarrying; manufacturing and construction) and C (wholesale and retail trade, repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and household goods; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and 
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communication). Regarding EMAS registered companies, most are situated in sector A. However, in 
relative terms, sector B (electricity, gas and water supply) has the highest proportion of registered 
companies. Sectors C, D (financial intermediation; real estate, renting and business activities) and E 
(other community, social and personal service activities) count a lower absolute number of EMAS 
registered companies. In our empirical test, the mining and quarrying, manufacturing and construction 
sector (sector A) is the omitted dummy. In the sensitivity analysis at the end of section 4, we present 
some analysis on the influence of the sector dummy specification on our results. 
 
 
3.2.  Financial characteristics 
 
Implementing an EMS can be considered as a voluntary investment in an intangible asset, which is 
more likely to occur in companies with a sound financial structure (Videras and Alberini 2000). It 
should be noted that the primal objective of an EMS is not to increase short-term profits. In fact, the 
opposite might be the case. The costs are immediate but the benefits might only materialise in the long 
run.  
 
First, we include the profit margin as a measure for a company’s profitability. More profitable 
companies are supposed to have easy access to funds, by retained profits or capital markets (Nakamura 
et al. 2001). The variable (PROFITABILITY) is measured by the average profit margin, defined as 
profit before taxation on turnover, over the period 1998-2004. Second, we include the solvency ratio 
(SOLVENCY) and expect a positive sign. The solvency ratio is calculated as shareholders funds on 
total assets and we use averages over 1998-2004. 
 
 
3.3.  Stakeholders and public policy 
 
Within the wide range of stakeholders, shareholders and creditors may be important groups requesting 
the company to adopt a certified EMS. Both may require an EMS as a guarantee of good management 
in general and environmental risk minimization in particular to safeguard their invested funds. We 
hypothesize that the higher the number of shareholders the more pressure they will exert. Small 
shareholders have less influence on and knowledge about the company’s operations and strategy 
compared to major shareholders. As a result, they have more interest in external verification of good 
management to minimize the risk of future environmental liability. The variable (SHAREHOLDERS) 
reports the number of shareholders in 2004. A shareholder is reported if he holds at least 1% of the 
shares.  
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The pressure that emanates from creditors is measured by the average of the ratio of non-current 
liabilities on total liabilities over the period 1998-2004 (NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES). The 
variable only reflects the interests of long-term creditors as we believe short-term creditors do not 
have an incentive to push the company’s policy towards immediate costs for long-term objectives.  
 
Finally, we include the country in which the company’s headquarters is located. EMAS participation 
rates differ significantly form country to country. The national institutional context and the 
government’s policy in particular is supposed to play a pivotal role in this regard by e.g. facilitating 
access to information, granting support funds or shaping attractive public procurement guidelines (e.g. 
Perkins and Neumayer 2004; Delmas 2002; Kollman and Prakash 2002). The variable is created as 
dummy variable (COUNRTY) that takes the value 1 if a company’s headquarters is located in a 
Member State that actively encourages EMAS registration. The classification is based on the number 
of incentives (regulatory flexibility, public procurement, support funding and technical 
assistance/information support measures) for registered organisations provided by each country as 
reported by the European Commission (2004). For companies in Germany (17 measures), Italy (15), 
Spain (13) and Austria (12) the variable takes the value 1. All other countries in the sample have eight 
or less incentive measures and are considered as less supportive. Table 2 presents descriptive data on 
the country breakdown of the companies in our sample.  
 
Due to the country breakdown of our sample, i.e. the Dow Jones STOXX 600 list, and the data 
availability in our databases, the country breakdown does not reflect the relative economic size of a 
country in the EU. It can be seen that about half of our companies’ headquarters are located in the UK. 
From column four and five it appears that the percentage of EMAS companies in our sample is 
relatively high for the countries that have a higher number of supportive measures as reflected in our 
country dummy variable. 
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 Table 2: Descriptive data on country breakdown 
Country Companies in 
the sample 
EMAS companies 
in the sample 
% EMAS 
companies 
Support 
measuresa 
UK 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Italy 
France 
Finland 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Switzerland 
Ireland 
Austria 
Norway 
Luxembourg 
210 
43 
34 
34 
24 
24 
16 
14 
10 
6 
6 
5 
4 
3 
3 
10 
10 
1 
6 
3 
0 
5 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
4.76% 
23.26% 
2.94% 
17.65% 
12.50% 
0% 
31.25% 
7.14% 
0% 
0% 
16.67% 
0% 
25% 
0% 
0% 
6 
17 
6 
13 
15 
4 
4 
8 
2 
8 
/ 
2 
12 
7 
4 
 436 38 8.72%  
 a As reported by the European Commission (2004) 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the variables and suggests that EMAS registered companies 
have a higher number of subsidiaries, more employees, are big compared to their average sector size 
and, to a lesser extent, have a higher number of shareholders and a larger share of non-current 
liabilities compared to non-registered companies Also, the location of the companies headquarters and 
sector dummies B, C and D seem to play a distinctive role. Table A1 in appendix shows that our 
variables are not too correlated. In the sensitivity analysis, we check whether the results are sensitive 
for correlations amongst explanatory variables. 
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 Table 3: Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) 
Variable Unit Total sample EMAS 
companies 
Non-EMAS 
companies 
Business characteristics 
Subsidiaries 
Employees 
Relative size 
Labour cost 
Capital intensity 
 
Number  
Number *1000 
Ratio 
Thousand euro 
Million euro 
 
72.99 (121.1) 
25.49 (52.12) 
1.085 (1.06) 
44.68 (20.67) 
0.47 (1,57) 
 
156.05 (265.30) 
63.66 (102.68) 
1.914 (1.46) 
51.51 (13.41) 
0.54 (0.71) 
 
65.06 (93.68) 
21.84 (42.91) 
1.006 (0.98) 
44.03 (21.13) 
0.46 (1.63) 
Financial characteristics 
Profitability 
Solvency 
 
Percentage 
Percentage 
 
8.89 (10.29) 
38.63 (17.72) 
 
8.83 (8.19) 
39.12 (11.77) 
 
8.90 (10.48) 
38.58 (18.20) 
Stakeholders and public 
policy 
Shareholders 
Non-current liabilities 
Country 
 
 
Number 
Percentage 
Dummy 
 
 
15.70 (18.94) 
43.74 (20.66) 
0.24 (0.43) 
 
 
19.42 (22.09) 
56.61 (15.01) 
0.53 (0.51) 
 
 
15.35 (18.60) 
42.51 (20.72) 
0.21 (0.41) 
Sector dummies 
Sector A 
Sector B 
Sector C 
Sector D 
Sector E 
 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dummy 
 
0.48 (0.50) 
0.05 (0.23) 
0.26 (0.44) 
0.16 (0.37) 
0.04 (0.20) 
 
0.61 (0.50) 
0.26 (0.45) 
0.05 (0.23) 
0.05 (0.23) 
0.03 (0.26) 
 
0.46 (0.50) 
0.03 (0.19) 
0.28 (0.45) 
0.17 (0.37) 
0.04 (0.20) 
 
 
4.  Results 
 
4.1.  Results of the basic specification 
 
The first column of table 4 presents the parameter estimates for the logit model. The corresponding 
probability values are presented between parentheses. As a robustness check, the last column shows 
the probit results. The results of both estimations are in line. In the following we concentrate on the 
logit model. The goodness of fit measure count R², defined as the percentage correctly classified 
observations with the estimated equation is 92.43%. Due to the low number of EMAS registered 
companies in the sample, this is however only slightly above the percentage estimated with a constant 
probability measured by simply dividing the number of non-certified companies by the total sample 
number (91.28%). The McFadden R² value is 0.34 and as the likelihood ratio statistic equals 87.67, the 
null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is rejected at the 1% significance level. However, it should 
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be noted that in binary regressand models the goodness of fit is of secondary importance. The sign of 
the estimated coefficients and their significance is what matters (Gujarati 2003). This especially holds 
for the research question at hand.  
 
 Table 4: Estimation results for EMAS participation 
Variable Logit estimation % increase 
in odds 
% increase 
in 
probability 
Probit estimation 
Business characteristics 
Subsidiaries 
Employees 
Relative size 
Labour cost 
Capital intensity 
 
0.0002 (0.9005) 
0.0092 (0.0219)** 
0.4820 (0.0032)*** 
0.0270 (0.0108)** 
-0.0078 (0.9734) 
 
0.020 
0.928 
61.938 
2.733 
-0.780 
 
0.002 
0.074 
4.675 
0.217 
-0.062 
 
0.0003 (0.7012) 
0.0042 (0.0523)* 
0.2467 (0.0052)*** 
0.0122 (0.0243)** 
-0.0118 (0.9155) 
Financial characteristics 
Profitability 
Solvency 
 
-0.0432 (0.0587)* 
0.0376 (0.0228)** 
 
-4.224 
3.830 
 
-0.337 
0.304 
 
-0.0193 (0.0920)* 
0.0175 (0.0353)** 
Stakeholders and public 
policy 
Shareholders 
Non-current liabilities 
Country 
 
 
0.0062 (0.4339) 
0.0341 (0.0107)** 
0.7267 (0.0990)* 
 
 
0.626 
3.469 
106.829 
 
 
0.050 
0.275 
7.775 
 
 
0.0033 (0.4426) 
0.0157 (0.0162)** 
0.4491 (0.0531)* 
Sector dummies 
Sector B 
Sector C 
Sector D 
Sector E 
Constant 
 
1.6637 (0.0048)*** 
-2.6096 (0.0066)*** 
-2.4951 (0.0137)** 
-0.4496 (0.6826) 
-7.4391 (0.0000)*** 
 
427.862 
-92.634 
-91.752 
-36.210 
 
 
24.795 
-8.018 
-7.934 
-2.975 
 
0.9469 (0.0037)*** 
-1.0831 (0.0068)*** 
-0.9916 (0.0255)** 
-0.2604 (0.6342) 
-3.7660 (0.0000)*** 
N 
Log-likelihood 
Rest. Log-likelihood 
LR statistic (14) 
Prob. (LR statistic) 
% correctly classified 
McFadden R² 
436 
-85.1787 
-129.0158 
85.6744*** 
(0.0000) 
92.43% 
0.3398 
  436 
-86.4427 
-129.0158 
85.1463*** 
(0.0000) 
92.43% 
0.3299 
* , ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively  
Note. Probability values are shown in parentheses. LR statistic is a chi-square test for all slope 
coefficients jointly equal to zero.  
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The second column shows (for the logit model) the change in odds ratio due to an increase in the 
independent variable by one unit. For instance, the coefficient for the variable employees equals 
0.0092. The corresponding odds ratio (e0.0092) is 1.0092. Then we may say that when the independent 
variable increases one unit, the odds that the dependent equals 1 increase by a factor of 1.0092, when 
other variables are controlled for. The closer the odds ratio is to 1, the less influence the independent 
variable exerts on the dependent variable. Equally, one can say that when the variable employees 
increase by one unit (1000 employees) the odds of being EMAS registered increase by 0.92%. The 
third column shows the percent increase in the probability of being certified for a one-unit increase in 
the independent variable, controlling for the other variables in the model.  
 
Next, we turn to the significance of the estimated coefficients. The estimated coefficients of the 
number of subsidiaries, the capital intensity, number of shareholders and the sector dummy E are not 
significant. The insignificance of the number of subsidiaries corresponds with Arora and Cason (1996) 
but contradicts with Dasgupta et al. (2000) who found that being a multi-plant company was the most 
influential variable. Whereas the theoretical arguments for the capital intensity variable were 
appealing, our unexpected result is also found by Cole et al. (2006). In their paper, it even turned out 
significantly negative for some measures of a company’s environmental awareness. Note however that 
three sector dummy variables are significant. These dummies may partly capture differences in capital 
intensiveness among companies. Compared to the mining and quarrying, manufacturing and 
construction sector (sector A), companies involved in electricity, gas or water supply (sector B) are 
more frequently registered. Companies in the services sectors C (trade, hotels, restaurants, logistics 
and communication) and D (financial intermediation, real estate and business activities) participate 
significantly less frequent in EMAS. Notwithstanding this finding was expected as on average 
manufacturing companies face higher environmental risks, it should be taken in account that it was 
only in April 2001 when the renewed EMAS scheme was implemented that companies in the service 
sector were allowed to participate. Finally, other community, social and personal service activities 
(sector E) have no significantly different participation rates compared to the mining, quarrying, 
manufacturing and construction sector. 
 
The estimated coefficient of the size of a company, measured by the number of employees, is 
significant at the 5% level. Controlling for the absolute number of employees, the estimated 
coefficient of the relative size of a company compared to its sector average turns out positive and 
significant at 1%. When the relative size ratio increases one unit, the odds of being EMAS registered 
increase by 61.94%, the probability increases by 4.68%. These results confirm the expectation that 
larger companies are more likely to have implemented EMAS even when controlling for the number 
of facilities.   
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Labour cost’s influence on the probability of EMAS implementation is positive and highly significant. 
This implies that companies with a highly skilled workforce or with unsafe working conditions have a 
higher probability of having implemented EMAS. This corresponds to some extent with Dasgupta et 
al.’s (2000) finding that companies in which a higher proportion of employees followed postsecondary 
education, have a significantly more comprehensive EMS.  
 
When looking at the financial variables, it turns out that the estimated coefficient of the profitability 
measure is significant at the 10% level, but has a negative coefficient. This is in contrast with our a 
priori expectations, but consistent with the diverging results of related research. On the one hand, Cole 
et al. (2006) found a negative influence whereas Hibiki et al. (2003) found it to be positive. In the 
results of De Canio and Watkins (1998), Arora and Cason (1995) and Nakamura et al. (2001) profits 
do not seem to have a significant influence on a company’s environmental responsiveness. This leads 
to conclude that profit levels do not seem to exert a decisive (positive) impact on this issue. A possible 
explanation for the negative coefficient may be that the need to differentiate from competitors is 
higher in more competitive markets where profit margins are generally rather moderate.  
 
The estimated coefficient of the solvency ratio is positive and significant. As the second column 
shows, an increase in the solvency ratio by 1 percentage point increases the odds of being registered 
by 3.83%. Furthermore, the higher the share of non-current liabilities the higher the probability a 
company is EMAS registered. Both confirm that a solid financial structure on the long term is 
favourable for implementing EMAS. The positive sign of non-current liabilities may also point to the 
pressure exerted from long-term creditors for the company to demonstrate that it minimises its 
(environmental) risks. While the estimated coefficient of the number of shareholders was positive but 
not significant, the coefficient of the non-current liabilities was. This seems to suggest that pressure 
from external stakeholders is especially relevant for those who provide long-term debt. With respect to 
debt variables, the results reported in the literature are mixed. The debt ratio turns out negative and 
significant in Nakamura et al. (2001) and Cole et al. (2006) but insignificant in Arora and Cason 
(1995), DeCanio and Watkins (1998) and Hibiki et al. (2003). Finally, a stimulating government 
policy, as reflected by the country dummy variable, provokes a positive and significant influence. The 
probability of being registered are 7.78% higher for companies whose headquarters is located in 
Germany, Italy, Spain or Austria compared to the other companies in the sample. 
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4.2.  Sensitivity analysis 
 
In order to check the robustness of our findings in the basic specification discussed above, we 
conducted a number of sensitivity analyses, which also might help us with the interpretation of our 
basic results. A first problem could be due to multicollinearity between our explanatory variables. 
Highly correlated variables make it difficult to separate the influence of these variables on the 
dependent variable. It could, for instance, be argued that large firms are more likely to pay higher 
wages and are more capital intensive. In order to check for potential biases in our results due to 
multicollinearity, we estimated the regression several times dropping each individual variable once at 
a time. The estimation output of this exercise is provided in appendix (table A2). This exercise shows 
that the results found in the basic specification are quite robust. The most notable change concerns the 
size of the company as measured with employees, which becomes insignificant when the sector 
dummy variables are dropped. Also, the profitability variable and the country dummy lose their 
significance in two out of eleven specifications. This is in line with the finding that these variables 
were only significant at the 10% level in the basic specification.  
 
Specification 7 and 9 provide some further analysis on the influence of a company’s financial 
structure. Specification 9 excludes the non-current liabilities variable. The coefficient on the solvency 
variable stays positive and significant. As the debt ratio, defined as the current and non-current 
liabilities on total assets, equals 1 minus the solvency ratio, this finding also implies that the higher the 
debt ratio of a company, the less likely the company will seek EMAS registration. The results in our 
basis analysis as well as those presented in table A2 show that the composition of the debt matters. In 
both specifications the coefficient on the non-current liabilities variable is positive and significant. 
This leads to the conclusion that whereas debt has a negative influence, the share of non-current 
liabilities in this debt positively influences the probability of participation in EMAS. Consequently, 
the share of current liabilities exerts a negative influence. This suggests that companies with access to 
stable long-term debt markets are more inclined to adopt EMAS.  
 
Specification 10 excludes the country dummy variable and can be used to further grasp the influence 
of the institutional context. The results with respect to the other variables are confirmed: all variables 
that were significant, remain significant, the others stay insignificant. Only the significance level of 
the non-current liabilities variable changes from 5% to 1%. The determinants of company participation 
in EMAS  do not respond to differences in the institutional context. The same conclusion stems from 
subsection 4.1 where we discussed our results with respect to related literature on US and Japanese 
companies. Nevertheless, studies like Delmas (2002) and Kollman and Prakash (2002) have pointed to 
the explanatory value for grasping international cross-country differences in ISO 14001 uptake. 
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Corresponding results were found by Perkins and Neumayer (2004) in explaining the geography of 
EMAS in the European Union. These seemingly contradicting findings might point to the fact that 
whereas the institutional context has little influence on the kind of companies that participate in these 
voluntary schemes, it influences the amount of these companies that participate. Rather than attracting 
other kinds of companies, a fertile formal and informal environment succeeds in attracting more of the 
same group of companies. It gets more companies out of the target group rather than enlarging the 
target group. 
 
The second sensitivity analysis further focuses on the influence of the country dummy variable. The 
basic specification revealed that the country dummy variable was significant at the 10% level. Some 
additional analysis, shown in appendix (table A3), points out that this result is not robust. First, 
specification 1 only includes those companies that are situated in a country that has at least one EMAS 
registered company. This limits the sample to 385 companies. The country dummy variable is no 
longer significant in this specification. In the second specification, we included separate dummy 
variables for the countries that are indicated as supportive based on the number of supportive measures 
initiated by the government. In this case, we reset the sample at its basic level of 436 companies. The 
results show that whereas the coefficients of the country dummies have the expected positive sign, 
only companies whose headquarters is located in Spain have a significantly higher probability of 
EMAS registration compared to companies located in the less supportive countries. To conclude, the 
significance of the country dummy variable might be driven by Spain.     
 
The third sensitivity analysis focuses on the influence of the sector dummies on the estimation results. 
The results are presented in appendix (table A4). As a first exercise, we excluded sector B. Sector B 
includes the electricity, gas and water supply companies. This sector is highly capital intensive and has 
a monopolistic structure. Besides, these companies are highly profitable and likely to be under 
government and public pressure. The rather high proportion of EMAS registered companies can be 
explained in this regard and this is likely to skew the results. The results of the first specification 
where firms in sector B are dropped from the analysis, confirm our basic findings. The variable on 
profitability and the country dummy are no longer significant, but the other conclusions hold. In the 
second specification, we additionally dropped firms from sectors C, D and E because of the low 
amount of EMAS registered companies in these sectors. Again, the profitability variable and the 
country dummy loose their significance. In the last specification, we further limited the sample to a 
subset firms within sector A. More specifically we only included the manufacturing sector. This 
subsector is rather competitive and counts a relatively high amount of EMAS as well as non-EMAS 
registered companies. Besides, until 2001 EMAS was only open for companies in the manufacturing 
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sector. With the exception of relative size that is no longer significant, the basic results are unaffected. 
Note however that in this case the sample is restricted to only 160 companies.  
 
As a final sensitivity analysis we estimated the regression with some alternative variable 
specifications. The results are shown in appendix (table A5). The second column shows the result of 
our basic specification and is included as a benchmark for comparison. In the second specification, we 
measured the absolute and relative size of a company based on turnover. The corresponding 
coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% respectively 10% level. In specification 3, we define 
the variable capital intensity as total assets per employee instead of fixed assets per employee. This 
does not substantially alter the results of the basic specification. When the return on total assets is used 
as an alternative measure for profitability of a company instead of the profit margin (specification 4), 
the estimated coefficient also turn out negative but insignificant. This result again shows that the 
conclusion on the negative influence of the profitability on EMAS registration is not that robust. The 
same picture stems from specification 5 in which the four alternative variable specifications discussed 
above are included. Finally, we point to the fact that the country dummy variable is not significant in 
any of the alternative specifications. 
 
All in all, our sensitivity analyses clearly suggest that the results obtained in the basic specification are 
quite robust. Across various specifications that we have tested, both the significance as well as the sign 
of most variables is unaffected compared to the basic results. The same holds for alternative ways to 
calculate a number of our variables.   
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Responding proactively to growing environmental pressure is becoming a widespread trend among 
companies. It goes without saying that the level of commitment however is uneven ranging from 
environmental leaders to defensive companies. Empirical research on the characteristics of 
environmentally responsive companies has focussed almost exclusively on US and Japanese firms. For 
Europe, which is commonly considered as the greenest of the three major developed economic 
markets, similar research is lacking. This paper seeks to contribute by empirically investigating the 
business and financial characteristics, stakeholder pressure and public policies distinguishing 
companies that have implemented EMAS. A logistic regression analysis was carried out on a sample 
of 436 European companies listed on the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 selection list. Our results indicate that 
large companies with a sound financial structure and high average labour costs have a higher 
likelihood of participating in EMAS. Also the relative size of a company compared to its sector 
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average increases the likelihood of participation. The profitability on the other hand exerts a negative 
influence. Also, the location of a company’s headquarters, which should capture differences in the 
institutional context, and the industrial sector determine the likelihood of EMAS participation. 
However, the exclusion of the country variable did not influence the determinants of EMAS 
participants. 
 
Both the fact that EMAS has a closer relationship with public regulators compared to private 
initiatives like ISO 14001 and Responsible care as well as diverging formal and informal institutions 
in the European Union compared to US and Japan suggested that the results might differ from 
previous studies on the characteristics of environmental leading companies. Overall however, our 
conclusions are in line with related findings from research carried out in the US and Japan. Although 
evidence is still limited, this might point to a rather moderate influence of the institutional context 
when it comes to distinguishing the characteristics of environmentally leading companies. The 
literature on the geographical diffusion of EMS on the other hand points to the decisive role of 
institutional-related aspects to explain the diverging adoption rates between countries. We believe 
these seemingly contradicting results can be reconciled. Rather than attracting companies with other 
characteristics, a favourable institutional context seems to be able to convince more companies from 
the target group. Linking these two findings further might be a challenging task for future research.  
 
Another issue that calls for further exploration is the question whether the adoption of voluntary 
initiatives makes companies outperform others on environmental abatement. Clear signals of added 
value above business-as-usual assessments are required to justify that many voluntary initiatives 
provide benefits for participants in the form of decreased regulatory pressure, subsidies or positive 
publicity. Increasing the amount of and reliability of environmental information is crucial to enhance 
transparency and enable public monitoring efforts. The Toxic Release Inventory in the US is a 
forerunner in this regard en has enabled this kind of research. For now, the findings do not permit an 
incontestable answer. Unfortunately, comparable firm level environmental performance data is lacking 
in Europe. A database on firm level CO2-emissions created in the wake of the recent emission-trading 
directive on greenhouse gas emissions might provide us with a promising indicator in this regard. 
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Appendix – Table A1: Correlation matrix 
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Appendix – Table A2: Sensitivity analysis on multicollinearity 
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Appendix – Table A3: Sensitivity analysis on the country dummy variable 
 
 Specifcation 1 (N=385) Specification 2 (N=436) 
Business characteristics 
Subsidiaries 
Employees 
Relative size 
Labour cost 
Capital intensity 
 
0.003 
0.069** 
5.408*** 
0.241*** 
0.497 
 
0.000 
0.083** 
4.794*** 
-0.229*** 
-0.425 
Financial characteristics 
Profitability 
Solvency 
 
-0.334* 
0.285** 
 
-0.364** 
0.317** 
Stakeholders and public policy 
Shareholders 
Non-current liabilities 
Country 
Austria 
Germany 
Italy 
Spain 
 
0.042 
0.256** 
5.850 
 
 
0.010 
0.322** 
X 
15.810 
2.749 
6.799 
22.985* 
Sector dummies 
Sector B 
Sector C 
Sector D 
Sector E 
Constant 
 
21.884** 
-8.048*** 
-8.185*** 
-2.568 
-8.709*** 
 
20.796** 
-8.132*** 
-7.916** 
-3.471 
-8.711*** 
* , ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively  
Note. The numbers reported are the percent increase in probability due an increase in the  
explanatory variable by 1 unit. An “X” refers to the fact that this variable is not included in the 
specification. 
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Appendix - Table A4: Sensitivity analysis on the sector dummies 
 
 Sample excl.  
sector B (N=411) 
Sector A (N=208) Manufacturing 
(N=160) 
Business characteristics 
Subsidiaries 
Employees 
Relative size 
Labour cost 
Capital intensity 
 
0.007 
0.074** 
4.782*** 
0.202** 
-0.209 
 
0.000 
0.126*** 
7.468*** 
0.548*** 
-5.743 
 
-0.002 
0.154*** 
5.792 
0.682*** 
-4.442 
Financial characteristics 
Profitability 
Solvency 
 
-0.244 
0.395*** 
 
-0.167 
0.487** 
 
0.065 
0.438* 
Stakeholders and public 
policy 
Shareholders 
Non-current liabilities 
Country 
 
0.063 
0.401*** 
5.968 
 
0.123 
0.696*** 
0.972 
 
0.164 
0.822*** 
-2.351 
Sector dummies 
Sector C 
Sector D 
Sector E 
Constant 
 
-8.050*** 
-7.915** 
-1.961 
-8.714*** 
 
 
 
 
-8.716 
 
 
 
 
-8.716*** 
* , ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively  
Note. The numbers reported are the percent increase in probability due an increase in the  
explanatory variable by 1 unit.  
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Appendix – Table A5: Sensitivity analysis on alternative variable specifications 
 
 Specific. 1 Specific. 2 Specific. 3 Specific. 4 Specific. 5 
Business characteristics 
Subsidiaries 
Employees  
Turnover 
Relative size  
Relative size on turnover 
Labour cost  
Capital intensity  
Total assets per employee 
 
0.002 
0.074** 
 
4.675*** 
 
0.217** 
-0.062 
 
-0.006 
 
0.001*** 
 
3.340* 
0.117 
-1.484 
 
0.002 
0.076** 
 
4.496*** 
 
0.241*** 
 
-0.672 
 
0.003 
0.068** 
 
4.791*** 
 
0.216*** 
-0.746 
 
-0.007 
 
0.001*** 
 
3.281* 
0.159* 
 
-0.252 
Financial characteristics 
Profitability  
Return on total assets 
Solvency 
 
-0.337* 
 
0.304** 
 
-0.333* 
 
0.345** 
 
-0.343* 
 
0.328** 
 
 
-0.124 
0.251* 
 
 
-0.326 
0.339** 
Stakeholders and public policy 
Shareholders 
Non-current liabilities  
Country 
 
0.050 
0.275** 
7.775* 
 
0.0328 
0.300*** 
6.306 
 
0.054 
0.284*** 
7.399 
 
0.038 
0.246** 
7.255 
 
0.029 
0.264** 
5.792 
Sector dummies 
Sector B 
Sector C 
Sector D 
Sector E 
Constant 
 
24.795*** 
-8.018*** 
-7.934** 
-2.975 
-8.710*** 
 
30.121*** 
-8.057*** 
-6.969* 
-1.255 
-8.709*** 
 
26.180*** 
-8.041*** 
-7.798** 
-2.838 
-8.711*** 
 
20.619** 
-7.849** 
-7.893** 
-2.385 
-8.708*** 
 
27.046*** 
-7.933*** 
-6.703* 
-0.201 
-8.708*** 
* , ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively  
Note. The numbers reported are the percent increase in probability due an increase in the  
explanatory variable by 1 unit.  
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Competing environmental management standards: How ISO 14001 
outnumbered EMAS in Germany, the UK, France and Sweden1 
 
 
Roeland Bracke – Johan Albrecht2 
 
Abstract. In the middle of the 1990s two international environmental management standards became 
available for European companies: the European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and the 
International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 14001. Companies that wanted to implement a 
standardized environmental management system were confronted with the choice between their 
national standard, the European standard or the international one. In the past decennium, the national 
standards have been abolished and the number of ISO 14001 certified companies has outnumbered the 
number of EMAS-registered organizations. The speed at which and the extent to which ISO 14001 has 
outnumbered EMAS differs, however, between countries in the EU-15. We argue that a country 
classification based on the degree of statism of the collective agency on the one hand, and the degree 
of corporatism of society’s organization on the other, offers a valuable perspective for analysing the 
evolution of the uptake of both standards in a country. We present the case of Germany, the UK, 
France and Sweden, and conclude that in countries characterised by a more societal organization of 
authority, private alternatives for national regulations like ISO 14001 are welcomed and adopted with 
enthusiasm. In countries characterised by a rather statist organization, such alternatives are looked 
upon with more suspicion resulting in delayed uptake. Whereas ISO 14001 is a purely private 
initiative, voluntary registration to the EMAS regulation creates a link between the company and the 
authorities. In contrast to corporatist settings, this frightens off business participation in associational 
countries. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Environmental auditing and management began in North America in the 1970s in response to the 
stringent and fast-growing environmental legislation. At first, industries and individual businesses 
created systems that suited their own needs. Pretty soon, attempts to develop more standardized and 
widely applicable systems arose at sectoral, national and even multinational levels. The first formally 
adopted standard for environmental management - BS7750 - was developed in 1992 by the British 
Standards Institution (BSI). Denmark and The Netherlands adopted BS7750 as their national 
environmental management standard, while other countries developed their own (although strongly 
                                                 
1 This paper is published in Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy (2007), 25(4), 611-627. 
2 Centre for Environmental Economics and Environmental Management, Ghent University. 
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based on BS7750) national standard, such as the French X30-200, the Irish IS 31° or the Spanish 
UNE77-801 (Krut and Gleckman, 1998). 
 
The emergence of distinct national environmental management systems confronted with the demands 
of a globalizing economy, and by the early 1990s there was growing support for the establishment of 
internationally recognised auditing procedures (Watson and Emery, 2004). On 29 June 1993, EMAS 
was established by the adoption of the Eco-management and Audit Regulation (1836/93/EC) by the 
European Council of Ministers. EMAS was ready for company registration in April 1995. Meanwhile 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) was working on its own standard that was 
published in September 1996. ISO defines an environmental management system as “the part of the 
overall management system that includes organizational structure, planning activities, responsibilities, 
practices, procedures, processes and resources for developing, implementing, achieving, reviewing, 
and maintaining, the environmental policy” (Johnson 1997, p. 65). 
 
As such, European companies that wanted to implement a standardized environmental management 
system had to choose between their national standard, the European standard or the international 
standard. Confronted with the emergence of international standards, interest was soon lost in national 
standards. The most important national standard, BS7750 was withdrawn and replaced by ISO 14001 
in March 1997 (Baumast, 2002), leaving only EMAS and ISO 14001 in competition. 
 
In this paper we focus on the introduction of ISO 14001 and EMAS in the policy arena and try to 
answer the following research question: how does the domestic socio-institutional setting determine 
the speed at which and the extent to which adoption of ISO 14001 has exceeded that of EMAS in 
different countries. For this purpose, we conducted a comparative case-study analysis of four countries 
based on a country classification introduced by Jepperson (2002). Jepperson distinguishes countries 
based on the degree of statism of the collective agency on the one hand, and the degree of corporatism 
of society’s organization on the other hand. Combining these two dimensions results in four different 
polity typologies. With Germany, the UK, France and Sweden we include a prototype of each polity 
type in our comparative analysis. 
 
The article is organized as follows. In the next section we present a brief history of the competition 
between ISO 14001 and EMAS. In section 3 we discuss the literature on the diffusion of 
environmental management standards. In section 4 we introduce the Jepperson country classification. 
The country case studies are presented in section 5, and in section 6 we draw up a comparative 
analysis. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in the last section.  
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2.  Brief history on the competition between ISO 14001 and EMAS 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that ISO 14001 and EMAS are often presented as substitutes for each other, 
there are a number of important differences between these standards (Watson and Emery, 2004). 
EMAS is based on a European regulation, and the standard is governed by the Commission and the 
member states. For implementation of this regulation, the EU member countries are required to set up 
organizations and procedures for the accreditation of environmental verifiers and for the registration of 
organizations. ISO 14001 was created by an international industry association and the participating 
national standards-setting bodies. Certification bureaus are accredited by national standard bodies, but 
self-declaration of conformance to the standard is also possible. EMAS is more rigorous compared to 
ISO 14001. It requires the improvement of environmental performance, whereas ISO 14001 only asks 
improvement of the management system. EMAS-registered companies must assure regulatory 
compliance; ISO 14001 only requires a commitment to regulatory compliance. In addition, EMAS 
requires the publication of an environmental statement validated by an accredited environmental 
verifier. Whereas EMAS is a standard of environmental excellence, ISO 14001 is a method of 
standardization (Krut and Gleckman, 1998). ISO 14001 is essentially a formal conformance standard: 
that is, it is concerned with whether an organization’s management procedures are consistent with its 
environmental policy.  
 
Figure 1 shows the uptake of ISO 14001 certificates and EMAS registrations by companies in the EU-
15. It can be seen that until 1998-99, the growth rate as well as the absolute numbers did not differ that 
much. It should be taken in account that before the revised EMAS II was adopted in March 2001, only 
companies in the manufacturing sectors could participate. For ISO 14001, all sectors could participate 
from the beginning. From 1999-2000 on, however, ISO 14001 certification was characterised by 
continuously strong growth. By December 2004 there were 33.108 ISO companies in the EU-15 (ISO, 
2005). The number of EMAS registrations, on the other hand, peaked in 2001 at 3.912 organizations 
and has declined since then to 3.048 in December 20043. As such, it is fair to state that in just a few 
years, ISO 14001 has outnumbered EMAS and become the dominant international environmental 
standard in the EU-15. The European Commission tried to counter this trend by adopting the revised 
EMAS II. In this, EMAS was opened for participation to all industries and ISO 14001 integrated as 
                                                 
3 Data received from the EMAS helpdesk (email 26/10/2005). It should be noted that under EMAS II (since April 
2001) corporate registrations are possible. As such organizations that had registered several sites under EMAS I 
can gather all their sites under one registration number. The number of sites has risen from 3.901 in April 2004 
to 4.253 by the end of September 2005. However, compared to the number and growth rate of ISO 14001 
certificates our statement holds. In the rest of this paper we will only use the data on registered organizations, as 
these data were available from 1995 on and for all EU-15 countries. 
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fulfilling the management-system part of the EMAS regulation. The objective was to promote EMAS 
as the standard for environmental excellence and to revitalize participation by attracting ISO 14001 
certified companies4.  
 
 Figure 1: The uptake of ISO 14001 and EMAS in EU member states 
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Sources: data on EMAS received from the EMAS helpdesk (email 26/10/2005). Data on ISO 14001 for 
the years 1995-1998 from (ISO, 2001) and for the years 1999-2004 from (ISO, 2005). 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it can be claimed that predicting the victory of ISO 14001 was a safe bet 
because of the combination of the international perspective and the fact that ISO 14001 is the logical 
next step after ISO 9001. However, there are a couple of observations that trouble this claim. 
 
Firstly, the link between ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 is not that obvious. In March 1995, before ISO 
14001 was available, 68.971 companies were already certified to ISO 9001 in the EU-15 - a number 
that ISO 14001 has still not reached. By December 2004 the number of ISO 9001 certificates reached 
261.425, almost eight times the number of ISO 14001 certificates. It seems that only a limited 
proportion of companies consider ISO 14001 as the logical extension to ISO 9001. In addition, the 
correlation coefficient between the number of ISO 14001 certificates per country divided by GDP and 
the number of ISO 9001 certificates per country divided by GDP for the EU-15 countries is only 
0,205. This shows that countries with a high number of ISO 9001 do not necessarily have many ISO 
14001 certificates. 
 
                                                 
4 Although there are no official numbers it can be stated that a number of companies have implemented both 
standards. In June 1998, close to half of the companies that were EMAS-registered also held ISO 14001 
certificate, while another third intended to go for ISO 14001 certification (Hillary, 1998).   
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Secondly, in the beginning, there was a rather strong expectation that EMAS could become the 
dominant standard in Europe. The competition between the two standards had already started before 
their actual adoption. Within the ISO technical committee, US delegates in particular put Europe under 
pressure to cancel plans for EMAS and embrace instead the international standard that was under 
development (Ward, 1994). The US favoured a more flexible standard, and especially opposed the 
mandatory public disclosure of environmental information verified by a third party as this might lead 
to litigation problems for US firms. The European policymakers, on the other hand, wanted a stringent 
standard, in particular because the standard might become an important element for giving regulatory 
relief to registered companies. Because of the fact that registration to EMAS could provide an 
opportunity for regulatory relief, and the rather strong belief that EMAS might become compulsory if 
the voluntary participation remained low, EMAS attracted more business attention than ISO 14001 
(Begley, 1996; Roberts, 1995). In addition, because of the uncertainty about how EMAS and ISO 
14001 would relate, most companies focussed on EMAS as they assumed that if they met the 
requirements for EMAS, certification to the less prescriptive ISO 14001 would be mainly a formality 
(Roberts, 1995). By the end of 1997, however, the atmosphere had changed and several important 
business federations explicitly stated their preference for ISO 14001:  
 
“VCI, the German chemical industry – once a vociferous supporter of EMAS – now believes 
its best chance of developing and promoting the industry in Germany is with ISO 14001… In 
Italy, Federchimica, the Italian chemical federation has reached the conclusion that ISO 
14001 is the standard for its members.” (Scott, 1997) 
 
Thirdly, the time it took for ISO 14001 certifications to outnumbered EMAS registrations as the 
number-one environmental management standards differs between countries. Germany and Austria are 
outliers as it was only at the end of 2001 and 2002, respectively, that they had more ISO 14001 
certified than EMAS-registered companies. In no other EU-15 country at any point in time has EMAS 
ever come close to dominating ISO 14001. Another curious observation is that, although the number 
of EMAS registrations has declined or stagnated since 2001, a remarkable growth can de seen in Italy 
and Spain. Between 2001 and March 2006, the number of EMAS-registered organizations rose from 
74 to 435 in Italy and from 165 to 535 in Spain5. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Numbers from the EMAS website (http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/emas/) (accessed on 4/6/2006) 
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3.  The international diffusion of environmental management standards 
 
A large part of the literature on the diffusion of environmental management systems takes a cross-
sectional approach to explain the geographical diffusion at a certain point in time. There are a number 
of empirical studies on the international diffusion of ISO 14001 certificates (e.g. Corbett and Kirsch, 
2001, 2004; Delmas, 2003; Potoski and Prakash, 2004; Prakash and Potoski, 2006; Vastag, 2004). 
Perkins and Neumayer (2004) empirically analysed the diffusion of EMAS registrations. Three of 
these studies include one or more explanatory variables that try to capture the institutional 
characteristics of a country in their model. Delmas (2003) found that the government’s commitment to 
environmental goals has a positive influence on the uptake of ISO 14001 by companies. A higher level 
of litigation, measured by the number of environmental law firms in a country, has a negative 
influence on this. Potoski and Prakash (2004) found that ISO 14001 adoption rates are likely to be 
higher in countries whose governments flexibly enforce stringent environmental regulations. In their 
most recent work, Prakash and Potoski (2006), however, found that the domestic variables - 
government consumption and regulation - were not significant. Perkins and Neumayer (2004) found 
that EMAS registrations are higher in member states with less interventionist, burdensome styles of 
regulation but doubt the reliability of this conclusion since neither Germany nor Austria - the two 
countries with the highest per capita EMAS counts- have a particularly low regulatory burden.  
 
This econometric-based research provides only limited information for our research question. Firstly, 
these studies focus on only one standard but the diffusion pattern of the two standards is quite 
different. The correlation coefficient between the ratio of ISO 14001 certificates divided by GDP and 
the ratio of EMAS registrations divided by GDP in 2004 in the EU-15 was only 0,252. Secondly, these 
studies are mainly cross-sectional in nature whereas answering our research question needs a 
combination of cross-section and longitudinal analysis. Thirdly, these studies are based on large-
sample research. This has proven to be very useful for identifying general trends when the values of 
the variables differ significantly between the countries in the sample. However, we believe that this 
approach offers only limited explanatory power for explaining rather subtle differences between quite 
comparable countries, as is it the case for this study.  
 
In addition to empirical work, there is some research - usually in the form of comparative analysis 
between a limited number of countries - which concentrates on differences in culture, values, beliefs 
and institutions of the countries in explaining the geography of EMAS and ISO 14001 adoptions. 
Delmas (2002) distinguishes the regulatory, normative and cognitive aspects of the national 
environment that affect the costs and benefits of ISO 14001 adoption, and thus the differences in 
adoption across countries. The cases of Europe and the United States are used to illustrate the 
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influence of the institutional framework. She concludes, amongst other things, that the US institutional 
environment seems to act as a deterrent to ISO 14001 adoption as US companies are fearful of a 
certification process which lays their performance open to public scrutiny. The opposite is true in 
Europe, where governments have encouraged the adoption of environmental management standards by 
setting up a trusted certification system and providing technical assistance to potential adopters. 
Kollman and Prakash (2002) conducted an in-dept comparative case study of the adoption of ISO 
14001 and EMAS in the UK, the US and Germany. They claim that the perception of the costs and 
benefits are largely determined by domestic factors. These perceptions are shaped by how 
environmental management standards are promoted, how information about them is disseminated in 
each country (supply aspects), and how the stakeholders support their introduction (demand aspects). 
Steger et al. (2002) investigated the influence of national culture, conditions, and incentives on EMAS 
registrations in Germany, France and Spain. Glachant et al. (2002) analyze companies’ participation in 
EMAS by focusing on the influence of the public regulator, based on in-depth case studies of France, 
the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany. Others (for example, De Bruijn, 2002; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 
1999; Knill and Lenschow, 1998) have analysed the geography with the ‘goodness-of-fit’ concept 
from the new-institutionalist school. According to this concept, the correspondence between 
supranational regulation on the one hand and domestic structures, policy style and policy content on 
the other determines the varying level of implementation in countries.  
 
While there is quite some literature on the geographical diffusion at a certain moment in time, research 
on the evolution of the diffusion of, and the competition between, the two standards in time is more 
limited. In this paper we try to make a contribution in this direction and focuses on the influence of the 
socio-institutional context.  
 
The decision to adopt a certifiable environmental management system is a voluntary choice for 
companies which, however, experience strong external factors. Along with others (for example, 
Delmas, 2002; Glachant et al, 2002; Kollman and Prakash, 2002; Prakash and Potoski, 2006; Steger et 
al., 2002) we believe that the national environment (national values, norms, habits, institutions, beliefs, 
etc) partly shapes this external context. Within the wide range of possible determinants, we focus 
primarily on a country’s socio-institutional setting to shed some light on the research question at hand. 
A relevant policy distinction is presented in the next section. 
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4.  A typology of polity models 
 
Drawing on the literature on state polity formation, Jepperson (2002) distinguishes countries based on 
two dimensions: the organization of society, and the organization of authority. Disentangling and then 
cross-classifying them yields four distinct polity models (see figure 2): state-corporate, liberal, state-
nation and social-corporate. These polity models correspond quite well with the political cultures of 
Germanic, Anglo, French and Nordic orbits, respectively.  
 
 Figure 2: A typology of polity models 
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The horizontal axis focuses on the organization of collective authority and contrasts statist from 
societal models. Societal visions locate purpose and authority in society at large, with government 
seen as an instrument and expression of society. As such, these countries feature more imagery of 
thinking, interest formation, representation, and bargaining. The UK is a classic example. Statist 
visions, in contrast, locate collective authority in a differentiated, insulated, and charismatic 
organizational state apparatus. They take on an image of a steering government, an inspired 
officialdom. There is more organizational integration of administrative, parliamentary, juridical, 
policing, executive, and planning powers. Germany and France typically fit into this category. 
 
The vertical axis represents the organization of society and distinguishes between corporate and 
associational models. In associational visions of society, society is imagined as a system of action 
generated by subunit ‘actors’. Social structure is pictured as arising from their communications and 
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exchanges. Whereas collective requirements (agreements) and duties are stressed under corporate 
organization, rights and choices are dramatized here. Jepperson (2002) labels Britain, the US and 
France as typically associational. In corporate models a communal order of differentiated roles and 
collective functions is established. Social organization is envisioned as rational and planned, rather 
than natural and emergent as it is depicted in associational imagery. In corporate models, the 
subelements of society are typically groupings or orders themselves, with group rights accorded to 
them like a sort of delegated polities. Germanic central Europe, Scandinavian Europe and parts of 
southern Europe produced the modern corporate system based on a functional theory of society. 
 
We believe this country classification might offer valuable insights on the way in which the socio-
institutional context influences the reaction of a country’s policy makers, companies, and society at 
large to the introduction of international environmental management standards. Alongside this cross-
sectional approach, we believe this classification is also able to provide insights for the longitudinal 
analysis of the evolution of both standards in a country since it points to the way in which interactions 
between social actors and authorities take place and to the different ways in which policies are drawn 
up. We do not restrict ourselves to a static interpretation in which different settings might explain a 
diverging position with regard to environmental management standards, but widen our view to see 
how these settings might trigger dynamic interactive processes that change perspectives on the 
advantages of implementing an environmental management system. With regard to the two 
dimensions discussed above, we postulate the following hypotheses.  
 
(i) Hypothesis concerning the organization of collective authority: 
‘Environmental management standards will be more widely supported in societal 
countries as the characteristics of this instrument correspond better with a societal 
organization of authority.’  
 
Within the wide range of environmental policy instruments, environmental management standards 
belong to the category of ‘voluntary instruments’. Characteristics like voluntarism, self-regulation, and 
flexibility more closely fit with a societal model of collective authority. The fact that most 
environmental management standards are mainly developed by business initiatives strongly contrasts 
with the statist vision of a steering, enlightened authority. When we distinguish between EMAS and 
ISO 14001 it is obvious that EMAS which is developed and monitored by policy makers, is more in 
line with the statist type, whereas the more flexible ISO 14001, which is developed by the private 
sector, fits the societal type more closely. 
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(ii) Hypothesis concerning the organization of society: 
‘Environmental management standards will be more widely supported in associational 
countries as the characteristics of this instrument correspond better with an associational 
organization of society’  
 
Within the category of voluntary instruments, environmental management standards are distinguished 
from others through their binary and individualistic character. An environmental management standard 
is a take-it-or-leave-it option for every individual company, and does not establish environmental 
performance targets. These characteristics especially distinguish environmental management standards 
from other voluntary instruments, such as negotiated agreements with targets based on a compromise 
between industry associations and policy makers and where the agreement usually applies for a whole 
industry sector. Governments looking to substitute or supplement command-and-control type 
regulation with new instruments based on voluntarism and cooperation will be attracted by the 
instrument type that suits their socio-institutional context. As such, in corporatist environments, with 
powerful industry associations seen as a sort of delegated polities, negotiated agreements fit best. In 
associational settings, negotiated agreements are less feasible as the ties within social organizations 
and between private and public actors are rather weak. Above all, the importance of individual free 
choice in these countries corresponds more closely with the voluntary-instrument subtype of 
environmental management standards. We return to these hypotheses after the case studies are 
presented in the next section. 
 
 
5.  Case studies 
 
In order to investigate the influence of a country’s socio-institutional setting on the adoption of 
environmental management standards, four case studies are presented: Germany, the UK, France and 
Sweden. These countries are selected because they can be considered as the prototype for the four 
polity modes, and because information about the adoption of both environmental management 
standards was available. Table 1 presents some basic information for each country. Rather than giving 
the values of the variables, we have decided instead to offer a qualitative weighting based on the 
position of the country in the EU-15 ranking (1-5: high; 5-10: middle; 11-15: Low). In other words, 
the descriptors allow comparisons to be made between the countries within a particular column, rather 
than the other way round. In parentheses, we add the actual position of the country in the EU-15 
ranking. The data on ISO 9001 are included as an indicator of the general popularity of management 
systems in a country. The last column presents information on the degree to which member states have 
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promoted EMAS (and, to a lesser extent, ISO 14001) by providing regulatory incentives to registered 
organizations. 
 
 Table 1: The uptake of ISO 14001, EMAS and ISO 9001 in 2004 
 Polity type ISO 
14001* 
EMAS* ISO 
9001* 
EMAS/ISO 
14001 
Government 
incentives** 
Germany 
The UK 
France 
Sweden 
State-corporate 
Liberal 
State-nation 
Social-corporate 
Low (12) 
High (5) 
Low (13) 
High (1) 
High (2) 
Low (13) 
Low (15) 
High (4) 
Low (11) 
High (3) 
High (5) 
High (4) 
High (2) 
Low (14)  
Low (15) 
Middle (10) 
High (1) 
Middle (7,5***) 
Low (11***) 
Low (14,5***) 
* The number of certified/registered organizations is divided by GDP; data on ISO 14001 and  
ISO 9001 from ISO (2005); data on EMAS received from the EMAS helpdesk by email 26/10/2005 
** Number of regulatory incentives for companies registered to EMAS as reported by the  
European Commission (2004). Some of these incentives also apply for certification to ISO 14001. 
*** This is the average ranking, meaning that a number of countries have the same numbers of 
measures 
 
5.1.  Germany: a game of panicky play 
 
Germany takes the second place in the EMAS ranking and has by far the most EMAS-registered 
organizations in absolute numbers. The number peaked in September 2001, at 2.674, but thereafter 
declined steadily to 1.499 in February 20066. For ISO 9001, as well as for ISO 14001, Germany ranks 
low down the pack. This indicates that (environmental) management systems are not really popular in 
Germany, and also explains the high EMAS/ISO 14001 ratio.  
 
The situation of Germany can be split into three periods: (i) strong opposition to the development of 
EMAS, which turned into (ii) strong enthusiasm in the middle of the 1990s, and ended in (iii) 
disillusionment with EMAS and growing interest for ISO 14001.   
 
Firstly, during the development of EMAS, Germany strongly opposed the idea. Germany was the only 
country to opposed the second version of the EC draft regulation (Bültmann and Watzold, 2000). This 
attitude is explained by the fact that the idea of self-regulation and flexibility did not match Germany’s 
environmental policy, which is traditionally presented as strongly dependent on state-driven technical 
regulation combined with direct controls of companies by public institutions (Bültmann and Wätzold, 
                                                 
6 This decline cannot be completely due to the new registration system introduced with EMAS II in April 2001 
as the number of registered sites (1.967) in February 2006 is also below the peak in registered organizations and 
has a declining trend.   
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2000; Wurzel, 2004). In addition, German industry opposed to the public’s access to environmental 
and company-related information. German business associations feared the discovery of trade secrets 
by rivals and the resulting damaging consequences for their competitiveness. In addition, they argued 
that legal compliance would be harder for German firms because of the high national standards 
compared with those of other European countries (Becke, 2004). 
 
However, by the time EMAS was available for registration, the German government as well as the 
German industry had become enthusiastic supporters. The switch in the German government’s 
perception is explained by their recognition that they were losing their role as an ‘uploader’ of national 
policies to the European level (Börzel, 2000, 2002; Pehle, 1997). This stimulated the recognition of 
the need for a change in policy style (Wurzel, 2002). Especially at the European level, there was the 
growing enthusiasm for incentive-based policy instruments. In face of implementation problems 
(Glachant, 2001; Jordan 1999) and inefficiency attributed to the regulatory approach, the European 
Commission looked for alternative, more flexible environmental policy concepts and instruments 
(Wurzel, 2002). The Fifth Environmental Action Plan of the European Commission, which saw an 
important role for EMAS, is considered a turning point in this regard (Weale, 1996). The former 
‘coalition’ countries of Germany like the Netherlands – the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan 
inspired the Fifth European Action Programme (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998) - and Denmark, 
already supported the new direction. In a way Germany, which was used to being a leader quite 
suddenly started to panic that it was missing the boat and would become a tailender.   
 
By 1993-94 German industry also began to see EMAS as an opportunity rather than a threat. 
Companies started to believe that EMAS would improve stakeholder relationships and could create an 
opportunity to show their high environmental performance levels (Becke 2004). Many companies did 
not want to miss the opportunity of gaining regulatory relief that the government had promised. In 
addition, as German companies already had a high level of in-company environmental protection, the 
effort required to achieve EMAS registration was expected to be comparatively lower than for 
companies with lower environmental protection levels.  
 
Another important element here is the way in which the accreditation and registration system is set up. 
This process was initially characterized by a conflict between the Federal Ministry of the Environment 
and environmental groups on the one hand, and the Federal Ministry of Economics and business 
associations on the other, over the amount of influence which industry should have in the system 
(Bültmann and Wältzold, 2000). The situation resulted in a deadlock that lasted for almost two years. 
Finally, a compromise was reached by the foundation of DAU (Deutsche Akkreditierungs- und 
Zulassungsgesellschaft für Umweltgutachter) as accreditation body and the chambers of industry and 
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commerce and chambers of crafts as competent bodies. As such, a lot of responsibility was granted to 
the private sector. This long and intense implementation process, however, attracted attention: public 
and private actors became ‘EMAS-minded’. Registration by companies was strongly promoted by 
information campaigns and financial support organized by federal and regional governments as well as 
affiliated public agencies and the chambers of commerce and industry or the chambers of crafts 
(Wätzold and Bültmann, 2000). Above all, the chambers of industry and crafts had a particular interest 
in high participation rates as they had sought responsibility for the registration system (Delmas, 2002). 
Also, most German states responded positively to the firms’ request for regulatory relief and financial 
support for participating firms. Germany takes the first place in the ranking on government support 
measures. In this support system, greater incentives are offered to firms that join EMAS in preference 
of the ISO 14001 scheme (Clausen et al., 2002). 
 
By the end of the 1990s, the atmosphere had, however, changed again as can be seen in the declining 
number of EMAS-registered companies from 2001 on. How can we explain this sudden turnabout? 
Baumast (2002) gives two reasons. On the one hand, business had expected more recognition from the 
government in the form of regulatory relief. The government attracted many companies with this 
prospect, but failed to keep its promises in many counties (Länder). On the other hand, recognition 
from other stakeholders was limited, certainly as in almost every other country, companies were busy 
getting certified to ISO 14001. Because the additional cost of implementing the more stringent EMAS 
instead of ISO 14001 did not pay off in terms of stakeholder recognition, EMAS became less popular.  
 
 
5.2.  The UK: a path dependency story 
 
The UK has quite a high level of ISO 14001 companies but almost no EMAS registrations. The UK 
can be characterised as one of the countries most committed to management systems. Already in 
January 1993 the EU-15 counted 22.550 ISO 9001 certified companies of which 18.577 (82.4%)were 
situated in the UK. For ISO 14001 the numbers are less impressive, but nevertheless in 2004 the UK 
was placed fifth in the EU-15. By virtue of the BS7750 standard, the UK is considered the cradle of 
environmental management standards (Delmas, 2002).   
 
In historic perspective, the non-adoption of EMAS in the UK might seem puzzling. The UK 
government was a heavy promoter of EMAS from the start of the policy process. The UK’s national 
environmental policy is characterized as rather liberal and flexible based, on company-oriented self-
regulation approaches (Fairbrass and Jordan, 2001). As such, The UK strongly criticised the prevailing 
strategy of centralised regulatory mechanisms of environmental European law as being inefficient, 
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inflexible, and neglecting the specific national institutional settings (Becke, 2004; Rittberger and 
Richardson, 2003) and favoured the European Commission’s shift to more flexible environmental 
policy concepts and instruments (Wurzel, 2002). EMAS was considered as an important element in 
this new strategy. The UK government hoped that national industries would gain a competitive 
advantage as management systems in general and the national environmental management system 
BS7750 especially, were strongly supported and implemented by UK industry (Wätzold and 
Bültmann, 2000). After the publication of BS7750 in March 1992, the standard was subjected to a 
two-year pilot implementation program involving almost 500 participants, including 230 
implementing organizations (Delmas, 2002). The modified standard was finalized in January 2004 and 
the sales of the standard proved very successful. It faced the highest demand for any BSI document 
ever (Baumast, 2002). 
 
How to explain the lack of EMAS registrations in this context? Two elements are crucial: the 
popularity of ISO 9001 and the lack of government support. The high numbers of ISO 9001 certified 
companies might have created a path dependency towards ISO 14001 certification. The role the 
government played in the UK is completely opposite to the German situation. The UK government 
strongly influenced the development of the standard, but took a passive position with respect to its 
actual implementation by companies. In its opinion, (environmental) management standards are a 
private sector instrument in which the government is not involved. The fact that the success of ISO 
9001 and the establishment of BS7750 were achieved without much government involvement must 
have supported this belief. The process of setting up an accreditation and registration system went 
smoothly as the UK was able to build on administrative structures already in place to implement 
national environmental management based on BS7750 and the ISO 9000 quality-management system 
(Knill, 2001). The drawback of such smooth implementation is the fact that it does not attract the 
attention of the parties involved (for example, government, environmental organizations, business 
associations, certification bureaus, national standard bodies) as was the case in Germany.  
 
In addition, Baumast (2002) also points to the fact that the UK is somewhat opposed to more European 
regulation. Industry considered EMAS as a centralized and stringent European ‘thing’, and preferred 
the more flexible and international ISO 14001 standard. 
 
 
5.3.  France: government dominance frightens business  
 
Although the quality management system ISO 9001 is quite popular in France, French companies have 
a very low interest in environmental management systems compared with other EU-15 countries. 
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France holds the 13th place in the ISO 14001 ranking and the last place in the EMAS ranking. As 
such, the competition between the two standards is of little interest in this country. 
 
With regard to the EMAS regulation, France took a rather indifferent position at the European level. 
This is explained by the lack of experience with environmental management and the voluntary nature 
of the regulation (Schucht, 2000). Nevertheless, when the accreditation and registration system had to 
be set up, the authorities took the lead. As in Germany, this process was characterized by a battle 
between actors such as the authorities, business associations, the national accreditation bureau, 
certification bureaus, and environmental pressure groups, to get as much involvement as possible in 
the system. As can be expected for a state-nation, in the end it was the Ministry of the Environment 
that dominated the accreditation and registration of the system. Schucht (2000) states that, with the 
benefit from hindsight, the Ministry of the Environment wanted strong control on the system of 
registration and accreditation right from the start, but needed to collaborate with other interest groups 
in pilot phases to gain information on the subject as they had very little experience of environmental 
management at the beginning.  
 
This clearly contrasts with the German case, where a long and difficult process resulted in an outcome 
that was supported by government as well as those business associations which attained a dominant 
position in the system. In France, dominance of the authorities was rejected by the business 
associations (Delmas, 2002). Unlike Germany, the institutional structures and the tradition of public-
private cooperation are lacking in France and conflicts are solved by unilateral government 
intervention. As such, the implementation of the EMAS regulation did not create a momentum for 
EMAS registration by companies such as occurred in Germany. The French Ministry of the 
Environment has always seen EMAS more as a promotional than as a regulatory instrument: business 
requests for deregulation for participants are left unanswered, and technical and financial support 
initiatives are scarce (Schucht, 2000). France is at the bottom of the rankings of political support 
measures in table 1. Companies were left frustrated and turned their back on EMAS, making it very 
easy for ISO 14001 to become the number-one standard in this country from the beginning. Why the 
number of ISO 14001 registered companies lags so clearly behind the number of ISO 9001 companies, 
however, is puzzling. 
 
 
5.4.  Sweden: where ISO 14001 is the bottom line 
 
Within the other polity types, choosing the prototype country was rather straightforward. The 
Scandinavian countries, labelled as social-corporate by Jepperson, are typically considered to be a 
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quite homogeneous group. As such, the choice of Sweden was rather arbitrary. However, against o 
choice of Norway was the fact that it is not a member of the EU-15. Denmark, in turn, is believed to 
be just a little closer to state-corporate model than Sweden; and Finland’s peripheral position in the 
EU-15 and its historic ties with Russia made us choose Sweden as prototype country.    
 
Whereas environmental concern on political and business levels has a long history in Sweden, it did 
not play a pivotal role in the development of environmental management systems as in the case of the 
UK.  However, after the publication of ISO 14001 and EMAS interest and uptake rose quite 
spectacularly. For ISO 9001, ISO 14001, and EMAS, Sweden ranks amongst the top countries. For the 
ratio ISO 14001/GDP Sweden is ranked highest and the value of the ratio is over twice that of the 
second country, Spain. This high value explains the rather low value of the EMAS/ISO 14001 ratio. 
This makes the position of EMAS somewhat puzzling. From a European perspective Sweden is a 
forerunner, but domestically the number of EMAS registered organizations is negligible compared 
with the number of ISO 14001 certificates. Another interesting fact is that the number of EMAS-
registered organizations peaked in 2001 on 212 and had fallen back quite drastically to 100 by 
February 2006.  
 
Baumast (2002) gives two explanations for the relatively limited amount of EMAS-registered 
organizations. First, there is the lack of political support for EMAS. Sweden shares the last place with 
Ireland in the ranking on government support measures. The only advantage to be gained is that firms 
who are obliged to publish an environmental report can substitute an EMAS statement (which in fact 
is an environmental report) (Clausen et al, 2002). As such, experts and company representatives see no 
added value in EMAS if an ISO 14001 is already achieved. In contrast to Germany, where many 
companies went for ISO 14001 after their EMAS registration, ISO 14001 is generally regarded as the 
main standard in Sweden. The interest in EMAS comes mostly from companies with important 
markets in Germany. The second explanation is economic: Sweden is the only country in the EU 
where the competent body for EMAS registration is an independent company that needs to finance 
itself through validation and registration fees - which are, consequently, the highest in Europe. Both 
the lack of supporting measures and the statute of the competent body point to the fact that the 
government does not want to interfere in companies’ decisions choosing between ISO 14001 and 
EMAS.    
 
How can we explain the popularity of ISO 14001? Firstly, public concern for the environment is very 
high in Sweden. As a consequence, environmental policy both of government and of businesses has 
been regarded as a front runner. Implementing an environmental management system is considered to 
be a useful element in companies’ environmental policy and enables them to demonstrate their 
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environmental dedication - especially to customers. This is perceived as the principal benefit for 
companies. A remarkable finding is that the number of ISO 14001 certified companies comes close to 
the number of ISO 9001 certificates. The ratio is 74% compared to only 16% in Germany, 12% in the 
UK and, 11% in France. Over the last few years, interest has been shifting from pure environmental 
management systems to integrated, sustainability-oriented systems focussing on economic, social, and 
environmental aspects. Second, the fact that having a certified environmental management system is 
an important element in public procurement is claimed to be an important explanatory factor 
(Baumast, 2002). Finally, Baumast sees a kind of bandwagon effect in the sense that ISO 14001 has 
reached the critical level where certification has become a must. Instead of drawing attention to the 
fact of being certified, in Sweden a company might attract attention if it is not certified. 
 
 
6.  Comparative case-study analysis 
 
In this section we aim to check whether the information gained in the case studies on the development 
of ISO 14001 and EMAS is in line with the intuition that stems from the Jepperson country 
classification and the resulting hypotheses postulated in section 3. At first sight the case studies point 
to the decisive role of specific factors in explaining the (lack of) success of the standards, such as the 
swings in the German government’s enthusiasm, or the high registration cost in Sweden, and do not 
necessarily show a direct or obvious link with the socio-institutional setting. Nevertheless, we think 
that the fact that certain elements occur or have an important influence in certain countries is not 
determined by fate or accidence but is bound to the socio-institutional setting and the resulting policy 
culture of that country. We thus take a deterministic rather than stochastic perspective.  
 
Figure 3 presents a summary of the case studies from the perspective of the Jepperson typology. For 
each country a short statement summarizes the initial position towards the introduction of 
environmental management standards (IN), the implementation of the EMAS regulation (IMP) and the 
uptake of ISO 14001 and EMAS (UP). 
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 Figure 3: Case-study summary 
 
associational 
corporate 
Sweden 
IN: supportive 
IMP: fast; private sector dominance
 
UP: EMAS uptake rate declined fast 
in favour of high ISO 14001 uptake 
statist 
Germany 
IN: suspicious 
IMP: difficult and conflicting but 
resulting in a supported compromise 
UP: high but declining EMAS 
uptake; low ISO 14001 uptake  
The UK 
IN: very supportive 
IMP: fast; private sector dominance
 
UP: low for EMAS; high ISO 14001 
uptake  
France 
IN: indifferent 
IMP: difficult and conflicting, 
resulting in business aversion 
UP: low, especially for EMAS 
societal 
 
 
Regarding the initial position concerning the introduction of environmental management standards, the 
intuition from the Jepperson typology seems to be confirmed. According to the hypotheses a more 
positive stance was expected from countries with a more societal organization of authority and a more 
associational organization of society. The supportive UK and the rather negative German position 
support our hypotheses. The mixed typologies of France and Sweden are harder to judge: with Sweden 
rather positive and France rather negative, the hypothesis concerning the organization of authority 
seems the most important. 
 
Also, the way in which the EMAS regulation is implemented seems in line with expectations. Previous 
research has shown that formal incorporation of EU policy by member states rarely implies 
homogeneity in patterns of implementation (Bailey, 2002; Liefferink and Jordan, 2002). This is also 
agreed by Steger et al. (2002) who, in their qualitative, interview-based study of EMAS participation 
in Germany, France and Spain, conclude that national culture and competitive situation both have an 
impact on the way EMAS is interpreted and validated in different countries. The case studies point to 
important differences, especially concerning the system for registration of companies and for 
accreditation of environmental verifiers. As expected, the societal countries, Sweden and the UK, 
enjoyed a smooth implementation process. The government gave the responsibility for the registration 
and accreditation system to a large extent to the private sector. The fact that these countries had 
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already some experience in (environmental) management standards facilitated this process, and is in 
line with the expectation that societal countries are more open to alternatives for national regulations. 
In statist Germany and France, the implementation process was characterised as difficult because of 
private-public conflicts. Again, the difference between statist and societal countries proves more 
important than the distinction between corporatist and associational countries. Comparing the case of 
France with Germany, however, might reveal the influence of this second dimension. In Germany a 
widely supported compromise was finally reached. Industry federations have a high responsibility; and 
the institutional and historic ties, which are such that these federations are almost considered part of 
the government, facilitated such an outcome. France, in contrast, lacks this kind of partnership 
thinking and the outcome in which the government dominated the system met with frustration and was 
rejected by industry.  
 
In addition, the uptake of the standards provides some evidence that supports the hypotheses 
postulated. The uptake of ISO 14001 in the four countries again points to the overriding importance of 
the hypothesis concerning the organization of authority: high in Sweden and the UK; low in Germany 
and France. For EMAS uptake and the EMAS/ISO 14001 ratio, however, the hypothesis concerning 
the organization of society seems confirmed: Germany and Sweden rank high, France and the UK low. 
Presumably the differences between EMAS and ISO 14001 provide an element of explanation. 
Whereas certification to ISO 14001 only links a company to other private actors (for example, 
certification bureaus, costumers, insurance companies, etc), EMAS registration also creates a link 
between the company and the authorities (EMAS is a European regulation). In corporatist settings, 
structures and links between business associations and authorities are more developed than in 
associational settings. As such, companies in corporatist countries might be much more open to 
participation in such initiatives whereas this might frighten off companies in associational countries. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
With EMAS and ISO 14001, two international environmental management standards became available 
in the middle of the 1990s. Companies of the EU-15 seeking to implement a standardised 
environmental management system faced a choice between their national standard, the European 
standard or the international standard. Although at the beginning there was some doubt as to which 
standard would become most popular, at the start of the 21st century EMAS fell behind ISO 14001. 
The speed at which and the extent to which ISO 14001 certificates outnumbered EMAS registrations, 
however, differs between countries. In this paper we attempt to shed some insights on this diverging 
diffusion pattern by focussing on the distinct national socio-institutional context. 
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Jepperson’s polity typology is taken as a starting point. This typology distinguishes countries on two 
dimensions: the degree of statism and the degree of corporatism. Combining these two dimensions 
produces four polity types. For each polity type a prototype country was selected and a case study was 
conducted. A comparative analysis of the four cases was used to test two hypotheses concerning the 
two dimensions of the polity typologies. The hypotheses were checked against the information 
gathered concerning the initial position towards the introduction of environmental management 
standards, the implementation of the EMAS regulation, and the actual uptake of both standards. The 
hypotheses were to a large extent supported by the case studies.  
 
The hypothesis stating that societal countries are expected to be more supportive compared with more 
statist countries was confirmed for the introduction of environmental management systems, for the 
implementation of the EMAS regulation and for the uptake of ISO 14001. With regard to the 
hypothesis stating that associational countries can be expected to be more supportive compared with 
more corporatist countries, only limited information was found so the hypothesis cannot be supported 
nor rejected. A clear example of the influence of this difference in the organization of society was, 
however, found in the ways the registration and accreditation system was set up in Germany and 
France. In Germany, strong institutional and historic ties between government and industry federations 
meant a conflicting process resulted in a commonly supported compromise. In France, however, this 
tradition of partnership is lacking and the resulting governmental dominance in the system was met 
with frustration by industry. Above all, the uptake of EMAS could be explained in this regard when 
considering the fact that EMAS registration creates a link between the company and the authorities.  
 
All in all, structural differences and the processes that took place in the four case studies correspond 
quite nicely with the intuitive expectations that stem from the polity typologies. This theoretical 
perspective might also offer interesting insights for our understanding of the diffusion of 
environmental policy instruments in general, and especially for the emergence of new instruments that 
are to some extent based on voluntarism, such as negotiated agreements or information and reporting 
systems. Enhancing knowledge concerning the link between socio-institutional setting and 
environmental policy instruments might steer policy makers in the instrument-selection stage of the 
policy cycle. If polity typologies to some extent determine the success of an instrument, this implies 
that copying best practices from other countries or regions is not just a ‘cut and paste’ exercise.   
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Twenty years of negotiated environmental agreements in Belgium: from 
gentlemen’s agreements to binding contracts 
 
 
Roeland Bracke - Marc De Clercq1 
 
 
Abstract. When negotiated environmental agreements entered the policy arena they were characterised 
as gentlemen’s agreements containing only vague targets, little monitoring provisions and hardly any 
sanctions in case of non-compliance. This brought about much criticism towards the effectiveness and 
legality of this instrument and lead to the development of guidelines towards more enforceable 
agreements. As this reduced the attractiveness for industry, this policy shift is questioned. Flanders is 
one of the few jurisdictions where a legislative framework was introduced and provides an illustrative 
case. The implications of the swing from gentlemen’s agreements to binding contracts were not limited 
to the legal status, but also affected the perspectives of the actors involved and the institutional context 
in which agreements are concluded and implemented. Whereas at first the policy shift resulted in a 
deadlock, the second-generation agreements now seem to deliver the improvements hoped for. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The emergence of negotiated environmental agreements was welcomed with enthusiasm by policy-
makers, industry and academics. Supplementing regulatory measures by other policy instruments, such 
as agreements with industry, was one of the key objectives of the European Commission’s Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme of 1992. Agreements were thought to promote a pro-active attitude 
on the part of industry, to provide cost-effective, tailor-made solutions and allow for a quicker and 
smoother achievement of environmental objectives. However, evaluation studies could not really 
demonstrate significant environmental improvements and the atmosphere gradually deteriorated (e.g. 
EEA 1997; ELNI 1998; OECD 1999 and 2003). Environmental organisations criticised negotiated 
agreements as non-transparent, closed-door arrangements neglecting third party interests (e.g. EEB 
1997; WWF 2000). Accordingly, a number of researchers concluded that instruments based on 
voluntarism were only capable of picking the low-hanging fruits (e.g. Khanna and Damon 1999; 
Alberini and Segerson 2002). Lyon and Maxwell (2003) even claim the mere existence of voluntary 
approaches might create welfare losses as they reduce the probability of better instruments being 
implemented.  
                                                 
1 Centre for Environmental Economics and Environmental Management, Ghent University. 
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Introducing a background legislative threat and strengthening the design of negotiated agreements are 
recurring policy recommendations (EC 1996b; OECD 1999; De Clercq 2002). In contrast to the latter, 
the legislative threat option has received much attention in the literature (Segerson and Miceli 1998 
and 1999; Hansen 1999; Maxwell et al. 2000). These papers study the welfare effects of negotiated 
agreements compared to regulatory instruments. Typically, this literature abstracts from design-issues, 
focuses on the target-level of an agreement and assumes full compliance. Empirical research however 
has show that non-compliance is rather widespread and partly attributed to design issues (e.g. EEA 
1997; OECD 1999; De Clercq 2002). The first generation of negotiated agreements were characterised 
as non-binding, gentlemen’s agreements (ELNI 1998). Such agreements do not provide for sanctions 
in case of non-compliance but only consist of a moral obligation on the actors to abide by their 
commitments. In addition they often contained only vague, non-quantified targets and lacked credible 
and efficient monitoring and reporting requirements (OECD 1999). 
 
In a communication on negotiated agreements, the European Commission (EC 1996b) called for a 
shift towards ‘second-generation’ agreements that are legally binding and contain clearly defined 
quantitative targets backed with transparent monitoring, reporting and enforcement mechanisms. This 
however requires that Member States develop a clear policy strategy and an institutional framework 
for the use of this instrument. In the beginning of the nineties, a number of countries like Denmark, 
Flanders2, The Netherlands and Portugal developed initiatives in this regard. The experiences of the 
shift towards more formal negotiated agreements in these countries is however questionable (Sauer et 
al. 2001). Any attempt to safeguard the effectiveness of environmental agreements reduces their 
attractiveness for industry. The most comprehensive legal framework on environmental agreements is 
developed in Flanders that, as such, provides an interesting case. We show that the framework caused 
a profound shift in the way agreements are used and enables to distinguish first-generation and 
second-generation agreements. 
 
The paper is organized into the following sections. Section two shortly resumes some prominent 
trends in the use of negotiated environmental agreements. The Belgian case is presented in section 
three. Section four compares the first and the second generation of environmental agreements in 
Belgium and section five concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Belgium is a federal state composed of three regions (Flanders, Brussels and the Walloon Region). During 
several state reforms competences were shifted from the federal level to the regions, that have become mainly 
competent for territory related matters (e.g. economy, housing, infrastructure, land use planning, environment). 
Flanders is the largest region with about 60% of total population and GDP. 
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2. Negotiated environmental agreements in environmental policy 
 
The first environmental agreements appeared already in the 1960s in Japan and the 1970s in Europe. 
In Japan, the first agreement was signed in 1964 between the city of Yokohama and the Electric 
Source Development Corporation, an electric power plant. The company committed to comply with 
pollution control measures that exceeded the rather lax national emission standards (Imura, 1998). In 
Japan, such agreements are typically concluded at the local level as a means to overcome the lack of 
regulatory powers of local authorities on environmental issues. Before the turning of the millennium, 
over 30,000 of these kinds of agreements have been signed in Japan (OECD 1999). In Europe, the first 
agreement was signed by the French Ministry of the Environment and the cement industry in 1971. 
The industry committed to achieve more stringent standards than those required by the 1961 law on air 
emissions. In return, the Ministry granted relief from sanctions to firms that were not in compliance 
with these standards (OECD 1999).  
 
There is neither a unique label nor definition of this policy instrument that has been called, amongst 
others, negotiated agreements, covenants, voluntary agreements, environmental agreements or 
industry commitments. Typically, they are concluded between public authorities and industry 
associations at national or regional level in which the public authority refrains from implementing 
certain legislation on the condition that industry achieves the environmental target agreed upon in the 
agreement. Whereas the input of the authorities may seem negligible, it is especially this consensus-
based involvement that distinguishes these agreements from other types of voluntary approaches such 
as unilateral commitments and public schemes (Glasbergen 1998). De Clercq et al. (2001a) point to 
the following typical characteristics of negotiated agreements in the European Union: (i) the support 
(i.e. to support or implement existing command-and-control regulation) or/and bridging function (i.e. 
to anticipate on upcoming environmental regulation); (ii) the collective liability of industry towards 
the fulfilment of the agreement and (iii) the legally non-binding status. Notwithstanding these general 
characteristics, the actual agreements differ largely with respect to the number of participants, liability 
rules, legal status etc. (OECD 1999).  
 
Figure 1 shows that binding agreements are rather exceptional in the European Union. The only 
member state where agreements are systematically binding is the Netherlands. Enforceability is 
achieved by means of an individual contract with each individual firm joining the agreement. This 
contract implies a firm’s liability in a civil court. Above, the pollution reduction targets set in the 
agreements are linked to the permit system. Each company has to draft an Environmental Plan 
consistent with the targets of the covenants. The permit authorities evaluate these plans and if these 
plans are repeatedly rejected, the company will be subject to stricter requirements (Glasbergen 1998). 
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 Figure 1: Share of legally binding agreements 
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An inventory made up by the European Commission in 1996 (EC 1996a) counted over 300 negotiated 
agreements in Europe. The total number however is higher as regional agreements are not taken in 
account and because the making of an inventory is difficult due to diverging definitions in the Member 
States and the informal character of many agreements. Although every member state had at least one 
agreement, this instrument was especially used in The Netherlands and Germany with each about 100 
agreements. The most prominent rise in the use of agreements was noted in the beginning of the 
nineties. In 1995 alone, nearly the same amount of agreements has been concluded compared to the 
time period from 1986 to 1990. Negotiated agreements were considered to fit seamlessly in the policy 
trend towards public deregulation, public-private co-operation and industry self-regulation as 
advocated by the fifth Environmental Action Programme of the European Union.  
 
Next to the rise in the amount of agreements concluded, a qualitative shift from ad hoc arrangements 
on isolated themes towards more structured negotiations supported by a broader policy strategy took 
place in the nineties. While the instrument at first was used without a formal institutional framework, 
several EU member states now have enacted regulations regarding voluntary agreements (Barth and 
Dette 2001). This shift was advocated as disappointing experiences from the past were attributed 
partly to the central role of industry in the target-setting process, the dubious legal status, the lack of 
quantified targets and the resulting lack of monitoring and enforcement possibilities (e.g. EC 1996b; 
EEA 1997; OECD 1999). Next to the limited effectiveness, the non-democratic character of the 
instrument was questioned, especially by non-governmental organisations (e.g. EEB 1997; WWF 
 207
Appendix – Research paper 3 
2000)3. Negotiated agreements were criticised due to the exclusion of third parties (including 
parliament) and the lack of transparency of the policy process. They claim targets should be set by 
Parliament based on consultation with interested parties and accessible to the public rather than 
negotiated behind closed-doors between government and industry representatives. 
 
In 1996 the European Commission issued a communication on negotiated agreements that sets 
guidelines for their effective use. Key elements are prior consultation with interested parties, a binding 
form, quantified and staged targets, the monitoring of results as well as the publication of the 
agreement and the results obtained. Some Member States took corresponding measures. Denmark 
(Article 10 of the Danish Environmental Protection Act of 1992) and Flanders (the Flemish Decree on 
Environmental Agreements of 1994) have codified basic rules; Portugal (Protocol for the Conclusion 
of Sectoral Voluntary Agreements of 1995) and The Netherlands (Codes of Conduct issued in 1996 
and adapted in 2003) have elaborated official recommendations without legal status (ELNI 1998). The 
outcome of the shift towards more formal negotiated agreements in these countries is however 
questionable (Sauer et al. 2001). The number of agreements concluded after the introduction of these 
regulations declined remarkably in Denmark and Flanders (ELNI 1998). The rather stringent 
requirements seem to have reduced the attractiveness of the instrument for industry. In the following 
we present the case of Flanders, which is illustrative as it is one of the few jurisdictions that has 
installed a legislative framework. Above it is probably the most encompassing framework developed 
and its implementation produced a significant swing in the use of this instrument.  
 
Two research projects on negotiated agreements in Belgium provided the authors with in depth 
information. The first “The use of voluntary instruments for the realisation of a sustainable 
development” was financed by the Federal Science Policy Office and carried out in the framework of 
the Scientific Support Plan for a Sustainable Development Policy (see De Clercq et al. 2001b). This 
project was carried out between 1997 and 2001 and evaluated all agreements concluded in Belgium 
and Flanders. The project ran parallel to the European NEAPOL project (Negotiated Environmental 
Agreements in Europe: Policy Lessons to be Learned from a Comparative Case Study Analysis; see 
De Clercq 2002) funded by the European Commission. The second “The implementation of the duty of 
acceptance in Flemish waste policy: the role of negotiated agreements” was financed by the Flemish 
Environmental Agency (VMM) in the framework of the MIRA-BE 2003 project (Report on Nature 
and the Environment: Policy Evaluation) (see De Clercq and Bracke 2005). Here we studied a group 
of waste management agreements that were concluded under the legislative framework. 
 
                                                 
3 The report on environmental agreements from the European Environmental Agency (EEA, 1997) provides an 
overview of the views of different stakeholders. 
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3.  Negotiated environmental agreements in Belgium 
 
Appendix A shows a list of all negotiated agreements concluded in Belgium. When going through the 
history of negotiated agreements in Belgium, three periods can be distinguished. First, between 1988 
and 1992 we get a period in which about a dozen agreements were concluded on an informal basis for 
some prominent environmental issues. Next, a legislative framework was developed and implemented 
in Flanders to create a solid ground for more effective agreements. However, due to the uncertainty 
resulting from this policy shift, only two agreements were signed in this period (1993–1997). In 1998 
the first agreement under the framework was signed and the use of the instrument has been picked up 
steadily from then. Up till now, 13 agreements have been signed in this third period (1998-2006). 
 
 
3.1.  The first period (1988-1992): agreements as ad hoc policies 
 
Rather than being the formal outcome of an encompassing policy strategy, negotiated agreements 
entered promptly in Belgium’s environmental policy. Subsequent state reforms in the eighties and 
nineties in which powers were shifted from the national to the regional level had resulted in a complex 
and even inconsistent environmental product policy. The lack of an elaborated juridical foundation for 
a national product policy, due to a poorly demarked division of authority on this issue, was one of the 
prime drivers to implement negotiated agreements as a pragmatic response (Flemish Council for the 
Environment and Nature (MiNa-Raad) 1992). Motivated policy makers had no choice but to resort to 
informal policy instruments.  
 
Against this background, the first agreement was signed in 1988 and their number increased fast. 
Within two years, five similar agreements (A1-A5) were concluded by the federal Ministry of the 
Environment: one agreement to reduce the mercury content in batteries, one agreement to bring 
phosphates-free washing powders on the market and three agreements to reduce the amount of CFCs 
in aerosols, cooling equipment and synthetics. The level of compliance with these agreements was 
high (three agreements were renewed within two years to sharpen the objectives), and the instrument 
was stretched to tackle other environmental issues. At the federal level two additional agreements 
were signed: one concerning the export of pesticides (A9) and one to reduce SO2 and NOX emissions 
from power plants (A10). The Flemish government followed suit and concluded two agreements 
concerning packaging waste (A6 and A7), an agreement with the chemical company BASF (A8) and 
an agreement concerning the storage of oil for the heating of houses (A12). Above one agreement was 
concluded jointly with the Brussels and Walloon Region to recycle aluminium waste (A11). As such, 
within just a few years time, the environmental policy was supplemented by about a dozen agreements 
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that varied with respect to the environmental target as well as with respect to the representative 
government authority. The agreement concerning the use mercury in primary batteries is described in 
the box below as an example of an agreement from this period. 
 
Example 1: Code of conduct to reduce the amount of mercury in primary batteries on the Belgian 
market (A1) 
This agreement was the first in Belgium and was called a code of conduct. In the introductory 
stipulations, the parties recognise the aim to reduce the use of heavy metals, among which mercury, by 
measures that are technically and economically feasible. Next, they point to the fact that a regulation 
from the European Community might take some time and refer to the decision of the European 
association of primary batteries producers (Europile) on this issue.  
The industry agrees to bring down the amount of mercury in alkaline batteries from 1% to 0.3% in 
1988 and from 0.3% to 0.15% in 1990 (Art. 1). Above they commit themselves to continue research to 
further reduce the mercury-content after 1990 (Art. 2). If asked, industry will report on the progress of 
these commitments to the government (Art. 3). Next, industry will advance the replacement of 
mercuric oxide batteries by other systems under the condition that it is technologically feasible (Art. 
4). If one of the parties feels that the fulfilment of the agreement is unsatisfactory, consultations will be 
organised (Art. 5).   
 
With respect to compliance, most agreements were evaluated rather positive (Bocket et al. 1994; De 
Clercq et al. 2001b). It should however be noted that in a number of cases (A1, A2, A5, A8 and A10) 
the targets were achieved surprisingly fast and considerably before the time limit set in the 
agreements. This might point to a limited level of ambition. De Clercq et al. (2001b) conclude that for 
these agreements the environmental impact above business-as-usual is hard to determine. Especially 
with respect to the five product-standard agreements one can question the agreements’ contribution. 
These agreements were concluded on issues that were on the policy agenda at European or 
international level (e.g. the protocol of Montreal on CFCs, mercury in batteries at the European level). 
By concluding a negotiated agreement, the government wanted to present a quick response to these 
upcoming challenges and were able to conclude agreements that exceeded the international 
compromise (MiNa-Raad 1992). The extent to which the Belgian government can influence European, 
or even internationally organised, industries on these issues seems however limited. Products like 
batteries and aerosols are rather produced for the world market and not for the Belgian market. The 
Belgian market represents only a fraction of their total turnover. It is hard to imagine that an informal 
agreement with Belgian policy makers will change the international-oriented product design of 
multinational companies with production plants all over the world. Above, similar agreements had 
been signed in neighbouring countries like the Netherlands and Germany. Concerning the Dutch 
battery agreement, Klok (1989) states that the agreement did not imply any change of conduct on the 
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part of the industry as the technology already existed and as in fact the objectives were already agreed 
within the European batteries producers association Europile.  
 
Other agreements (A6, A7, A11 and A12) were rather examples of non-compliance. This is explained, 
amongst others, by the lack of concrete action-programmes and enforcement mechanisms in the 
agreements and uncertainties due to changing regulatory circumstances in the policy arena (Seyad et 
al. 1996).  
 
Next to the limited environmental impact or even partial non-compliance, questions were raised about 
the opportunity of negotiated agreements as policy instrument. The Flemish Social and Economic 
Council (SERV) (1997) points to the following three elements. First is the lack of democratic control. 
The executive power is able to by-pass parliamentary control and to neglect third party interests. 
Especially agreements with a single company (A8) in which concessions about the level of future 
environmental taxes were made, was severely criticised (MiNa-Raad 1992). To some extend 
transparency and public consultation might overcome this issue, but this is hardly organised. It is 
mainly by the media and notifications of debates in competent parliamentary commissions that the 
essential content of these agreements is known (Van Oevelen 1991). In contrast to traditional 
regulation, there is no official system of publication for negotiated agreements and several agreements 
never appeared in any official publication. The second critique concerns the lack of enforceability due 
to the dubious legal character and the lack of sanctions. Based on an inquiry with representatives from 
business associations and regulators, Bocken et al. (1994) confirm the uncertainty about the juridical 
binding character of these agreements. Several times it turned out that different representatives from 
industry, even with regard to the same agreement, gave a different answer concerning the juridical 
binding character. One business association catalogues the agreement as a gentlemen’s agreement 
whereas another calls the agreement binding. Van Oevelen (1991) states that due to the practically 
total lack of adequate control and enforcement arrangements, the sanctions in case of non-compliance 
are rather of psychological (e.g. loss of reputation, negative press) than of juridical nature. Third, the 
lack of monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the agreements is contested.  
 
Notwithstanding the enthusiasm of the former federal Environmental Minster M. Smet (Smet 1991) it 
was acknowledged that in the absence of a legal framework, environmental agreements are prone to a 
number of faults, both at the policy level and in legal terms (Bocken et al. 1994). Above the Mina-
Raad (1992) states there appears to be limited reflection and insight on the opportunity of negotiated 
agreements within the government departments involved. However, most observers believe a juridical 
framework that stipulates some instructions and limiting conditions can counter most disadvantages. 
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3.2.  The second period (1993-1997): introducing a legislative framework 
 
After the fourth stage of the state reform in 1993, most environmental competences had been 
transferred to the regional level. As such it was the Flemish parliament that took the initiative to 
develop a legislative framework for negotiated agreements. With the Decree of 15 June 1994 on 
environmental policy agreements, the regional legislator sought to solve a number of legal problems 
and to create a solid ground for the appropriate use of agreements in the future. The Decree is based on 
preparatory work carried out by the Interuniversity Commission for the Revision of Environmental 
Law in the Flemish Region (Bocken and Ryckborst 1996).  
 
We will present the main elements of the Decree below, a more extensive analysis can be found in 
Lavrysen (2000). Agreements are called environmental policy agreements and defined as “any 
agreement between the Flemish Region, represented by the Flemish Government, on the one hand, 
and one or several umbrella organisations representing enterprises on the other, for the purpose of 
preventing environmental pollution, limiting or removing the consequences thereof, or of promoting 
effective conservation of the environment”. Industry associations need to have legal status and must 
prove to be representative for a sector or a group of companies confronted with a common 
environmental problem. Above they should carry an explicit mandate from their members to conclude 
such agreements. Environmental agreements cannot replace existing legislations nor depart from them 
in lenient way. The agreements are binding on the parties.  
 
A summary of the draft agreement has to be published in the Belgian Official Journal and the 
complete draft must be available for inspection during 30 days. Any person can submit objections in 
writing to the designated authority that, after an assessment by the authority, will be communicated to 
the other party. The draft is also communicated to public bodies (the Flemish Social and Economic 
Council (SERV) and the Flemish Council for the Environment and Nature (MiNa-Raad)). These 
bodies are obliged to issue a well-reasoned, non-binding opinion within 30 days after receipt. Finally, 
the draft and all above-mentioned opinions are sent to the President of the Flemish Parliament that has 
the right to veto an agreement within 45 days. Otherwise the agreement will be concluded and 
published in the Belgian Official Journal. If the agreement is concluded despite a negative opinion of 
the SERV and/or MiNa-Raad, the Flemish Region must, in a report to be attached to the published 
version of the agreement, justify its decision to conclude the agreement. The agreement becomes 
effective ten days after publication in the Belgian Official Journal.  
 
During the period of validity of the environmental agreement, the Flemish Region cannot issue any 
regulation in connection with subjects dealt with by the agreement, with reservation for cases of 
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urgency or obligations imposed by EU or international law. The Flemish Region can convert an 
agreement, wholly or partially, into regulations even during the period of validity. This power is 
intended to secure equal treatment of non-affiliated enterprises. An agreement must lay down 
procedures for verification of compliance with its stipulations. The parties ought to report annually on 
the progress of the agreement to the Flemish Parliament. If within 45 days after receipt of the report, 
the Flemish Parliament objects to the environmental agreement by resolution or by a well-reasoned 
motion, the Region will terminate the agreement. In case of non-compliance, each party has the right 
to demand the compulsory performance in kind or by equivalent. An agreement is concluded for a 
specified period that may not exceed five years and cannot be extended tacitly. The agreement 
terminates either by common agreement between the parties, by the expiry of the period or by 
cancellation.  
 
Whereas the legislative framework was installed to stimulate the use of this instrument, the opposite 
was the case in the first years after it came into force. The juridical framework was harshly criticised 
for hindering the realisation of environmental agreements (SERV, 1997). It took four years until the 
first agreement (C1) was concluded under this framework. Above, between 1994 and 1997, two 
agreements (B1 and B2) were signed outside this framework4 on the explicit request of the industry 
associations (De Clercq et al. 2001b). The legislative framework however also entails some 
advantages for industry. There is the guarantee that the government will not issue new regulations. 
This creates a stable climate to plan long-term investments and strategies. The government gets more 
instruments to control free-riders and industry’s public image might profit from larger public 
recognition due to increased involvement of third parties and transparency. The disadvantages 
however seemed to outweigh and the initial enthusiasm that industry had displayed quickly faded as 
soon as it turned out that they were expected to enter into legally binding and enforceable agreements. 
Above, the fairly complicated procedure and the observation that few business federations were 
empowered under their by-laws to negotiate environmental agreement on behalf of their members had 
an inhibiting effect (Lavrysen 2000).  
 
The Flemish government on the other hand advocated the use of negotiated agreements in a number of 
policy letters and policy plans issued in the mid-nineties, especially for some waste management 
objectives (SERV 1997). Preparatory negotiations however proved that industry was reluctant to go 
along with the shift towards more stringent agreements (SERV 1997). In a way the equilibrium was 
disturbed. In the first period, agreements could be reached quite easily against a rather vague 
background legislative pressure, as they were only voluntary commitments on expected trends. Above, 
in a worst-case scenario, non-compliance with the agreement seemed to have limited (i.e. non-
                                                 
4 Both were later replaced by similar agreements under the decree on environmental agreements. 
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juridical) consequences. The stringent juridical character introduced by the Decree however sharply 
changed industry’s perception on the non-compliance cost. Consequently, a more thorough legislative 
threat was needed to convince industry to enter into the agreements that government representatives 
had in mind (Wille 2000). This was solved by the introduction of the duty of acceptance in the 
Flemish waste policy that marks the start of the third period. 
 
 
3.3.  The third period (1998-2006): agreements as institutional arrangements 
 
The duty of acceptance obliges producers to take back products they have put on the market at the end 
of their life cycle. From 1998 on, certain waste streams (e.g. tyres, batteries, accumulators, cars, 
electronic equipment…) became subject to this regulation. Next to the general principle, the regulation 
includes specified collection and recycling targets for different waste fractions. Negotiated agreements 
with industry associations are to be concluded to implement this duty. If no agreement is reached, each 
company has to draw up a waste management plan in which is describes how to comply with the duty 
of acceptance. The same holds for companies that prefer not to participate with the agreement. The 
negotiations concern only the practical organisation of the collection and waste treatment system, not 
the environmental targets to be achieved (De Clercq and Bracke 2005). Until mid-2006, 10 agreements 
have been concluded in this regard: batteries, paper, cars, tyres, electric and electronic appliances, 
accumulators, medicines, frying oils and fats and photographic chemicals. Additionally, two 
agreements from the first period have been renewed: the agreement on oil storage tanks for heating 
buildings (C6) and the agreement on NOX and SO2 emissions from power stations (C11). Besides an 
agreement to introduce an environmental management system for soil sanitation was concluded (C10). 
As such, the spectrum is almost exclusively limited to waste management objectives because a 
legislative treat instrument is at hand. 
 
Whereas these numbers might give the opposite impression, the take-off phase was difficult. The first 
agreements that were negotiated were both agreements on waste paper (C2 and C3). The negotiations 
took many years and both the SERV and the MiNa-raad negatively advised on the draft agreements, 
which were however concluded without many corrections anyway. Above, environmental 
organisations and municipalities criticised the agreements and their results (De Clercq and Bracke 
2005). A lot was however learned from these first experiences and as more agreements on the 
acceptance duty were negotiated and concluded, the implementation process became somewhat 
smoother. At first, industries’ primer goal was to prevent or at least bring down the implementation of 
the duty. However, as more and more products are submitted, the acceptance of industry associations 
enhances and a more positive stance is taken. The prime objective has become the development of a 
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manageable collection and recycling network (De Clercq and Bracke 2005). In 2004, a reference 
document on negotiated agreements has been developed by the Public Waste Agency of Flanders 
(OVAM) together with representatives form the other regions, the municipalities, the SERV, the 
MiNa-raad, business federations, and diverse actors form the recycling and waste treatment industry 
(OVAM 2004). The document serves as the standard reference against which every future agreement 
should be checked and as a manual during the negotiations. This should further smoothen the 
implementation of future agreements with respect to the duty of acceptance. 
 
Except for the agreements on waste paper, the agreements are evaluated rather positive. This is 
confirmed by an evaluation study of the agreements C2-C6 (De Clercq and Bracke 2005), in the 
advices of the SERV and the MiNa-raad and the annual evaluations in the Flemish parliament. 
Subsequently, two agreements have been renewed (C4 and C5), some are being revised (C2, C3 and 
C7) and new agreements on other waste products are being negotiated. The following box presents a 
typical example of an agreement from this group. 
 
Example 2: Agreement concerning waste electric and electronic appliances (WEEA) (B6) 
This agreement is one of ten agreements concluded so far to implement the duty of acceptance as 
stipulated in the Flemish waste policy. Although the agreement was only concluded the 1st of June 
2001, the first explorative consultations were already held in 1995. The lack of a legal framework for 
getting all involved actors aboard resulted in a deadlock that was resolved by the introduction of the 
duty of acceptance for WEEA that took off on the 1st of July 1999.  Based on a report of 1999 from the 
study-group BELELEC with representatives of the industry, the distribution sector and the 
government, negotiations were resumed and finally resulted into this agreement that is signed by 
eleven industry associations as well as the association of reuse centres. The problematic negotiation 
process induced a policy of tolerance that lasted for about two years.  
As the recycling and recovery targets with regard to WEEA are lead down in the Flemish waste 
regulation, the agreement’s goal is to develop a collection and recycling network. The primary 
objective is to establish organisational structures and working processes. Therefore Recupel was set up 
as a not-for-profit organisation by the sector. Recupel collects the fees from all producers, selects and 
controls the partners responsible for the collection and recovery of WEEA and reports to the 
government on the agreement. Recupel already employs about 30 employees and market research 
points out that 86% of the Belgian consumers know the Recupel contribution that is to be paid on all 
EEA. In general the agreement is responsible for a significant shift in the way WEEA is handled and is 
evaluated quite positive. As well the sector as the government like to present the Recupel case as a 
forerunner to other European member states and for other waste streams.  (www.recupel.be) 
 
The two agreements described present a nice example of the difference in use of negotiated 
agreements in both periods. Whereas the first agreement is merely an industry engagement that is used 
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as an ad-hoc intermediate policy instrument which lasted less then three years, the second agreement 
groups producers, importers, distributors, retailers, electricians and reuse centres resulting in an 
institutional setting that is able to address a complex environmental issue for years to come. 
 
 
4.  First versus second-generation agreements in Belgium 
 
The previous section revealed the shift in the use of negotiated agreements in Belgium due to the 
introduction of the Decree on environmental policy agreements in 1994. The first group was used as 
ad hoc policy arrangements containing a number of weaknesses in their design (SERV, 1997). The 
second generation of agreements on the other hand were embedded in a clear policy strategy and 
concluded in a legal framework making them look like formal contracts instead of non-binding 
industrial commitments. Table 2 sums up some of the key differences between the characteristics of 
the agreements from the first period and the third period. Given the inherent diversity between 
negotiated agreements, the statements in table 2 rather hold for each group in general than being 
perfectly valid for each individual agreement. 
 
 Table 2: Key differences between agreements from the first and third period 
 First period Third period 
Average length 
Negotiation time 
Legislative pressure 
Function 
Environmental theme 
Environmental objective 
 
Government representative 
Execution of the agreement 
Follow-up policy 
 
Enforceability  
4.7 pages 
Some months/years 
Vague/up-coming 
Bridging to regulation 
Diverse 
Speed up or assure business as 
usual trends 
Ministry of the Environment 
By the individual members 
Limited reporting  
 
Sanctions especially of 
psychological nature 
8.7 pages 
Several years 
Existing legislation 
Implementing legislation 
Waste management 
Shift financial and organizational 
responsibility 
Public Waste Agency 
Collective organisation is set up  
Annual report and discussion in 
the Flemish Parliament 
Compulsory execution in kind or 
by equivalent is possible 
 
First, the more formal approach emerges from the average length of the agreements. The first group of 
agreements counts on average 4.7 pages whereas the second group has on average 8.7 pages. As the 
first group of agreements was not officially published in the Belgian Official Journal, a bias in this 
measure is inherent as the front and spacing vary within the first group and between the first and the 
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second group. If one would take this in account and measure the average amount of words, the 
difference would be even more pronounced. The more formal approach also appears when one looks 
at the negotiation time. Again the negotiation time is not formally recorded for each agreement, but 
some indications are made in various sources (e.g. MiNa-raad 1992; SERV 1997; De Clercq et al 
2001b; De Clercq and Bracke 2005). In the first group there are examples of agreements that were 
negotiated within just a few months (e.g. A2, A4, A5, A8, A9) as well as agreements were the 
negotiation phase took much longer (e.g. A6, A7, A11). With some exceptions for agreements that 
were a revised version of previous agreements (e.g. C1, C9), most second-generation agreements 
knew a long-lasting negotiation phase. For some agreements the first explorative contacts already date 
before the mid-nineties resulting in a negotiation time of up to five years or more (e.g. C4, C5, C7).  
 
A third difference is the existence of a strong legislative pressure for the agreements from the third 
period. In the first period the treat was rather the fact that an environmental theme was on the policy 
agenda. The agreements on mercury, CFCs and phosphates served as a resort in cases where 
implementing regulation was hampered due to the lack of an elaborated juridical foundation for a 
national product policy. Most agreements of the third period were concluded in the wake of the 
regulation on duty of acceptance, which was introduced in the Flemish waste policy. The agreements 
are established with the sole goal to implement and execute the legal duty of acceptance. This also 
contrasts with the first group whose function was rather to serve as a short-term solution in attending 
future regulation. As a result the environmental theme for almost all second-generation agreements is 
limited to waste management whereas in the first group it was a more heterogeneous mixture of 
product and process objectives. When there is no back-up legislation, industry is no longer willing to 
enter into the second-generation agreements. Related, the environmental objective changed. The first 
agreements, especially the product-standards agreements, aimed to speed up or at least assure 
business-as-usual progress. The waste management agreements on the other hand induced a system 
innovation. Whereas the collection and treatment of these waste fractions used to be a public task, as 
well the financial as the organizational responsibility is shifted to the producers and importers.  
 
The actor who takes on the function as government representative is another important difference. For 
the first group the Ministry of the Environment at federal or regional played an important role in 
negotiating and following-up the agreements. Consequently, the stance of the Minister largely 
determined how and whether the instrument was used. Within the second group this task is shifted 
almost completely to an executive public agency (OVAM). As such, the agreements are, to some 
extend, decoupled from the turbulent political scenery, and get embedded in institutions that have a 
close and long-term connection with the industrial target groups.  
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For most agreements in the second group the industry associations have set up a not-for-profit 
organisation for the execution of the agreement. This organisation is the centre of a network of 
involved actors such as producers, distributors, retailers, government representatives, waste collectors, 
recyclers and reuse centres. As such an individual duty (acceptance) is collectively implemented. For 
the agreements of the first group, the individual companies had to implement measures to achieve the 
environmental target. This gives rise to liability problems in case of non-compliance by only a number 
of participating companies. With regard to the follow-up policy, we already indicated that in the first 
period there we only limited reporting requirements whereas for agreements from the third period an 
extensive report is required for the annual evaluation in the Flemish Parliament. Above, the not-for-
profit organisations report on the results of the agreements in their annual reports and on their 
websites. Finally, the enforceability of the most recent agreements is higher as the legislative 
framework explicitly provides the opportunity to claim the execution in kind or by equivalent in case 
of non-compliance. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
When the first negotiated agreements emerged in the policy arena, they were characterised as non-
binding agreements. Moreover, most agreements had only vague targets, little provisions concerning 
monitoring and control and hardly any sanctions in case of non-compliance. This has given way to 
much criticism towards the effectiveness and legality of this instrument. In time, the European 
Commission and several EU member states have enacted guidelines or regulations, resulting in a more 
formal approach towards negotiated agreements. The most comprehensive legal framework has been 
implemented in Flanders with the Decree on environmental policy agreements of 1994. 
 
The paper showed how the introduction of the legal framework caused a shift in the way agreements 
were used. The agreements concluded before were characterised as pragmatic, ad hoc political 
arrangements with short-term objectives on issues for which regulation was hampered due to badly 
designed regulatory powers. Above, the agreements showed a number of deficiencies in terms of 
design and juridical nature, making them prone to the label of gentlemen’s agreement. The Decree of 
1994 marks a turning point. At first it was criticised as being to stringent and formalistic, jeopardising 
the attractiveness of this voluntary instrument. Whereas it took several years before the first agreement 
under this framework was concluded, by the year 2000 the negotiated agreements are becoming 
pivotal instruments in the Flemish waste policy. The agreements are an essential part of a clear policy 
strategy and backed by existing legislation. With regard to the agreements as a document, the 
legislative framework has turned them from non-binding industrial commitments to formal contracts.  
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The Flemish case points to the delicate balance policy makers have to take in account. Negotiated 
agreements might be attractive policy instruments due to their informal and flexible nature. However, 
these characteristics seem to limit their environmental effectiveness due to free riders, non-compliance 
and business as usual targets. Any attempt to establish safeguards de facto complexities these 
arrangements, brings them closer to traditional regulatory solutions and makes them less appealing for 
industry. Finding a right balance between environmental effectiveness and attracting industry’s 
involvement is not an easy task for policy makers.  
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Appendix A: Negotiated environmental agreements in Belgium (until September 2006) 
 
 Agreement Year Pages 
A1 Gedragscode tot het verminderen van de hoeveelheid kwik in primaire 
batterijen die in België op de markt worden gebracht 
Agreement to reduce the amount of mercury in batteries 
1988 
(1990) 
 
4 
 
 
A2 Overeenkomst betreffende het gebruik van CFK’s als drijfgas in aërosolen 
Agreement concerning the use of CFCs as propellant in aerosols 
1988 
(1989) 
3 
 
A3 Overeenkomst tussen de Belgische Staat en de Belgische Vereniging van 
verwerkers van oliën en vetten voor technische doeleinden 
Agreement to reduce the amount of phosphates in washing-powders 
1988 3 
A4 Overeenkomst tussen de Belgische Staat en de Belgische Unie voor 
koeltechniek en luchtconditionering 
Agreement to reduce the use of CFCs in cooling equipment 
1989 3 
A5 Overeenkomst tussen de Belgische Staat en Fechiplast 
Agreement to reduce the use of CFCs with the synthetic industry 
1989 
(1991) 
3 
 
A6 Basisovereenkomst verpakkingsafval 
Basic agreement concerning packaging waste 
1990 8 
A7 Convenant verpakkingsafval 
Covenant concerning packaging waste 
1991 9 
A8 Overeenkomst met de BASF Antwerpen n.v. inzake de beperking en 
voorkoming van milieuverontreiniging aan de bron 
Agreement with BASF to reduce and prevent environmental pollution at the 
source 
1991 4 
A9 Overeenkomst betreffende de export van pesticiden onderworpen aan de PIC 
(Prior Informed Consent) procedure 
Agreement concerning the export of pesticides subject to the PIC procedure 
1991 4 
A10 Overeenkomst betreffende emissiereducties van SO2 en NOX afkomstig van 
electriciteitsproductie-installaties 
Agreement to reduce  SO2 and NOX emissions from power stations 
1991 8 
A11 Protocolakkoord tussen het Waalse Gewest, het Brusselse Gewest, het Vlaamse 
Gewest en de Belgian Aluminium Association 
Agreement to recycle aluminium waste 
1991 3 
A12 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst met de bedrijfssector inzake de opslag van 
huishoudbrandolie bij particuliere verbruikers voor de verwarming van 
gebouwen 
Agreement concerning the storage of oil for the heating of private  houses  
 
 
1992 
 
4 
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B1 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de selectieve inzameling van oude en 
vervallen geneesmiddelen 
Agreement concerning the waste medicines 
1994 
(1996) 
 
n.a. 
B2 Protocolovereenkomst betreffende de selectieve inzameling en verwerking van 
gebruikte batterijen 
Agreement concerning waste batteries 
1997 
 
n.a. 
C1 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de selectieve inzameling van oude en 
vervallen geneesmiddelen 
Agreement concerning the waste medicines 
1998 8 
C2 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de uitvoering van de VLAREA-
aanvaardingsplicht drukwerkafvalstoffen (periodieke pers) 
Agreement concerning waste paper (periodic press) 
1998 4 
C3 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de uitvoering van de VLAREA-
aanvaardingsplicht drukwerkafvalstoffen (reclamedrukwerk) 
Agreement concerning waste paper (advertising sector) 
1998  4 
C4 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de uitvoering van de VLAREA-
aanvaardingsplicht afgedankte voertuigen 
Agreement concerning waste cars 
1999 
(2005) 
12 
C5 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de uitvoering van de VLAREA-
aanvaardingsplicht afvalbanden 
Agreement concerning waste tyres 
1999 
(2003) 
11 
C6 Miliebeleidsovereenkoms betreffende gasolietanks voor de verwarming van 
gebouwen 
Agreement concerning oil storage tanks for heating buildings 
2000 7 
C7 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de uitvoering van de VLAREA-
aanvaardingsplicht afgedankte elektrische en elektronische apparatuur 
Agreement concerning waste electric and electronic appliances 
2001 16 
C8 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de uitvoering van de VLAREA-
aanvaardingsplicht afvalloodstartbatterijen 
Agreement concerning waste accumulators 
2003 11 
C9 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de uitvoering van de VLAREA-
aanvaardingsplicht afvalbatterijen 
Agreement concerning waste batteries 
2003 11 
C10 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de invoering van een 
milieuzorgsysteem in het kader van bodemsaneringswerken 
Agreement concerning environmental management systems for soil sanitation 
2004 10 
C11 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de vermindering van de SO2- en NOX-
emissies afkomstig van installaties van elektriciteitsproducenten 
Agreement to reduce  SO2 and NOX emissions from power stations 
2004 4 
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C12 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de uitvoering van de VLAREA-
aanvaardingsplicht van afvalfotochemicaliën 
Agreement concerning waste photographic chemicals 
2004 9 
C13 Milieubeleidsovereenkomst betreffende de uitvoering van de VLAREA-
aanvaardingsplicht voor gebruikte eetbare oliën en vetten die voor het frituren 
an voedingsmiddelen gebruikt kunnen worden 
Agreement concerning frying oils and fats 
2006 7 
Source: A1-A12: Bocken et al. (1994) ; B1-B2: De Clercq et al. (2001); C1-13 Belgian Official Journal  
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On the assessment of environmental voluntary agreements in Europe: 
Lessons to be learned from a comparative case study analysis1,2 
 
 
Marc De Clercq3 - Roeland Bracke 
 
Abstract. The aim of this study is to gain insight on the factors leading to success or failure of 
environmental voluntary agreements. To do this we relied on a comparative case study covering twelve 
voluntary agreements from six different European countries. First, a general evaluation framework for 
assessing the performance of environmental voluntary agreements is presented. This framework takes 
into account three different evaluation dimensions: application, impact and resource development. 
Second, we focus on the factors explaining the level of performance. Four external preconditions for 
success were identified: the general policy style, the readiness to use severe alternative instruments in 
case of non-compliance with the agreement, the potential of the sector to negotiate and act as one 
collective actor and the potential for market success triggered of by the implementation of the 
agreement. Next to these external factors related to the institutional-economic context wherein a 
negotiated agreement is used, the specification of an agreement is considered to be an internal factor 
influencing the performance. The comparative case study shows that taken individually each of the 
factors is not as such a necessary condition for the success of an environmental voluntary agreement. 
Rather it is the combination of these success factors that is ultimately decisive for the performance of 
an agreement. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Interest in the use of voluntary approaches as an alternative to regulatory and economic instruments 
has grown rapidly in the European Union since the publication of the Fifth Environmental Action 
Programme in 1992, which advocated broadening the range of environmental policy instruments. 
Within the broad range of voluntary approaches, particular attention has focused on the use of 
environmental voluntary agreements. In 1996 the Commission produced a Communication on the use 
of such agreements, which included a number of general guidelines that were intended to ensure their 
effectiveness, credibility and transparency. Despite the enthusiasm expressed for this new policy 
                                                 
1 This paper is published in The Handbook of Environmental Voluntary Agreements, 2005, E. Croci (Ed.), 239-
260 
2 This paper is part of a broader research exercise under the NEAPOL (Negotiated Environmental Agreements: 
Policy Lessons to be Learned from a Comparative Case Study Analysis). NEAPOL is financed by the European 
Commission – DG XII, and is part of the EC Environment and Climate Research Programme (1994-1998) – 
Research Theme 4: Human Dimensions of Environmental Change (project number ENV4-CT97-0560). 
3 Centre for Environmental Economics and Environmental Management, Ghent University 
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instrument, little attention has been paid to the evaluation of environmental voluntary agreements, 
either in terms of developing a coherent evaluation framework, or in terms of performing ex post 
analysis of actual agreements. 
 
In 1999, the OECD made an overview of available information on the assessment of voluntary 
approaches. It states that the evaluation of voluntary approaches, and particularly of environmental 
voluntary agreements, is hindered by the newness of the approaches and by the fact that practitioners 
created them. The latter affects the availability of theoretical analysis on their performances, the 
former constraints empirical investigation. 
 
Nevertheless, the existing literature on the evaluation of environmental voluntary agreements can be 
divided into two groups. First of all, some authors focus on the development of a theoretical evaluation 
framework that allows identifying factors that influence the performance of voluntary agreements (see 
for example EEA 1997; Segerson and Miceli 1998; OECD 1999; Burritt 2002a and Cabugueira 2002). 
The common feature and also the merits of these works are that they indicate a number of aspects that 
must be taken into account when assessing the performance of environmental voluntary agreements. 
On the other hand there exists a rather limited number of ex post case studies on the assessment of one 
or a few agreements (see for example Klok 1989; Storey et al. 1997; Lehmenn 2000; Immerzeel-Brand 
2002 and Burritt 2002b). Only Klok (1989), who discusses eight voluntary agreements in the 
Netherlands, and Storey et al. (1997), who analyse five agreements to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, have taken up the challenge to assess in a systematic way the performance of a selected 
sample of environmental voluntary agreements. Although the aim was a systematic evaluation, a great 
part of their analysis sticks to the descriptive phase. Elements defined important for the performance 
of environmental voluntary agreements are discussed for each agreement individually, but an in dept 
comparison of the different cases is lacking. Storey et al. (1997, p.19) conclude that ‘there is a lack of 
clear and established methodologies for evaluating the performance of environmental voluntary 
agreements’.  
 
This paper is the result of the European Commission sponsored NEAPOL project, which stands for 
‘Negotiated Environmental Agreements: Policy Lessons to be Learned from a Comparative Case 
Study’. Negotiated agreements were defined in this research project as: ‘agreements between public 
(national, federal or regional) authorities and industry, wherein both parties commit themselves to 
realise the environmental goals stated in the negotiated agreement’. The aim of the project was to 
introduce a general evaluation framework that tries to answer the following research question: Which 
specific characteristics of environmental voluntary agreements and which factors within the 
institutional-economic context within which an agreement is used, influence the performance of 
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environmental voluntary agreements? This knowledge can be very useful to policy makers in two 
different stages of the policy cycle. First, in the phase of the instrument choice, an assessment of the 
appropriateness of the institutional-economic context could be very helpful when deciding whether to 
use an agreement or an alternative policy instrument, like a regulation or a tax. Secondly, when an 
environmental voluntary agreement is preferred, insight in the specific characteristics of voluntary 
agreements can enhance the effectiveness when implementing the agreement.  
 
In order to reach relevant policy recommendations, we relied on a comparative case study analysis 
covering twelve environmental voluntary agreements from six different European countries. The 
analysis consists of three well-defined stages. First a general framework for assessing the performance 
is developed which can be applied to a broad range of environmental voluntary agreements. The 
aggregated performance measure is defined as a mixture of the degree of application, the 
environmental and economic impact and the development of the policy resource base. 
 
Next, five factors influencing the performance of an environmental voluntary agreement were 
identified: the specification of the agreement, the general policy style, the regulatory threat, the sector 
structure and the competitive structure. The first one is related to the agreement itself, whereas the 
other four are related to the institutional-economic context wherein the agreement is negotiated and 
applied. 
 
Finally, a comparative analysis of twelve agreements in six European countries was carried out. The 
individual case studies are compared with respect to their performance and with respect to the 
specification and the institutional-economic context. This stage allowed us to test the importance of 
the factors assumed to influence the performance. Once this was done, an evaluation was made and 
policy conclusions were drawn. The analysis distinguishes itself from previous work by the systematic 
evaluation method allowing a comparative analysis of the cases. Moreover, the broadness of the 
sample, although still limited looked upon from a positive research methodological point of view, is 
remarkable. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Next, section two presents the measure of performance used to 
evaluate the selected environmental voluntary agreements. The factors we believe to influence this 
performance are discussed in the following section. Finally, section four presents the comparative case 
study analysis from which conclusions and policy recommendations were drawn. 
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2.  The performance of environmental voluntary agreements 
 
In this section a general evaluation framework for assessing the performance of voluntary agreements 
is presented. This framework has two important characteristics. First, it can be applied to a broad 
range of environmental voluntary agreements irrespective of the parties involved or the environmental 
problem targeted. Second, the evaluation framework assigns a specific performance score to each 
agreement. Although it is not the aim to make a decisive report of the cases studied by means of one 
score, this allows ranking of the agreements according to their performance which will be very helpful 
for the comparative analysis in section four. The framework takes into account three different 
evaluation dimensions: application, impact and resource development. These dimensions are explained 
below. This section ends with a discussion of the presented performance measure. 
 
 
2.1. Application 
 
The application of the agreement refers to the compliance of the parties with respect to the targets and 
obligations specified in the agreement. An agreement is considered successful when on the one hand 
the environmental targets defined in the agreement are reached and on the other hand when all 
individual obligations of the parties are fulfilled. A distinction between the ‘targets’ and the 
‘obligations’ should be made: a good performance on the environmental targets defined in the 
agreement can influence the environment, while the performance on the other obligations (such as 
reporting, monitoring,) can for example, influence the cost-effectiveness and the policy resource base, 
and not the environment. 
 
 
2.2. Impact 
 
Because the level of ambition of the environmental targets in an agreement could be rather low or 
because the targets could be rather vague and qualitative, the degree of application is not the only 
thing that matters when evaluating the performance of an agreement. This leads us to the ‘impact’ 
dimension: did the existence of the agreement lead to a substantial environmental impact? Taking into 
account the environmental impact when assessing the performance of an agreement is crucial because 
it is the environmental impact of the agreement that matters in the end. If environmental voluntary 
agreements are just an institutionalisation of business-as-usual scenarios (see, for example, Börkey and 
Glachant 1998), this will result in a low score for this dimension. 
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Contrary to the application dimension, the assessment of the impact of an agreement is a complicated 
problem. Figure 1 draws a clear picture of the methodological problems that arise (Rietbergen and 
Blok 1999). 
 
 Figure 1: Methodological problems for assessing the impact dimension 
Policy
effect
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First, the environmental improvement due to technological or operational changes in the absence of 
the agreement and other environmental policy instruments is difficult to determine. In other words a 
good and reliable business-as-usual scenario is often lacking. Second, other policy instruments can 
influence the difference between the monitored and the estimated business-as-usual environmental 
improvement. The way we tried to assess the impact dimension is as follows. First, the situation and 
evolution of the environmental target before the agreement existed were studied. Next, a critical 
comparison of this trend and the monitored environmental situation at the end of the agreement was 
made, taking into account the possible effect of other policy instruments and other structural changes, 
like output changes due to changing consumer demands. The fact that the sample of agreements 
studied has different environmental goals, from arranging the collection and recycling of end-of-life 
vehicles in Germany to regulating the reduction of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions by 
the power generation industry in the Netherlands, entails an additional difficulty. This is the problem 
of inter agreement comparison, which will be discussed at the end of this section. 
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2.3. Resource Development 
 
The resource development refers to the improvements in the policy resource base resulting from 
negotiating and implementing the agreement. The policy resource base compromises the prevailing 
institutional network (both formal and informal), the political, economic, legal and cognitive resources 
of the various actors involved in the policy process, the state of relations between these actors; and the 
actors’ perceptions of the scale of the problem, the need for action and the validity of different policy 
instruments. In particular, the resource base includes the state of knowledge of the actors (both 
collectively and individually) encapsulating both the total ‘amount’ of knowledge, and also the 
‘distribution’ of knowledge among the various actors. As such, it can accommodate the important 
informational concepts of shared uncertainties and information asymmetries (Aggeri 1999).  
 
Due to the nebulous character of the policy resource base, it is difficult to identify general evaluation 
criteria for resource development. Nonetheless, there are three aspects of resource development that 
may be expected to have a general relevance: learning, relations between actors and general awareness 
and attitudes. Learning can lead to a reduction in the overall cost of achieving the target set in the 
agreement. An improvement in relations between actors is claimed to be one of the major advantages 
for voluntary agreements over other instruments (European Commission, 1996). Moreover, the fact 
that industry is confronted with its environmental impact when negotiating an agreement can bring a 
positive influence on its general awareness and attitudes along. This dimension clearly reveals the 
importance of the so-called ‘soft-effects’ of learning and awareness building (OECD 1999). 
 
Positive resource development thus includes for example: the improvement of relations between actors 
resulting from increased mutual respect and trust, the generation of new and innovative information 
about the problem and potential solutions and the dissemination of knowledge amongst the actors. As 
such, resource development can reflect either an increase in the total quantity of resources (for 
example a reduction in shared uncertainties), or a decrease in the inequality of existing resource 
distribution between actors (for example a reduction in information asymmetries). 
 
 
2.4. The aggregate performance measure 
 
Each of these three evaluation dimensions (the application, the impact and the resource development) 
is considered relevant for assessing the performance of environmental voluntary agreements. Each 
dimension plays a certain, but different role in the performance of an agreement. Often, there will be 
an interaction between them, although this is not necessary the case. For example, the fact that an 
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agreement has a good application with respect to its environmental target does not necessarily mean 
that there will be an actual impact on the environment. On the other hand, an agreement with a good 
environmental and economic impact can be considered inferior to an agreement with the same impacts 
but with a better development of the resource base. 
 
Of the three dimensions, clearly the impact and the resource development in the end determine the 
performance of an agreement. The application dimension only is too narrow as a judgement base. 
However, it gives a clear picture of the motivation of the actors and it provides a good estimate of the 
impact and the resource development that are more difficult to measure. 
 
Therefore, the application, the impact and the resource development of each agreement were measured 
and aggregated to obtain a total performance score. The assessment of the different evaluation 
dimensions is done by means of a grading scale technique. Therefore a group of statements was set up 
for each evaluation dimension (see table 1).  
 
Table 1: Statements for assessing the aggregated performance 
Evaluation dimension Statements 
Application  Compliance with the environmental performance targets is good. 
 The target did not break down or eroded substantially during its intended life 
span. 
 Compliance with the individual obligations is good. 
Impact  There is a significant improvement on the target environmental variable, 
compared to the business as usual scenario. 
 The application of the agreement is cost-efficient with respect to compliance. 
 The administration cost of the agreement is fairly low. 
Resource development  The agreement led to an important improvement in the attitudes of the parties 
concerning environmental issues. 
 The agreement led to an important improvement in learning. 
 The agreement has led to substantial innovation in policy making in this area. 
 The agreement has led to greater trust and more productive relationships 
between parties. 
 The agreement has generated product- or process-related innovations and/or 
market opportunities. 
 
These statements had to be assessed for each agreement by giving them a grade from 1 to 5, showing 
to what extent the statement is valid. The statements were accompanied by a scoring guide and some 
explanatory notes to enhance the objectiveness of the assessment. To obtain the average performance 
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of each agreement, we have taken the arithmetic mean of the scores on the three evaluation 
dimensions: application, impact and resource development. 
 
In order to enhance the objectiveness of assessing the statements, the following procedure, based on 
the Delphi method, was followed. In each country, a team of two specialists in environmental 
voluntary agreements was selected with the task of studying the selected agreements in their country 
intensively, writing a case study report and assessing the statements. First, each specialist assessed the 
statements individually. Then the scores were compared and discussed in order to give one score on 
each statement. Next, each case study was passed on to a research partner from another country in 
order to check the scores on the statements. The German specialists e.g. controlled the French case 
studies, the German case studies were checked by the Italian specialists and so on. Finally, a 
discussion session on the assessment of the statements between all project partners was organised. 
 
 
2.5. Discussion 
 
It should be emphasised that the main goal of this study is to determine factors that influence the 
performance of environmental voluntary agreements in order to draw relevant policy 
recommendations. To do this we relied on a comparative case study analysis. In order to reach solid 
policy recommendations, the European Commission obliged us to take diverging agreements in the 
sample. The selection of the cases was based on five criteria. First, enough information on the 
agreement was needed. Second, the agreement had to be significant for the environmental problem it 
deals with. Third, the period during which the agreement has been used should be long enough in 
order to enable a performance evaluation. Fourth, the sample must consist of both successful and 
unsuccessful cases. Finally, the economic context of the different industrial sectors involved must be 
diversified.  
 
Of course, the diverging scope of the sample did not make the task of comparing the performance of 
these agreements easier. Questions like how to compare a radical shift in the collection and recycling 
of end-of-life vehicles in Germany to a similar, or why not a minor, reduction of sulphur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxide emissions from the power generation industry in the Netherlands can not be answered 
with the given state of knowledge. Consequently, this kind of intra agreement comparison is not taken 
in account when measuring the performance of the negotiated agreements. Thus when we assessed for 
example the impact of an agreement we only took into account the improvement compared to a 
reliable business-as-usual trend without trying to compare this improvement to the impact of another 
agreement with another environmental target. This sort of inter sector comparison problems can be an 
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interesting subject for future research as it might help policy makers to decide where action is needed 
most urgently. 
 
 
3.  Critical factors for success 
 
After assessing the performance of the agreements, we now focus on the factors explaining the level of 
performance. Knowing these factors and their influence on the performance of environmental 
voluntary agreements is especially interesting for policy makers as it can help them with the 
instrument choice and with the actual implementation of agreements. Five factors are identified. Four 
of these are related to the institutional-economic context wherein an agreement is negotiated and 
applied, the other one is related to the agreement itself. First we turn to the institutional-economic 
context. 
 
 
3.1. The institutional-economic context  
 
Four hypotheses were postulated regarding the relation between the different institutional-economic 
aspects and their expected influence on the performance of the environmental voluntary agreements. 
All of our hypotheses are supported by other theoretical research on this subject (see, for example, 
Alberini and Segerson 2002; Arora and Gangopahdyay 1995; Garvie 1999; Glasbergen 1998; Hansen 
1997; Klok and Kuks 1994; Maxwell at al. 1998; Segerson and Miceli 1998; Van de Peppel and 
Herweijer 1994). Below, the hypotheses are presented accompanied with some explanation. 
 
3.1.1.  The policy hypothesis 
 
“The fact that public environmental policy evolves in a tradition and climate of consensus 
seeking, joint problem solving, mutual respect and trust is a crucial positive factor for the 
performance of environmental voluntary agreements.” 
 
Environmental voluntary agreements can be seen as a sort of a transaction. Transactions thrive best in 
a climate of trust. Such a climate is built on positive experiences in the past. The authorities need to 
trust that the industry will not erode the environmental objectives or cheat by not complying with the 
agreement. The industry must trust that the authorities will not resort to additional regulations. 
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3.2.1.  The instrumental hypothesis 
 
“The fact that public policy makers show the readiness to use alternative policy instruments, as 
a stick behind the door to deal with the environmental problems, in case the negotiated 
agreement fails, is a crucial positive factor for the performance of environmental voluntary 
agreements.” 
 
This hypothesis concentrates on the readiness of the policy makers to use an alternative instrument in 
case of non-compliance to the agreement by the private parties. The readiness of the policy makers 
however has to be combined with the severity of this alternative when applied. When the threat of the 
alternative instrument is credible and this instrument has more stringent or costly consequences for the 
companies involved, they should have a bigger incentive to make the agreement succeed. In this 
regard, ‘speak softly and carry a big stick’ is an old adage.  
 
This hypothesis can be considered as a reformulation of the regulatory gains argument, also called the 
‘stick’ approach, which is used in most of the literature for explaining the existence of voluntary 
approaches (see, for example, Segerson and Miceli 1998). The advantage from the signing of an 
environmental voluntary agreement would consist of the avoided costs of a public regulation aimed at 
addressing the same environmental problem. 
 
3.1.3.  The sector hypothesis 
 
“The fact that the industry involved is homogeneous, has a small number of players and is 
dominated by one or two players, or has a powerful industry association that can speak for all 
its members, is a crucial positive factor for the performance of environmental voluntary 
agreements.” 
 
The structure of the target group can influence the performance of an agreement in the negotiating and 
execution phase. Negotiations will be more efficient if there is a big company or an industrial 
organisation that can speak for the whole sector. A small number of players can also increase the 
degree of application because monitoring will be easier and the possibility of free-riding companies 
diminishes.    
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3.1.4.   The competitive hypothesis 
 
“The fact that industries are close to the final market is a crucial positive factor for the 
performance of environmental voluntary agreements, due to consumer pressure.” 
 
Besides the negative incentives arising from the instrumental hypothesis, polluters can also recognise 
positive incentives to strive for more environmental protection. Literature on voluntary agreements 
calls this the reputation enhancing argument, or the ‘carrot’ approach (see, for example, Börkey and 
Glachant 1998). Voluntary agreements would be an answer to the demand pressure for firm’s 
environmental performance leading to higher demand and profit. The central idea behind this 
hypothesis is that an agreement will be more feasible when the companies have a certain competitive 
incentive vis-à-vis the other companies in the area covered by the agreement, to distinguish 
themselves, for example through a green image. As such, voluntary agreements might be considered a 
part of firms’ public relation activities (Arora and Cason 1996).  
 
Another way of looking at this hypothesis focuses on the increased risk of bad impacts for industries 
performing badly when there is a high degree of closeness between the final markets and consumers. 
Due to the salience of the produced brand, the chance of being criticised increases, with the possible 
effects on both sales to consumers and on the toughness of the provoked responses by authorities.    
 
3.1.5.  Assessing the institutional-economic context 
 
To gain information on the institutional-economic context, we have carried out an analysis using the 
same technique as for the performance evaluation. Different statements on each hypothesis were 
postulated (see table 2) and then judged for each agreement, by giving them a one to five score. 
 
Aggregation resulted in a score for each hypothesis. By these scores, we tried to measure how 
favourable each of the four institutional-economic aspects was with respect to the agreement’s 
performance. A high score for a certain hypothesis meant that the conditions described in the 
hypothesis were valid for this agreement and thus we expect a good performance. 
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  Table 2: Statements for assessing the institutional-economic context 
Hypothesis Statements 
Policy hypothesis  Environmental policy evolves in a tradition of consensus seeking and 
joint problem solving apart from the conclusion of the agreement. 
 Apart from the process leading to the conclusion of the agreement, policy 
making in the area covered by the agreement is characterised by a climate 
of mutual trust. 
 Apart from the process leading to the conclusion of the agreement, the 
private sector(s) covered by the agreement show(s) a clear readiness to 
self-responsibility with respect to the environmental problem. 
Instrumental 
hypothesis 
 The chances that public authorities will use an alternative instrument in 
case of non-success or non-conclusion of the agreement are high. 
 If applied, the alternative instrument has more severe consequences for 
the target group than those resulting from the application of the 
agreement. 
Sector hypothesis  There is already a dominant interest of a major player/a small number of 
players or a powerful and representative industry association in the area 
covered by the agreement. 
 The private parties to the agreement belong to the same industrial sector. 
 The potential for significant free riding between the members of the 
targeted sector covered by the agreement, is low. 
Competitive 
hypothesis 
 Buyers can distinguish the difference in environmental quality 
performance of the firms in the participating sector(s). 
 Buyers value environmental sound products in the area covered by the 
agreement. 
 
 
3.2. The specification of an agreements 
 
Even when all institutional-economic factors are favourable to the conclusion and execution of an 
agreement, success is by no way automatically guaranteed. Success indeed depends also upon the 
creation of a number of internal preconditions. Those internal factors of success are captured under the 
heading of specification. Special attention should be given to the evaluation criteria for the 
specification of negotiated agreements presented in table 3. In practice, it may not be feasible for an 
agreement to compare well against all of the criteria. However, the criteria provide a useful benchmark 
against which to assess the specification of a particular agreement. 
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  Table 3: Evaluation criteria for the specification of a negotiated agreement 
Evaluation criteria Description 
Target The inclusion of a clearly defined and quantified target is crucial for the 
success of an environmental agreement. 
Burden sharing rule An agreement that relies on individual actions by firms to meet a collective 
target is more likely to be successful when accountability is developed to 
individual firms. This is best achieved by the inclusion of an explicit ‘burden 
sharing’ rule, or a mechanism for appointing the collective target.  
Monitoring 
mechanisms 
The inclusion of adequate monitoring mechanisms is crucial for measuring 
the performance against the target. Ideally, the performance of an agreement 
would be monitored using information collected and collated by an 
independent body. 
Additional guarantees 
or sanctions 
The inclusion of additional guarantees or sanctions regarding the achievement 
of targets will considerably enhance the credibility of an agreement. 
Contractual form By providing a clear legal framework, that is enforceable through court 
decisions, a binding contract adds considerable force to a negotiated 
agreement. 
Legal compliance In addition to complying with the provisions of the national law under which 
the agreement falls, it must also comply with the requirements of the EC 
Treaty and its derived legislation. 
General provisions In order to avoid potential confusion and disputes during the operation of the 
agreement, it is important that a number of basic issues are clarified like the 
parties and their respective obligations, the duration of the agreement, the 
conditions under which it can be revised or terminated, the competent 
jurisdiction. 
 
Well-specified agreements are important because they lead to a higher rate of application, impact and 
resource development. A clear description of the obligations of the parties combined with a sanction in 
case of non-compliance leads to a higher degree of application. Better application and more 
demanding objectives improve the impact on the target variables. The policy resource base also will be 
developed more when a credible monitoring mechanism and other reporting activities are included in 
the agreement. This leads us to postulate the following specification hypothesis:  
 
“The fact that the agreement is well-specified, containing all important elements of table 3, is a 
crucial positive factor for the performance of environmental voluntary agreements.” 
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Again statements were postulated (see table 4) and then judged for each agreement. A well-specified 
agreement leads to a high score on these statements, indicating that a successful implementation and 
execution is expected. 
 
  Table 4: Statements for assessing the specification 
Specification 
dimension 
Statements 
Environmental 
performance 
 The agreement contains a well-defined environmental performance objective. 
 The objective represents a meaningful improvement in environmental 
performance 
 The agreement contains a credible mechanism for achieving the environmental 
performance objective 
 The agreement contains a credible system for monitoring performance against 
the specified objective. 
Learning  The agreement contains a clear objective with respect to learning. 
 The agreement contains a credible mechanism to support and encourage 
learning. 
 The agreement contains an adequate monitoring system for co-ordinating 
learning activities. 
Economic 
efficiency 
 The agreement contains a burden-sharing mechanism that is consistent with a 
cost-efficient outcome. 
 The agreement contains a credible mechanism to prevent free riding by 
participants. 
 The agreement does not create any barriers to new entrants. 
 
 
4.  Comparative evaluation 
 
The final goal of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of the factors influencing the 
performance of environmental voluntary agreements based on a comparative evaluation of twelve 
individual case studies. To provide data for this comparative analysis, two agreements were selected in 
Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, France, Germany and the UK, giving us a sample of twelve cases 
(see table 5). Although still limited looked upon from a positive research methodological point of 
view, it is the greatest sample of environmental voluntary agreements ever analysed in a systematic 
way. Moreover, the agreements were concluded in different countries and their respective 
environmental targets cover a wide area of environmental problems. This high diversity among the 
selected agreements gives a higher degree of validity to the conclusions drawn from the comparative 
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case study. Because these case studies had to be cross-compared, they were made up using a common 
case study design that links the data to be collected to the statements that need to be judged. 
 
  Table 5: The selected negotiated agreements 
Abbreviation Country Description of the agreement 
GBAT Germany Agreement to reduce the mercury-content in batteries and to 
collect used batteries separately. 
GELV Germany Agreement to maximise the recycling rate of end-of-life vehicles. 
FCFC France Agreement to eliminate the use of CFCs in the industry. 
FECO France Agreement upon the collection and recycling of packaging waste. 
BBAT Belgium Agreement upon the private separate collection and recycling of 
used batteries. 
BELE Belgium Agreement to reduce the emissions of SO2 and NOX in power 
plants. 
DSO2 The Netherlands Agreement upon the reduction of the SO2-emissions of power 
plants. 
DWHI The Netherlands Agreement upon the take back of worn household appliances by 
their producers. 
IVIC Italy Regional agreement upon the improvement of the environmental 
quality in the province of Vicenza  
IAGI Italy Agreement upon the improvement of gasoline quality 
EFAR UK Agreement upon the collection from farms of waste plastic films 
used in the production. 
EEFF UK Agreement to improve the energy efficiency in the chemical 
industry. 
 
Having assessed all statements and doing the necessary aggregations, we obtained a score on the 
average performance, the specification, the policy style, the threat of an alternative instrument and the 
sector and competitive structure. These scores allowed testing whether there is in fact a positive 
relationship between the favourability of the conditions and the performance of the agreements in our 
sample. This has been done using a graphical representation. We already mentioned that the 
specification and the aspects of the institutional-economic context we studied could be a precondition 
for the performance of voluntary agreements. These aspects therefore functioned as independent 
variables that explained the dependent variable, that is the performance of an agreement. Thus the 
vertical axis measures the performance, the horizontal axis represents the different scores on the 
aspects considered to influence this performance. A trend line showing the relation between the 
independent variable and the performance is included in the figures. The hypotheses postulate that a 
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high score on the independent variables should lead to a successful agreement. So a hypothesis is 
supported if the trend line has a positive slope. 
 
A second way of assessing the hypotheses was done by using Spearman’s rank-order correlation test. 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient, defined between –1 and 1, gives an indication of the 
relationship between two variables. If the coefficient is negative, a negative relationship between the 
two variables exists. With a positive coefficient, a positive relationship exists. A coefficient close to 
zero indicates that there is no discernible relationship between the two variables. The greater the value 
of the coefficient, the more pronounced the relationship between the two variables. It is stressed that 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient gives an indication on the strength of the relationship 
between two variables, but does not allow making conclusions on the causality.  
 
In the correlation test, two hypothesises are postulated and judged. The null hypothesis says there is no 
correlation between the two variables, the alternative hypothesis states that a correlation exists. This 
way, the alternative hypothesis corresponds to the postulated hypothesises concerning the influence of 
the factors for success. In this research project, the null hypothesis was supported if the correlation 
coefficient is below the critical two-tailed rs value at the 0.05 level of significance (rs .05=0.587). If 
on the other hand the correlation coefficient was above 0.587, the null hypothesis has been rejected 
and the hypothesis tested was supported. However, one should keep in mind that because of the 
limited sample outliners can have a significant effect on the value of Spearman’s rank-order 
correlation coefficient and thus on the results of this quantitative analysis. 
 
 
4.1.  The policy hypothesis 
 
Figure 2 shows that except for the BBAT and the IAGI agreement, we can see a quite positive relation 
between the degree of consensus seeking, respect and trust in the policy making process and the 
performance of the agreement. The positive slope of the trend line is strongly affected by these two 
agreements. This brings Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient close to zero (rs=0.059), 
indicating that our hypothesis is rejected within a 95 per cent confidence interval.  
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  Figure 2: The relationship between the policy style and the performance  
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However, the fact that there are no scatter points in the lower right corner, rather confirms our 
hypothesis. This shows that there are no agreements concluded in a favourable policy style, which had 
a low measure of performance. Agreements situated in the upper left corner might be agreements that, 
despite the unfavourable policy climate, are successful because of other beneficial institutional-
economic aspects. It is clear that the policy style is certainly not the only precondition for a successful 
implementation of environmental voluntary agreements. For that reason, other important features for 
successful agreements must exist.   
 
 
4.2.  The instrumental hypothesis 
 
The trend line in figure 3 shows a clear positive relationship. Accordingly, Spearman’s rank-order 
correlation coefficient is quite high (rs=0.668), indicating that the instrumental hypothesis is 
supported. Four agreements were concluded in a context where there was a very strong and severe 
alternative threat (DSO2, BELE, BBAT and IAGI). All those cases were also evaluated as rather 
successful ones. Particularly these agreements support the validity of the instrumental hypothesis. 
Besides these successful agreements there are also two cases, which are assessed with the lowest 
possible grade (FCFC and IVIC). Accordingly, their performance score is lower than average. Again it 
is important to notice that the lower right part of the scatter graph remains almost empty. Here, this 
means that there are no low-performing agreements in the sample when a strong alternative treat was 
present. In the upper left area, we can detect some agreements that again contribute their high 
performance to another aspect. We can conclude by saying that, while a strong alternative threat is not 
necessary, it can clearly contribute to the performance of an agreement. 
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  Figure 3: The relation between the existence of an alternative threat and the 
performance  
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4.3.  The sector hypothesis 
 
Again, a positive trend line and thus a positive relationship between the homogeneity of the sector and 
the performance emerge from figure 4. This hypothesis is also supported by Spaerman’s rank-order 
correlation coefficient test (rs=0.607). Only two agreements break this positive trend, which are the 
British energy efficiency agreement (EEFF) and the French Eco-Emballages agreement (FECO). All 
other agreements seem to be in line with expectations. 
 
  Figure 4: The relation between the sector structure and the performance 
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4.4.  The competitive hypothesis 
 
Whereas the previous three hypotheses seemed to be confirmed, there is less clarity here: the scatter 
points on figure 5 are dispersed throughout the entire graph. Not surprisingly, Spaerman’s rank-order 
correlation coefficient is very low (rs=0.135) and the competitive hypothesis is rejected. The negative 
slope of the trend line indicates that the theoretical idea that firms will be prone to a good 
environmental performance when there is demand pressure from green consumers is not confirmed by 
our agreements.  On the one hand, we have a few agreements concluded with firms in sectors were 
there is demand pressure, that performed badly (DWHI, EFAR, FCFC), and on the other hand, we 
have agreements with a rather good performance in markets where demand pressure was not strong 
(DSO2, BELE, EEFF, GELV). 
 
  Figure 5: The relation between the competitive structure and the performance 
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We can conclude that although the theoretical assumption beyond this hypothesis is quite convincing, 
this is not supported by our analysis. This could be an indication that when firms voluntary undertake 
actions to improve their environmental record, they usually do not go much further than business-as-
usual. The industry’s information advantage over the environmental problem, the alternative 
abatement strategies and their associated costs, enable companies to fool consumers and government 
in believing that they are conscious of environmental problems whereas in reality they are only saying, 
but not doing this (‘window dressing’) (Alberini and Segerson 2002). 
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4.5.  The specification hypothesis 
 
Figure 6 clearly shows a positive relationship between the specification of an agreement and its 
performance. Spaeman’s rank-order correlation coefficient is high (rs=0.839) and supports the 
specification hypothesis. There are no agreements situated in the upper left corner or in the lower right 
corner. This shows what we already expected: the degree of specification is an important internal 
precondition for the performance of an agreement.   
 
Figure 6: The relation between the specification and the performance 
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4.6.  The combined institutional-economic context 
 
When looking at the different hypotheses separately, we already mentioned that the absence of the 
expected relationship between one institutional-economic aspect and the performance of an agreement 
can be due to the fact that this performance is positively or negatively influenced by another aspect, 
diluting the influence of the first. The same holds for the specification of an agreement. Looking at the 
different hypotheses simultaneously can bring us insight in the possible existence of a ‘combined 
(un)favourable institutional-economic context’. This has been done by defining the combined context 
as the arithmetic mean of the scores on the five hypotheses. Again a graphical representation with the 
trend line is presented in figure 7.  
 
A clear positive relationship emerges. Also Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient (rs=0.783) 
supports the idea that a favourable institutional-economic context is positively correlated with the 
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performance of negotiated agreements. This leads us to conclude that the favourability of each of the 
institutional-economic aspects we studied is not a necessary condition for the performance of an 
environmental voluntary agreement. Rather it is the combined context that determines the performance 
of the agreements studied. The negative influence of an unfavourable factor can be totally outweighed 
by the positive influence of another aspect of the socio-economic context. 
 
  Figure 7: The relation between the combined institutional-economic context and the 
performance 
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5.  Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to gain insight on the factors leading to success or failure of environmental 
voluntary agreements. To do this we relied on a comparative case study covering twelve agreements 
from six different European countries.  
 
First, a measure for the performance of voluntary agreements was developed. In our view, the 
performance of an agreement is a mixture of the degree of good application of the agreement, the 
degree of impact the agreement has on the environment and on the economic efficiency and the degree 
of resource development that occurs while negotiating and implementing the agreement. It is 
emphasised that taking into account only the application of the agreement would result in a very 
narrow definition of performance. Moreover, it is the impact on the environment and the development 
of the policy resource base the agreement brought about that matters in the end. 
 
The theoretical as well as the empirical research point to a number of internal and external factors that 
influence this performance. Four external preconditions for success were identified: the general policy 
style, the readiness to use severe alternative instruments in case of non-compliance with the 
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agreement, the potential of the sector to negotiate and to act as one collective actor and the potential 
for market success triggered of by the implementation of the agreement. Next to these external factors 
related to the institutional-economic context wherein a voluntary agreement is used, the specification 
of an agreement is considered to be an internal factor influencing the performance. 
 
In the cases studied, we found evidence that all factors could be important for enabling the success of 
an agreement. Only the evidence for the competitive hypothesis is less convincing for the twelve cases 
studied, although the theoretical arguments in favour of this hypothesis are quite robust. Notices that 
this could be an indication of the low (or wrong) motivation companies have when announcing 
voluntary actions to strive for a better environmental performance. 
 
It should be emphasised that taken individually each of the factors is not as such a conditio sine qua 
non for the success of an environmental voluntary agreement. Rather it is the combination of the 
success factors that is ultimately decisive for the performance of an agreement. This is important 
because some of the success factors – the sector structure and to a large extend the competitive 
structure – are independent factors that cannot be manipulated by the government. These factors 
should play a crucial role in the instrument choice of policy makers. But even if these factors are not 
favourable to expect a successful agreement, the use of this instrument should not be ruled out in 
advance. This because the other three factors – the general policy style, the specification and certainly 
the alternative instrument – are under the control of the policy maker and can thus be manipulated to 
create a favourable environment for a voluntary agreement. These factors should play a crucial role 
when negotiating and implementing an agreement. So, next to the ex post analysis carried out in this 
paper, the questions used in this study could be used as a quick checklist to ex ante assess whether or 
not the environment is potentially favourable for the conclusion of a successful environmental 
voluntary agreement. 
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